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WikiDiscuss


posts: 2388
These are clearer than the realis: the attached sentence is believed not to be true and its truth is somehow the object of an attitude.
posts: 2388

Oughtn't {ei} be for laying an ob on someone — whether authoritatively or not — to match the other forms in the neighborhood?



posts: 1912


pc:
> Oughtn't {ei} be for laying an ob on someone — whether authoritatively or
> not — to match the other forms in the neighborhood?

I think it reduces to that in the case where the second person is the
agent: {ei do klama}, "it ought to be the case that you go", i.e.
"you ought to go", but I think {ei} is more general, as it works
even for non-agentive situations. For example:

eipei zo ei tutci lo nu te bilga da de
Oughtn't {ei} be for laying an ob on someone?

mu'o mi'e xorxes




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posts: 2388

Nice example! I think that is most of what I meant by nonauthoritative laying on, now that I look at it.

Jorge Llambías <jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar> wrote:
pc:
> Oughtn't {ei} be for laying an ob on someone — whether authoritatively or
> not — to match the other forms in the neighborhood?

I think it reduces to that in the case where the second person is the
agent: {ei do klama}, "it ought to be the case that you go", i.e.
"you ought to go", but I think {ei} is more general, as it works
even for non-agentive situations. For example:

eipei zo ei tutci lo nu te bilga da de
Oughtn't {ei} be for laying an ob on someone?

mu'o mi'e xorxes




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Re: BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
These are clearer than the realis: the attached sentence is believed not to be true and its truth is somehow the object of an attitude.



posts: 953

From the section:

> .ai nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti)

> ai nai changed from rejection / refusal (which is i'a nai) to unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness.

This is at odds with both the CLL, the cmavo list, and usage. You should change it back to rejection/refusal.

-arj

> > .ai nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti)
>
> > ai nai changed from rejection / refusal (which is i'a nai) to unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness.
>
> This is at odds with both the CLL, the cmavo list, and usage. You should change it back to rejection/refusal.
>
> -arj

What about compositionality?

rejection/refusal is the opposite of acceptance/accession/consent, not the
opposite of intent/purpose/design.

Do you have examples of usage where {ainai} is used for rejection/refusal?

>From what I can see, it has been used to show lack of intent:
"ainai X" = "I have no intention of doing X" which really means "I have
the intention of not doing X." In some cases, this could constitute refusal,
if it comes after a request or suggestion or command that I do X, but in
such cases {vi'o nai} would be more appropriate.

Do you think this is an inappropriate use of {ainai}:

.ai nai do pu se xrani
I didn't mean for you to get hurt.

If so, what do you take the Lojban to mean, and how would you express
the English in Lojban?

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388



> > > .ai nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express
> unintentionality / accidentality /
> unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti)
> >
> > > ai nai changed from rejection / refusal
> (which is i'a nai) to unintentionality /
> accidentality / unplannedness.
> >
> > This is at odds with both the CLL, the cmavo
> list, and usage. You should change it back to
> rejection/refusal.
> >
> > -arj
>
> What about compositionality?

Vastly overrated — when it makes for useless
definitions. In this case, however, once we get
past (I am not sure I have) the idea that one can

  • express* intentionality or its absence, this

would seem to be a natural (and rejection, which
clearly can be expressed, is covered).

> rejection/refusal is the opposite of
> acceptance/accession/consent, not the
> opposite of intent/purpose/design.
>
> Do you have examples of usage where {ainai} is
> used for rejection/refusal?
>
> >From what I can see, it has been used to show
> lack of intent:
> "ainai X" = "I have no intention of doing X"
> which really means "I have
> the intention of not doing X." In some cases,
> this could constitute refusal,
> if it comes after a request or suggestion or
> command that I do X, but in
> such cases {vi'o nai} would be more
> appropriate.
>
> Do you think this is an inappropriate use of
> {ainai}:
>
> .ai nai do pu se xrani
> I didn't mean for you to get hurt.

Probably, since the English *states* my
non-intention, not *express* it (and, again, can
it really be expressed?)
> If so, what do you take the Lojban to mean, and
> how would you express
> the English in Lojban?

Approximately "Oops, did that hurt you?" though
this contains a number of other things as well --
acceptance of some responsibility and an apology,
at least — but very weakly.

