WikiDiscuss

Posted by stevo on Thu 10 of Aug, 2006 21:53 GMT posts: 381

In a message dated 8/10/2006 1:56:45 PM Central Standard Time,
jjllambias@gmail.com writes:

> Of course. In that case, "Bob" will be the name of a li-abstraction,
> there is nothing wrong with that. You can also have li-abstractions
> as values of variables, and of course {lo namcu} refers to a li-abstraction
> too. The point is that anything that fills a place that requires a
> li-abstraction
> has to refer to a li-abstraction. This is not about the form that the sumti
> there can have but about the type of value that the sumti there can refer to.
>

What's a "li-abstraction"? Isn't "li" a gadri, like "le" and "lo", and not
an abstraction like "nu" and "za'i"?

The abstraction closest in meaning to "li" that I can see is "ni", the amount
abstraction.

stevo

On 8/10/06, MorphemeAddict@wmconnect.com <MorphemeAddict@wmconnect.com> wrote:
> What's a "li-abstraction"? Isn't "li" a gadri, like "le" and "lo", and not
> an abstraction like "nu" and "za'i"?

While it's not an "abstraction" as we usually use the term in Lojban,
any number can also be an "abstraction".

The term we should probably be using is "sumti restriction".

--
Theodore Reed (treed/bancus)
www.surreality.us

On 8/10/06, MorphemeAddict@wmconnect.com <MorphemeAddict@wmconnect.com> wrote:
> What's a "li-abstraction"?

Mainly numbers, but there are other things such as dates and clock-times
that are li-abstractions in Lojban too.

> Isn't "li" a gadri, like "le" and "lo",

Yes. Not exactly alike because they are in different selma'o, but they are
all gadri. All gadri can be used to refer to abstractions.

>and not
> an abstraction like "nu" and "za'i"?

{nu} and {za'i} are usually classed as abstractors in Lojban, i.e. members
of selma'o NU. (They may be abstractions too in the sense that any word
could be considered an abstraction. Perhaps we should also include
text-abstractions as another sumti class to consider.)

mu'o mi'e xorxes

Posted by stevo on Thu 17 of Aug, 2006 18:12 GMT posts: 381

In a message dated 8/17/2006 9:35:01 AM Central Standard Time,
jjllambias@gmail.com writes:

> > First please correct — as I have done — the first claim
> > to read "If you want a dog, you are in luck because dogs exist."
>
> Why should dogs existing be enough to satisfy my want of a dog?
> Do you think that existence of X is always a sufficient condition for
> satisfaction of a want of X? If you don't think that (and I know you don't
> think that) then why say that the fact that dogs exist means I'm in luck?
>

You'd really be out of luck if you wanted a dog and they didn't exist. So
the fact that they exist means that at least part of the necessary conditions
are fulfilled. It's hardly a sufficient condition though.

stevo

Posted by JohnCowan on Thu 17 of Aug, 2006 18:32 GMT posts: 149

MorphemeAddict@wmconnect.com scripsit:

> You'd really be out of luck if you wanted a dog and they didn't exist. So
> the fact that they exist means that at least part of the necessary conditions
> are fulfilled. It's hardly a sufficient condition though.

Quite right. Such situations are commonplace, however; you may want a pair of
(your) clean black socks, but then you find out they're all in the wash.

--
Normally I can handle panic attacks on my own; John Cowan <cowan@ccil.org>
but panic is, at the moment, a way of life. http://www.ccil.org/~cowan

Posted by pycyn on Fri 18 of Aug, 2006 00:27 GMT posts: 2388

> In a message dated 8/17/2006 9:35:01 AM Central Standard Time,
> jjllambias@gmail.com writes:
>
>
> > > First please correct — as I have done — the first claim
> > > to read "If you want a dog, you are in luck because dogs exist."
> >
> > Why should dogs existing be enough to satisfy my want of a dog?
> > Do you think that existence of X is always a sufficient condition for
> > satisfaction of a want of X? If you don't think that (and I know you don't
> > think that) then why say that the fact that dogs exist means I'm in luck?
> >
>
> You'd really be out of luck if you wanted a dog and they didn't exist. So
> the fact that they exist means that at least part of the necessary conditions
> are fulfilled. It's hardly a sufficient condition though.

This is the point: since all you want is just a dog — nothing special about it — an existing dog
oughtto be sufficient. Since it is, you want something more, regardless of what you say.

