WikiDiscuss

A brief general discussion to make some context here. One thing cannot both be and not be in the same respect and at the same time. So, when we seem to have a case that contradicts that we have to make a distinction, either in the subject or in the predicate. So, given that John was here yesterday and is not today, we can avoid problems ether by saying "John is here yesterday and is not here today" (taking "John" as a constant directly involved in the situation) or by saying "The yesterday slice of John is here but the today slice is not" (taking John as involved only through his parts, not as a whole. We might of course say "John is such that his yesteday slice is here and his today slice is not" leaving "John" a constant but only his slices doing the work.) The corresponding situations for Mr. Rabbit eating and not are "Mr. Rabbit is a-eating and not b-eating" (or some such thing) and "The a manifestation of Mr. Rabbit is eating but the b-manifestation is not." We can, of
course, generalize on on "John" in any transparent context (and, indeed, in those on "slice of John") but not in opaque contexts, since John might not exist and certainly his yesterday slice might not. Mr Rabbit, on the other hand, as a kind in intension or a property or whatever always exists and so can always be generalized on: to "something" or "some rabbit kind" or.... . But, like slices, manifestations can not be generalized out of opaque contexts. So from "I want Mr. Rabbit" we can presumably generalize to "There is something (indeed, a rabbit kind) such that I want it." But "I want Mr. Rabbit" does not say the same thing as "I want a rabbit;" that requires "I want a manifestation of Mr. Rabbit." And from this we can get "There is something (some rabbit kind) such that I want a manifestation of it." My problem is to know which of these is what {mi djica lo ractu} means and, having said that, how do I say the other. The situation is easy in old Lojban (up to possible
needed predicates: {mi djica tu'a le ka ractu} (taking {ka}as the nearest thing to -kind, for the moment) whence {su'o da (poi ka ractu) zo'u mi djica da} and {mi djica tu'a lo ractu}, whence, by a longer route perhaps, {su'o da (poi ka ractu) mi djica tu'a lo ckaji da}. The new {mi djica lo ractu} seems to fit somewhere in between — or maybe mix parts of one with parts of the other. (Incidentally, if "I want Mr. Rabbit" is not meant in some weird sense, it seems to me always false since I always have Mr. Rabbit — and all other abstractions — as much as I can.)
R: See above.

S: But quantification is also over kinds (apparently and I don't mind much) and you seem to want to do both at once — or rather shift back and forth without any indication. In particular, {lo ractu} seems to shift meaning from Mr.Rabbit to a manifestation of Mr Rabbit at your whim. Please give me a rule for figuring out when it is which.

T: What is the proper case: "something" or even "something which is a rabbit kind," I suppose. This clearly goes through. But the interesting case is of a manifestation and there the generalization leaves an reference to manifestations which is not accounted fgor in your examples, so far as I can see. UNless, of course, we are back to the two — undistinguished — meaning of predicates, where the reference to the manifestation is buried in the predicate when it is convenient to do so. The third point is the move from "Mr. Rabbit x's and Mr.Rabbit y's" to Mr. Rabbit x's and y's" Again, this will work (like negation transparency) only if the predicates have been modified to absorb the reference to the different manifestations (and it would be nice to make that absorption explicit at least — aand better, of course, to make it nominal rather than predicative).

pc

Jorge Llambías <jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar> wrote:

R:An example of an ambiguous sentence with the proposed {lo}
would help clarify matters. From what you say I don't see
how the proposed {lo} is ambiguous.

pc:
> O:But MR.Rabbit is said to be the same over spatially discrete parts, not
> merely temporal slices and that is markedly different from John: we talk --
> when it is necessary to avoid confusion or contradiction — about the parts
> of John, not merely John, but Mr.Rabbit talk is always about Mr. Rabbit
> simpliciter, not about his parts or manifestations or whatever.

S:Quantification is over the instances. We can talk about them
when we need or want to.

> Q: But {lo ractu} does not behave like a constant term — or at least you
> keep refusing to admit ordinary inferences involving constants with respect
> to it: generalization, negation transparency, apparently subject raising over
> compounds, and the like do none of them apply to {lo}, but all do to {la},
> say.

T:Generalization to the proper general case does apply to {lo}. It
does not generalize to instances, but then it is not an instance.
Negation transparency does apply to {lo}.
I don't quite understand the third point, but if it applies
to {la} it probably does apply to {lo} as well.

mu'o mi'e xorxes