{mi na purpla lo nu do se xrani}, though I am not
wild about {purpla} and miss again the "x does y
intending to do z" of Philosophy (several
philosophically interesting terms got cut out
early in the vocabulary building process and
reasonable replacements, though promised, have
never actually appeared).


posts: 2388


> >
> > Do you think this is an inappropriate use of
> > {ainai}:
> >
> > .ai nai do pu se xrani
> > I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
>
> Probably, since the English *states* my
> non-intention, not *express* it (and, again,
> can
> it really be expressed?)
> > If so, what do you take the Lojban to mean,
> and
> > how would you express
> > the English in Lojban?
>
> Approximately "Oops, did that hurt you?" though
> this contains a number of other things as well
> --
> acceptance of some responsibility and an
> apology,
> at least — but very weakly.
>
> {mi na purpla lo nu do se xrani}, though I am
> not
> wild about {purpla} and miss again the "x does
> y
> intending to do z" of Philosophy (several
> philosophically interesting terms got cut out
> early in the vocabulary building process and
> reasonable replacements, though promised, have
> never actually appeared).
{mi se snuti lo nu do se xrani} is not much
better and works not at all for more detailed work.


On 8/7/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > Do you think this is an inappropriate use of
> > {ainai}:
> >
> > .ai nai do pu se xrani
> > I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
>
> Probably, since the English *states* my
> non-intention, not *express* it

The English probably both states and expresses it.
It is difficult to disentangle statements about oneself
from expressions, and in English we often express
something by stating something about ourselves.
Saying "I'm sorry", for example is a common
way of expressing that one is sorry, even if it also
makes the statement that one is sorry. Stating that
something is the case is not incompatible with
expressing something in the same act.

> (and, again, can
> it really be expressed?)

Why not? As you show below even more clearly, saying
"oops" is often a way to express unintentionality, this time
without making the corresponding statement.

> Approximately "Oops, did that hurt you?"

Or "Oops, you got hurt!".

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 953

On Sun, 7 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:

>>> .ai nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti)
>>
>>> ai nai changed from rejection / refusal (which is i'a nai) to unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness.
>>
>> This is at odds with both the CLL, the cmavo list, and usage. You should change it back to rejection/refusal.
>>
>> -arj
>
> What about compositionality?
>
> rejection/refusal is the opposite of acceptance/accession/consent, not the
> opposite of intent/purpose/design.

Rejection/refusal may not be the best keywords, but it's the best I can
think of. What would you call the intention of not doing something?

> Do you have examples of usage where {ainai} is used for rejection/refusal?

Yes, from the IRC corpus:

Examples that support my interpretation:
17:01 <fracture> .ainai mi na gunka ca le pavdei
17:01 <fracture> .ui
17:01 <fracture> sa
17:01 <fracture> .ainai mi gunka ca le pavdei

21 Jun 2004 18:23:28 <fracture> .i .ainai curmi lonu citka lo titnanba .i slari nanba po'o

25 Dec 2004 11:33:28 <Broca> ainai mi bebna


06 May 2005 17:39:13 <Broca> ainai mi jmina lo valsi poi mi finti

Examples that support your definition:
None found.

Uncertain examples:
06:46 <bancus> la kolas: .i .ainai.o'o mi na bazi cliva .i do pu
xlagalfi le sidbo pe le sodva .i do pu zbasu le dukse xlali selckasu le
sakta selpinxe poi ro le prenu cu zmanei ke'a .i xu do djuno le du'u lo
bloti xukmrkafin cu vindu

22 May 2004 14:04:21 <Broca> iaru'e do pu xusra le du'u zo do'e tolplixau 22 May 2004 14:04:34 <Broca> i e'o ko skicu le mukti

22 May 2004 14:05:54 <rlpowell> .ainai na go'i
22 May 2004 14:06:29 <rlpowell> mi xusra le du'u lo jbopre cu jai to'e dukse fai le nu pilno zo do'e


>> From what I can see, it has been used to show lack of intent:
> "ainai X" = "I have no intention of doing X" which really means "I have
> the intention of not doing X."

Totally agreed. But that is not a possible reading of your current
proposal, as far as I can tell.

> In some cases, this could constitute refusal,
> if it comes after a request or suggestion or command that I do X, but in
> such cases {vi'o nai} would be more appropriate.
>
> Do you think this is an inappropriate use of {ainai}:
>
> .ai nai do pu se xrani
> I didn't mean for you to get hurt.