Posted by pycyn on Fri 18 of Aug, 2006 00:32 GMT posts: 2388

> MorphemeAddict@wmconnect.com scripsit:
>
> > You'd really be out of luck if you wanted a dog and they didn't exist. So
> > the fact that they exist means that at least part of the necessary conditions
> > are fulfilled. It's hardly a sufficient condition though.
>
> Quite right. Such situations are commonplace, however; you may want a pair of
> (your) clean black socks, but then you find out they're all in the wash.
>
That is, what you wanted was to have your clean black socks available to wear, which you shortened
somewhat in stating your want.

Posted by JohnCowan on Fri 18 of Aug, 2006 01:46 GMT posts: 149

John E Clifford scripsit:

> > Quite right. Such situations are commonplace, however; you may want
> > a pair of (your) clean black socks, but then you find out they're
> > all in the wash.
> >
> That is, what you wanted was to have your clean black socks available
> to wear, which you shortened somewhat in stating your want.

My point was that if all your black socks are dirty, then the desire
for *clean* black socks is unsatisfiable *for the same reason* that the
desire for a unicorn is unsatisfiable, though less permanently so.

--
John Cowan cowan@ccil.org http://ccil.org/~cowan
Nobody expects the RESTifarian Inquisition! Our chief weapon is
surprise ... surprise and tedium ... tedium and surprise ....
Our two weapons are tedium and surprise ... and ruthless disregard
for unpleasant facts.... Our three weapons are tedium, surprise, and
ruthless disregard ... and an almost fanatical devotion to Roy Fielding....

Posted by pycyn on Fri 18 of Aug, 2006 14:46 GMT posts: 2388

This discussion has - as usual, unfortunately — gotten off the point and into a vatriety of
irrelevancies or downright errors.

The issue was whether to have those little "preferred argument type" parentheses on some places.
The general point was that, while not obligatory, the indications were useful, espexcially when 1)
they were required by the obvious sense of the predicate and 2) when the English idiom was
markedly different. The latter case, I maintained was especially important where following the
English idiom led to results that went against logic, that is appeared to allow moves that were
invalid. In keeping with that I recommended putting thee suggestions in even more places where
following English led to these kinds of error.

That led to a discussion of whether the usually valid arguemnts were in fact invalid in these
cases. Xorxes, with his usual ingenuity presented a number of cases in which both premise and
conslusion were true and and explanation in terms of how universes of discourse changed over the
course of a conversation. And I tried to show both that the supposed cases where the rules were
not invalidated were not genuinely such cases and that the universe of discourse did not change in
the way proposed.

Both of these discussions turn out to be irrelevant to the issue. The heart of the issue is not
how universes change but in what universe (or stage of the universe) a sentences is evaluated.
For example, is the sentence "I want a unicorn" evaluated before or after the universe haw been
expanded to contain the unicorn I want. The answer is pretty clearly "Before," since we want the
claim to be sometimes true and, in the universe as expanded it is never the case that I want a
unicorn since the expansion is exactly to get me the unicorn I want. Once that issue is settled
the moves to make the aruments appear OK fade: in the universe before expansion, while it may be
true that I want a unicorn, it is not guaranteed that there is a unicorn I want or any unicorn at
all. Similarly, even if, in the universe in which the dream is described rather than the universe
of the dream, any unicorn is a centaur and any centaur a unicorn (because there are neither), it
does not follow that, if I dream of a unicorn, I dream of a centaur. And the evaluation of both
claims takes place in the unexpanded universe, since in the expanded universe I am not dreaming or
at least not of the thing that defines that universe. Now, it is the case that some pairs of
premise and conclusion can be plausibly argued to be both true. But this, of course, does not
show that the argument form is valid. On the other hand, just one case of true premise and false
conclusion show that the form is invalid and there seems to be such cases readily to hand.

So, it does seem to be useful to use a different idiom from the English in those places, to avoid
te appearnce that the rules applied. The Lojban suggestion has been to use abstractions. With
abstractions in those places the rules go through without a hitch (although the identity of
abstractions is not always what one might like). Further, as xorxes has demonstrated, the
satisfaction of a want and the like always involve some abstraction realized and we might as well
say what that abstraction is rather than leaving it entirely to context.

On 8/18/06, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> The heart of the issue is not how universes change but in what universe
> (or stage of the universe) a sentences is evaluated.

Here you start mixing worlds, where things take place, with domain of
discourse, which has referents as its members. One issue is how the
domain of discourse changes as the discourse progresses, and another
issue is in what worlds do the members of the domain of discourse exist.
In the above sentence you start using "universe" for "domain of discourse"
and then switch to using "universe" for "world".

> For example, is the sentence "I want a unicorn" evaluated before or
> after the universe haw been expanded to contain the unicorn I want.