Yes, I think it's about as strange as using "ei" in a past tense sentence.
If you removed the "pu" I would translate it as "I'll see to it that you
don't get hurt."

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
<Rad> NEI! IKKE GI MEG LINK! TENK FOR MEG!


On 8/7/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
>
> Rejection/refusal may not be the best keywords, but it's the best I can
> think of. What would you call the intention of not doing something?

Intention.

> > Do you have examples of usage where {ainai} is used for rejection/refusal?
>
> Yes, from the IRC corpus:
>
> Examples that support my interpretation:
> 17:01 <fracture> .ainai mi na gunka ca le pavdei
> 17:01 <fracture> .ui
> 17:01 <fracture> sa
> 17:01 <fracture> .ainai mi gunka ca le pavdei

That's a refusal/rejection only if in response to someone suggesting or
asking or ordering that he work today, but then vi'onai would be better.
Without more context, I would say it was meant as just
{ai mi na gunka ca le pavdei}.


> 21 Jun 2004 18:23:28 <fracture> .i .ainai curmi lonu citka lo titnanba .i slari nanba po'o

Same here.

> 25 Dec 2004 11:33:28 <Broca> ainai mi bebna


Was that meant as "I reject the implication that I'm silly" or something
like that? If so, then this should have been {ienai}. It could also mean
"I'm not trying to be silly", but I suppose you didn't mean it like that,
or it would support my definition.

> 06 May 2005 17:39:13 <Broca> ainai mi jmina lo valsi poi mi finti

>
> Examples that support your definition:
> None found.

OK, but no examples clearly support rejection/refusal either.

> Uncertain examples:
> 06:46 <bancus> la kolas: .i .ainai.o'o mi na bazi cliva .i do pu
> xlagalfi le sidbo pe le sodva .i do pu zbasu le dukse xlali selckasu le
> sakta selpinxe poi ro le prenu cu zmanei ke'a .i xu do djuno le du'u lo
> bloti xukmrkafin cu vindu
>
> 22 May 2004 14:04:21 <Broca> iaru'e do pu xusra le du'u zo do'e tolplixau
> 22 May 2004 14:04:34 <Broca> i e'o ko skicu le mukti
> 22 May 2004 14:05:54 <rlpowell> .ainai na go'i
> 22 May 2004 14:06:29 <rlpowell> mi xusra le du'u lo jbopre cu jai to'e dukse fai le nu pilno zo do'e

Some confusion with the double negatives, probably.

> >> From what I can see, it has been used to show lack of intent:
> > "ainai X" = "I have no intention of doing X" which really means "I have
> > the intention of not doing X."
>
> Totally agreed. But that is not a possible reading of your current
> proposal, as far as I can tell.

True, the wording applies better as being about things in the past than
about something that may or may not happen in the future. My point was
that people have not been using {ainai} for rejection/refusal, at least not
consistently. Most often they have used it as {ai nai broda} = {ai na broda}.

> > In some cases, this could constitute refusal,
> > if it comes after a request or suggestion or command that I do X, but in
> > such cases {vi'o nai} would be more appropriate.
> >
> > Do you think this is an inappropriate use of {ainai}:
> >
> > .ai nai do pu se xrani
> > I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
>
> Yes, I think it's about as strange as using "ei" in a past tense sentence.

I don't see any problem in using {ei} with a past tense. {ei} is used to
express how the speaker feels things ought to be now, in the future or
have been in the past:

ei do pu dunda le cukta la djan
You ought to have given the book to John.

ei le cmavo smuni pu xagmau se skicu
cmavo meanings ougth to have been better described.

> If you removed the "pu" I would translate it as "I'll see to it that you
> don't get hurt."

Which is not about rejection/refusal, it's about intention:

ai do na ba se xrani

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 953

On Sun, 7 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:

> On 8/7/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
>>
>> Rejection/refusal may not be the best keywords, but it's the best I can
>> think of. What would you call the intention of not doing something?
>
> Intention.

Well, yes, but we need to have something a bit more specific, to separate
it from {ai}.

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
<Nixon> Etter revolusjonen har jeg ordnet meg slik at jeg fr meg statue.
<Nixon> Har avtalt dette med nkkelpersoner p venstresiden.
<Nixon> Som takk for min innsats.
<Nixon> Det blir en 150m hy statue i havnebassenget.
<Kre> skal du ha restaurant i hodet?


On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
> On Sun, 7 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambías wrote:
> > On 8/7/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> Rejection/refusal may not be the best keywords, but it's the best I can
> >> think of. What would you call the intention of not doing something?
> >
> > Intention.
>
> Well, yes, but we need to have something a bit more specific, to separate
> it from {ai}.

What I propose is to use {ai} to express either the intention
of doing or not doing something: {ai mi klama} if I intend to
go and {ai mi na klama} if I intend to not go, and leave
{ai nai mi klama} to express that I have no intentions
about the matter. {ai cu'i mi klama} is something in between:
I have not yet made up my mind whether or not I intend to go.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388




> On 8/7/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > > Do you think this is an inappropriate use
> of
> > > {ainai}:
> > >
> > > .ai nai do pu se xrani
> > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
> >
> > Probably, since the English *states* my
> > non-intention, not *express* it
>
> The English probably both states and expresses
> it.
> It is difficult to disentangle statements about
> oneself
> from expressions, and in English we often
> express
> something by stating something about ourselves.
> Saying "I'm sorry", for example is a common
> way of expressing that one is sorry, even if it
> also
> makes the statement that one is sorry. Stating
> that
> something is the case is not incompatible with
> expressing something in the same act.
>
> > (and, again, can
> > it really be expressed?)

The point is that {ainai} and its kin NEVER
state, they only express. That is, an {ainai}
expression is not false if I really did intend
the involved event; it is merely misleading or
some other negative judgment on it. The "state
and express" rule seems only to work with things
that can/do already state: "Oy, he's coming" is
false only if he is not coming, not if he is but
I am happy about it. It may be that "I did not
intend" can be expressed in English, if at all,
only using stating language, but it seems to me
at least as likely that it cannot be exprtessed
at all and that the "expressive" aspects of usage
are implications (if you claim it was not
intentional then you are aware that it was
damaging and are trying to reduce responsibility
while making a weak apology, and so on). It is
hard to figure out — in language appropriate for
emotions or attitudes — what is being expressed
here.

>
> Why not? As you show below even more clearly,
> saying
> "oops" is often a way to express
> unintentionality, this time
> without making the corresponding statement.
>
> > Approximately "Oops, did that hurt you?"
>
> Or "Oops, you got hurt!".
The problem with "oops!" is that it says so much
more than unintentionality and extends to
situations where intentionality does not even
seem to apply (or, at least, would not normally
be thought to: obvious accidents, for example).


posts: 2388




> On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org>
> wrote:
> > On Sun, 7 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambías wrote:
> > > On 8/7/05, Arnt Richard Johansen
> <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> Rejection/refusal may not be the best
> keywords, but it's the best I can
> > >> think of. What would you call the
> intention of not doing something?
> > >
> > > Intention.
> >
> > Well, yes, but we need to have something a
> bit more specific, to separate
> > it from {ai}.
>
> What I propose is to use {ai} to express either
> the intention
> of doing or not doing something: {ai mi klama}
> if I intend to
> go and {ai mi na klama} if I intend to not go,
> and leave
> {ai nai mi klama} to express that I have no
> intentions
> about the matter. {ai cu'i mi klama} is
> something in between:
> I have not yet made up my mind whether or not I
> intend to go.
>
It is nice to get {ainai} and {ai na} separated,
since {xnai} and {xna} seems often to be equated
in these attitudinals (and even more so in BAI).
The {ainai} {aicu'i} distinction seems to me to
be less clear and less useful. If I have not yet
formulated an intention about something then I
have no intention about it. The most that can be
said as an intermeidate position is that for some
things about which I have so far no intention, I
intend to formulate an intention — and for
others I don't. But using either {nai} or {cu'i}
for these second order intentions does not seem
to me to have any justification other than a
remote preactical one — and it violates
compositionality, of course. One would normally
assume (except for this use of {nai}) that the
things like {cu'i} had to do with the strength of
one's resolve — maybe something along the likes
of thevarious old "shall"-"will" distinctions
(which no one can now — nor ever, so far as I
can tell — remember consistently).


On 8/8/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
>
> The point is that {ainai} and its kin NEVER
> state, they only express.