It's evaluated after the domain of discourse has been expanded to contain
unicorns as a member. There is never any "the unicorn I want" at stake,
because the reference is to unicorns in general, not to any particular
unicorn. (There is a reading in which it means "I want a certain unicorn",
but presumably that is not the intended reading here.)

> The answer is pretty clearly "Before," since we want the
> claim to be sometimes true and, in the universe as expanded it is never
> the case that I want a unicorn since the expansion is exactly to get me
> the unicorn I want.

Here you are talking about expanding the world where things exist rather
than the domain of discourse which contains the referents of referring terms.
That's odd, because utterances don't expand the world in that way. (The
only sense I can think of in which an utterance expands a world is in that
before the utterance was made the utterance did not exist in the world, and
after it is made, the utterance does exist. Perhaps performatives have the
power of expanding the world in some sense too.) A claim is not true
or false in a domain of discourse. It is true or false in a world, which is
not expanded in any relevant sense by uttering "I want a unicorn".
The world in this case is the real world, and in the real world I exist
and unicorns don't exist. The predicate "want" is true, in the real world,
if the referent of "I", which exists in the world, and the referent of
"unicorns",
which happens not to exist in the world, are related by the predicate "want".
There is no need for the two referents being related by a predicate to exist
in the world where the utterance is made. In plenty of cases they are even
required to exist in different worlds.

> Once that issue is settled
> the moves to make the aruments appear OK fade: in the universe before
> expansion, while it may be true that I want a unicorn, it is not guaranteed
> that there is a unicorn I want or any unicorn at all.

But the world is not relevantly expanded by the utterance. Only the domain
of discourse may be expanded. And the claim is never evaluated in a domain
of discourse, it is evaluated in a world. We don't need any guarantee that
any referent exist in any world. Existence in a world, if required at all
for the evaluation, is something that must be evaluated independently
of the membership of the referent in the domain of discourse.

> Similarly, even if, in the universe in which the dream is described rather
> than the universe of the dream, any unicorn is a centaur and any centaur
> a unicorn (because there are neither), it does not follow that, if I dream
> of a unicorn, I dream of a centaur.

In the world in which the dream is described, even if no unicorn exists
and no centaur exists, a unicorn is not a centaur. For "a = b" to be true
in a world it is not necessary that a and b exist in that world. And saying
that all things that don't exist in a given world are thereby the same thing
in that world seems just wrong. All that is required for "a = b" to be true in
a world is that "a" and "b" have the same referent in the domain of discourse
of the utterance, which may include (and usually does include) things that
don't exist in the world in which the utterance is made.

mu'o mi'e xorxes

Posted by pycyn on Fri 18 of Aug, 2006 21:12 GMT posts: 2388

> On 8/18/06, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > The heart of the issue is not how universes change but in what universe
> > (or stage of the universe) a sentences is evaluated.
>
> Here you start mixing worlds, where things take place, with domain of
> discourse, which has referents as its members. One issue is how the
> domain of discourse changes as the discourse progresses, and another
> issue is in what worlds do the members of the domain of discourse exist.
> In the above sentence you start using "universe" for "domain of discourse"
> and then switch to using "universe" for "world".

No, I meant universe of discourse throughout. One of the main points of ahving a universe of
discourse is to determine whether sentences are true or false in it. And it is always in some
such universe that sentences are evaluated — even if the universe is just "the real world" (or
the universe associated with it, if you will).

>
> > For example, is the sentence "I want a unicorn" evaluated before or
> > after the universe haw been expanded to contain the unicorn I want.
>
> It's evaluated after the domain of discourse has been expanded to contain
> unicorns as a member. There is never any "the unicorn I want" at stake,
> because the reference is to unicorns in general, not to any particular
> unicorn. (There is a reading in which it means "I want a certain unicorn",
> but presumably that is not the intended reading here.)

Well, no. The whole thing about unicorns comes in exactly in evaluating the sentence. "I want a
unicorn" is true just in case I have a psychological lack such that, if I were to have a unicorn
(suppose) the lack would disappear. So, yes, the unicorn I want does enter in, or at least a
unicorn that I get does. That unicorn is, however, in another universe, counterfactual to this
one, one in which unicorns exist and I get one. But it comes up on for evaluating the want claim
in this universe. Once that is settled, the unicorn plays no role in this universe. Or need not
-- we can always bring it in, if we want 9and the others agree).

> > The answer is pretty clearly "Before," since we want the
> > claim to be sometimes true and, in the universe as expanded it is never
> > the case that I want a unicorn since the expansion is exactly to get me
> > the unicorn I want.
>
> Here you are talking about expanding the world where things exist rather
> than the domain of discourse which contains the referents of referring terms.