All UIs are used to express or indicate something, never
to state. Only bridi can be used to state.
bridi can also be used for other things than stating.
UIs can accompany a bridi. This bridi accompanied by a
UI may but need not be used to state.

> > > Approximately "Oops, did that hurt you?"
> >
> > Or "Oops, you got hurt!".
> The problem with "oops!" is that it says so much
> more than unintentionality and extends to
> situations where intentionality does not even
> seem to apply (or, at least, would not normally
> be thought to: obvious accidents, for example).

"Oops" is indeed much less well defined than Lojban
attitudinals, which generally have much more restricted
senses. "Oops" is certainly not a perfect match for {ainai}
always and everywhere. Hardly any English interjection
(probably none) is a perfect match for a Lojban UI.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


On 8/8/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
>
> It is nice to get {ainai} and {ai na} separated,
> since {xnai} and {xna} seems often to be equated
> in these attitudinals

{e'u nai} is the only one I can find where that seems to be
the case. Which one(s) did you have in mind?

>(and even more so in BAI).

With BAIs, it is never the case that {bai nai ko'a} is
equated with {bai ko'a naku}. Which case did you
have in mind?


> The {ainai} {aicu'i} distinction seems to me to
> be less clear and less useful. If I have not yet
> formulated an intention about something then I
> have no intention about it. The most that can be
> said as an intermeidate position is that for some
> things about which I have so far no intention, I
> intend to formulate an intention — and for
> others I don't.

Not everybody is as decisive as you though. I often
find myself wavering in a state where I have an
intention and at the same time I don't.

> But using either {nai} or {cu'i}
> for these second order intentions does not seem
> to me to have any justification other than a
> remote preactical one — and it violates
> compositionality, of course. One would normally
> assume (except for this use of {nai}) that the
> things like {cu'i} had to do with the strength of
> one's resolve — maybe something along the likes
> of thevarious old "shall"-"will" distinctions
> (which no one can now — nor ever, so far as I
> can tell — remember consistently).

But strength is handled by {ru'e} (weak), {sai} (strong}
and {cai} (stronger).

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388




> On 8/8/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> >
> > The point is that {ainai} and its kin NEVER
> > state, they only express.
>
> All UIs are used to express or indicate
> something, never
> to state. Only bridi can be used to state.
> bridi can also be used for other things than
> stating.
> UIs can accompany a bridi. This bridi
> accompanied by a
> UI may but need not be used to state.

I just wanted to reiterate this point, which has
been lost from time to time in the past. UI do
have the power — in some cases — to interfere
with, not merely accompany, the assertions of
bridi. And the irrealis cases are particularly
so inclined (though others are as well).
Assuming intentions can be expressed, this would
be such a case.

> > > > Approximately "Oops, did that hurt you?"
> > >
> > > Or "Oops, you got hurt!".
> > The problem with "oops!" is that it says so
> much
> > more than unintentionality and extends to
> > situations where intentionality does not even
> > seem to apply (or, at least, would not
> normally
> > be thought to: obvious accidents, for
> example).
>
> "Oops" is indeed much less well defined than
> Lojban
> attitudinals, which generally have much more
> restricted
> senses. "Oops" is certainly not a perfect match
> for {ainai}
> always and everywhere. Hardly any English
> interjection
> (probably none) is a perfect match for a Lojban
> UI.
Some surely come close than "oops" and {ainai}.


On 8/8/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
>
> > Hardly any English
> > interjection
> > (probably none) is a perfect match for a Lojban
> > UI.
> Some surely come close than "oops" and {ainai}.

No doubt. Indeed I had already used "oops" for another
attitudinal:

.o'a nai (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to express shame / abashment / embarrassment /
humiliation / mortification (cf. ckeji)

.o'a nai mi mrilu le notci lo srera noigri
Oops, I posted the message to the wrong newsgroup.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On 8/8/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> >
> > It is nice to get {ainai} and {ai na}
> separated,
> > since {xnai} and {xna} seems often to be
> equated
> > in these attitudinals
>
> {e'u nai} is the only one I can find where that
> seems to be
> the case. Which one(s) did you have in mind?

{e'u} seems odd in several ways, though not
particularly in this one, but then it is a little
hard to see the difference between urging someone
not to do something and the polar opposite of
urging them to do it and that, once the
distinction is made is hard to distinguish from
taking no action pro or con something (which is
what one would expect {e'u cu'i} to be rather
than giving up a previous suggestion. It may be
that similar problems (whether because these
notions are rather vague to begin with or are
merely described rather vaguely) lead to the
uncertainty of just what the negative — and now
and even moreso the neutral — are meant to mean.

> >(and even more so in BAI).
>
> With BAIs, it is never the case that {bai nai
> ko'a} is
> equated with {bai ko'a naku}. Which case did
> you
> have in mind?
>
I am glad to hear that has been straightened out
as well. At one point (about the last time I
looked in, I suppose) the line between {BAInai}
and {BAI na} was fluctuating all over the place
and at least some people were equating them in
most cases (this tended to be associated with an
overly literal and formulaic reading of the
connection between BAI and the "corresponding"
predicates).

> > The {ainai} {aicu'i} distinction seems to me
> to
> > be less clear and less useful. If I have not
> yet
> > formulated an intention about something then
> I
> > have no intention about it. The most that
> can be
> > said as an intermeidate position is that for
> some
> > things about which I have so far no
> intention, I
> > intend to formulate an intention — and for
> > others I don't.
>
> Not everybody is as decisive as you though. I
> often
> find myself wavering in a state where I have an
>
> intention and at the same time I don't.

I am not terribly decisive but I don't live in
contradictions either, as the situation of having
and not having an intention about some one thing
would be. I may fluctuate back and forth very
rapidly but that just means that I have no fixed
intention (which might be equated with not really
having an intention at all — yet). Is this
fluctuating state what {aicu'i} is expressing?
That is not what "neutral" suggests — but then,
it is not clear what the opposite of "intention"
is in attitudinal terms so it is hard to say what
lies in between.
>
> > But using either {nai} or {cu'i}
> > for these second order intentions does not
> seem
> > to me to have any justification other than a
> > remote preactical one — and it violates
> > compositionality, of course. One would
> normally
> > assume (except for this use of {nai}) that
> the
> > things like {cu'i} had to do with the
> strength of
> > one's resolve — maybe something along the
> likes
> > of thevarious old "shall"-"will" distinctions
> > (which no one can now — nor ever, so far as
> I
> > can tell — remember consistently).
>
> But strength is handled by {ru'e} (weak), {sai}
> (strong}
> and {cai} (stronger).
This whole "system" seems to be getting more and
more muddled: {cu'i} is the midpoint on a seven-
point scale of something or other (whether you
call it strength or not) of which {ru'e}, {sai}
and {cai} are the increasing stronger values,
applied going off in the general areas x and
{xnai}. As noted, since it is not clear what
{ainai} means (except not {ai na}), it is not
clear what the midpoint is like nor what strength
is. The natural reading (in which {ai nai} is
{ai na}) would have {ai cu'i} as completely
uncommitted in the area, with tending toward and
against running off through the "strength"
markers. But if {ainai} is "uncommitted in the
area," the polar opposite of "commiitted"
("intends"), the middle point comes out somewhere
in the middle of {ai sai} or maybe {ai ru'e} on
the basis of strength, and the position of
fluctuating between pro and con doesn't really
appear at all.



On 8/8/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> {e'u} seems odd in several ways, though not
> particularly in this one, but then it is a little
> hard to see the difference between urging someone
> not to do something and the polar opposite of
> urging them to do it and that, once the
> distinction is made is hard to distinguish from
> taking no action pro or con something (which is
> what one would expect {e'u cu'i} to be rather
> than giving up a previous suggestion.

I couldn't make much sense of "abandon suggestion"
for {e'u cu'i} either, so I dropped it from the definitions.

> It may be
> that similar problems (whether because these
> notions are rather vague to begin with or are
> merely described rather vaguely) lead to the
> uncertainty of just what the negative — and now
> and even moreso the neutral — are meant to mean.

So I take it that your "since {xnai} and {xna} seems often
to be equated in these attitudinals" was mostly hyperbole.

> > >(and even more so in BAI).
> >
> > With BAIs, it is never the case that {bai nai
> > ko'a} is
> > equated with {bai ko'a naku}. Which case did
> > you
> > have in mind?
> >
> I am glad to hear that has been straightened out
> as well. At one point (about the last time I
> looked in, I suppose) the line between {BAInai}
> and {BAI na} was fluctuating all over the place

Nothing has changed since the last time you
participated in the discussion, as far as I know.