Ther is nothing here about existing, only about being in a universe. The point is that the
referring term "a unicorn" (if indeed it is a referring term) refers to a thing in a different
universe from the one in which the want claim is evaluated (indeed, one that come into
consideration just to evaluate that claim.

> That's odd, because utterances don't expand the world in that way.

Well, we agree about something at least.

> (The
> only sense I can think of in which an utterance expands a world is in that
> before the utterance was made the utterance did not exist in the world, and
> after it is made, the utterance does exist. Perhaps performatives have the
> power of expanding the world in some sense too.)

They do: they create rights and duties at least.

> A claim is not true
> or false in a domain of discourse.

That is the only place it can be.

It is true or false in a world, which is

I take it "world" here means the extension of the predicate "exists" or some such thing in some
universe.

> not expanded in any relevant sense by uttering "I want a unicorn".
> The world in this case is the real world, and in the real world I exist
> and unicorns don't exist. The predicate "want" is true, in the real world,
> if the referent of "I", which exists in the world, and the referent of
> "unicorns",
> which happens not to exist in the world, are related by the predicate "want".
> There is no need for the two referents being related by a predicate to exist
> in the world where the utterance is made. In plenty of cases they are even
> required to exist in different worlds.

To my astonishment, I agree with almost everything you say. It is irrelevant, of course, but it
is nice to have some concord. Yes, mentioning things do not call them into existence nor do a
wanter and a wanted have to exist in the same world (that is part of the reason there is a problem
with expressing wants). But, of course, I didn't say anything against that — indeed, I didn't
say anything about that.

I think, from what you have said, that you think that sentences aren't evaluated in universe of
discourse. But they have to be. A universe of dsiscourse is a full interpretation and it has to
be, if descriptions are use, since we need to know the extensions of all the predicates and the
identifications of all the objects and so on. Otherwise, adding a unicorm=n makes no sense: it is
either a new thing or an old one, but in any case it has to be something that is in the extesnion
iof unicorn. And, of course, the extensions of all the predicates and the identities of all the
objects is exactly what is needed to evaluate a sentence. I think that you think a universe of
discourse is just a bunch of things with perhaps labels attached, but that is a totally inadequate
notion for even minimal use (keeping track of what is being talked about say). And if you get
more, you get an evaluator of sentences.

> > Once that issue is settled
> > the moves to make the aruments appear OK fade: in the universe before
> > expansion, while it may be true that I want a unicorn, it is not guaranteed
> > that there is a unicorn I want or any unicorn at all.
>
> But the world is not relevantly expanded by the utterance. Only the domain
> of discourse may be expanded.

But notice that I was talking about the universe, the domain, not about the world at all.

> And the claim is never evaluated in a domain
> of discourse, it is evaluated in a world.

It has to be evaluated in a domain if at all. There is no rwequirement in this sort of evaluation
that the things involved exist, only that they are available for fariables and referrers.

>We don't need any guarantee that
> any referent exist in any world. Existence in a world, if required at all
> for the evaluation, is something that must be evaluated independently
> of the membership of the referent in the domain of discourse.

Well, actually, presumably what exists and what does not is also decided in the domain, since we
can certaily make reference to "an existing water buffalo" (or unicorn for that matter)and so we
needs must have that much of an evaluation done.

> > Similarly, even if, in the universe in which the dream is described rather
> > than the universe of the dream, any unicorn is a centaur and any centaur
> > a unicorn (because there are neither), it does not follow that, if I dream
> > of a unicorn, I dream of a centaur.
>
> In the world in which the dream is described, even if no unicorn exists
> and no centaur exists, a unicorn is not a centaur. For "a = b" to be true
> in a world it is not necessary that a and b exist in that world.

Or, as this case points out, even for them to be in the universe of discourse. I am not sure just
what the counterfactual for dreams is like (there are several interesting but no convincing
stories) but I am pretty sure that some such line is involved, that is that recourse is made to
some counterfactual universe.

> And saying
> that all things that don't exist in a given world are thereby the same thing
> in that world seems just wrong. All that is required for "a = b" to be true in
> a world is that "a" and "b" have the same referent in the domain of discourse
> of the utterance, which may include (and usually does include) things that
> don't exist in the world in which the utterance is made.

Well, since the claim was about universes, I suppose that this just makes my point: in a universe
in which there are no unicorns and no centaurs, the universal claim "Everything is a unicorn just
in case it is a centaur" clearly holds and that is what is needed for identity.