> and at least some people were equating them in
> most cases (this tended to be associated with an
> overly literal and formulaic reading of the
> connection between BAI and the "corresponding"
> predicates).

For BAI = fi'o broda, we have BAI nai = fi'o na broda.

Notice that {bai nai ko'a} = {fi'o na broda ko'a} is very
different from {bai ko'a na ku} = {fi'o broda ko'a na ku}.

The {nai} in {bai nai} negates the underlying predicate,
i.e. the inner meaning of {bai}, it does not negate the
main selbri which gets an additional place with the
{bai} tag.

Similarly, for UInai, {nai} often negates the inner meaning
of the UI, it generally does not negate the bridi which the
UI modifies.


> Is this
> fluctuating state what {aicu'i} is expressing?
> That is not what "neutral" suggests — but then,
> it is not clear what the opposite of "intention"
> is in attitudinal terms so it is hard to say what
> lies in between.

I agree there is no obvious meaning for {aicu'i}.

I think the opposites intentional - unintentional for
{ai} {ainai} are fairly obvious, but maybe that's just me.

I also think that the "indecision" proposed in the ma'oste
for {aicu'i} is at least reasonable and can be understood
as an intermediate state between intent and unintentionality.


> This whole "system" seems to be getting more and
> more muddled: {cu'i} is the midpoint on a seven-
> point scale of something or other (whether you
> call it strength or not) of which {ru'e}, {sai}
> and {cai} are the increasing stronger values,
> applied going off in the general areas x and
> {xnai}. As noted, since it is not clear what
> {ainai} means (except not {ai na}), it is not
> clear what the midpoint is like nor what strength
> is. The natural reading (in which {ai nai} is
> {ai na})

And I thought you approved of {ainai} not being {ai na}!

So, do you have a suggestion, or is this just general
complaining that things are not very clear?


would have {ai cu'i} as completely
> uncommitted in the area, with tending toward and
> against running off through the "strength"
> markers. But if {ainai} is "uncommitted in the
> area," the polar opposite of "commiitted"
> ("intends"), the middle point comes out somewhere
> in the middle of {ai sai} or maybe {ai ru'e} on
> the basis of strength, and the position of
> fluctuating between pro and con doesn't really
> appear at all.

Something like this:

ai cai - extermely determined to
ai sai - very much intending to
ai ru'e - somewhat intending to
ai cu'i - undecided
ai nai ru'e - not really contemplating
ai nai sai - quite unconcerned with
ai nai cai - completely unconcerned with

(The difference between {sai} and {cai} seems to be hardly
ever significant, I think {sai} is the general intensifier and {cai}
is mostly for effect.)

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 953

On Mon, 8 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:

> On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
>> On Sun, 7 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:
>>> On 8/7/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Rejection/refusal may not be the best keywords, but it's the best I can
>>>> think of. What would you call the intention of not doing something?
>>>
>>> Intention.
>>
>> Well, yes, but we need to have something a bit more specific, to separate
>> it from {ai}.
>
> What I propose is to use {ai} to express either the intention
> of doing or not doing something: {ai mi klama} if I intend to
> go and {ai mi na klama} if I intend to not go, and leave
> {ai nai mi klama} to express that I have no intentions
> about the matter. {ai cu'i mi klama} is something in between:
> I have not yet made up my mind whether or not I intend to go.

Yes, I understand what your proposal is. But you have to bring the section
in line with what the CLL and the cmavo list says.

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
- Hvorfor snakker man engelsk p Internet?
- Har du hrt om minste felles nevner?


On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
> Yes, I understand what your proposal is. But you have to bring the section
> in line with what the CLL and the cmavo list says.

Only if what they say makes sense to me as shepherd
of the section.

I will not write definitions that are in line with what the CLL
and the cmavo list say just because that's what they say.
I try to follow them as much as possible, but when I consider
those definitions flawed, I will write what I consider better
definitions. I'm very willing to discuss and consider
other positions, but a mere "the CLL and the cmavo list
say it" just doesn't do anything for me.

I can certainly not impose my definitions on anyone, so
if they are considered unsatisfactory by two or more
people, and they don't convince me to change them,
they will be voted down. In that case, I have no objection
to stepping down as shepherd and let someone
else take responsibility for whatever modifications they
want to make. I will probably not vote for them, but I will
not half-veto any definitions that the majority approves either.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388




> On 8/8/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > {e'u} seems odd in several ways, though not
> > particularly in this one, but then it is a
> little
> > hard to see the difference between urging
> someone
> > not to do something and the polar opposite of
> > urging them to do it and that, once the
> > distinction is made is hard to distinguish
> from
> > taking no action pro or con something (which
> is
> > what one would expect {e'u cu'i} to be rather
> > than giving up a previous suggestion.
>
> I couldn't make much sense of "abandon
> suggestion"
> for {e'u cu'i} either, so I dropped it from the
> definitions.

Leaving what? (I can't find your lists in any of
the usual places, but my looking through wiki are
often not successful).

>
> > It may be
> > that similar problems (whether because these
> > notions are rather vague to begin with or are
> > merely described rather vaguely) lead to the
> > uncertainty of just what the negative — and
> now
> > and even moreso the neutral — are meant to
> mean.
>
> So I take it that your "since {xnai} and {xna}
> seems often
> to be equated in these attitudinals" was
> mostly hyperbole.

Only in the sense that I took cases which were
unclear or apparently nonsense as cases of the
identification, which did alwys make sense at
least.

> > > >(and even more so in BAI).
> > >
> > > With BAIs, it is never the case that {bai
> nai
> > > ko'a} is
> > > equated with {bai ko'a naku}. Which case
> did
> > > you
> > > have in mind?

I guess that I don't see the difference you are
making here. The last time I checked I thought
that {no broda ko'a} and {broda ko'a naku} meant
the same thing by you except when explicit
quantifiers were involved (they do mean different
things by me in any case where existence could be
an issue as well).

> > I am glad to hear that has been straightened
> out
> > as well. At one point (about the last time I
> > looked in, I suppose) the line between
> {BAInai}
> > and {BAI na} was fluctuating all over the
> place
>
> Nothing has changed since the last time you
> participated in the discussion, as far as I
> know.
>
> > and at least some people were equating them
> in
> > most cases (this tended to be associated with
> an
> > overly literal and formulaic reading of the
> > connection between BAI and the
> "corresponding"
> > predicates).
>
> For BAI = fi'o broda, we have BAI nai = fi'o na
> broda.
>
> Notice that {bai nai ko'a} = {fi'o na broda
> ko'a} is very
> different from {bai ko'a na ku} = {fi'o broda
> ko'a na ku}.

As noted, I don't quite get the point here. Is
it that in the first case the negativity is
attached only to the buried predicate whereas in
them latter case it leaks out to the (more) main
predication? A look at the examples suggests
that at least often this will work in the way
intended apparently only if {nai} corresponds to
{to'e}, so the "explanation" is not quite
serviceable. Putting that in would eliminate the
possible misinterpretation, but would also
occasionally get the wrong thing (where only {na}
is meant, even if not {naku}) or else something
barely intelligible.
I think — moving back from BAI — this stuff
about {ai} falls into the last category as things
now stand, but I also think that much of this
results from the whole frame of discourse being
unclear.
Does {ai mu klama} implicate (maybe even mean) "I
intend to come" or "I come intentionally" Tense
condsiderations aside, these seem rather
different, especially when mixed with some sort
of negation. "I come accidentally," "I happen to
come", "I come unintentionally" apply to the
second with polar negation, though it is hard to
see what contrary or contradictory negation is
like here. For the first case, we seem to have
only "I do not intend to come" as a negation and
it is as uncertain as "not" usually is: it
clearly means that I have not formulated an
intention to come but it is not clear whether
this means I have formulated an intention
incompatible with coming (most easily an
intention not to come) or simply have no
intention in the area at all. The traditional
list seems to take the strong position: {ainai}
is "intend not," the negation goes into the main
predication. (Note that this is different from
{ienai}as stronger, volitional not merely
factual, and so on.) In this case, the neutral
position is just having no intention either way.
If, on the other hand, we take the opposite of
having an intention to come to be having no
intention about coming (which would also be the
opposite of intending not to come), that is
decisive and indecisive, it is not clear what a
neutral position can be (of course, there is no
law that says there has to be one in every case).

>
> The {nai} in {bai nai} negates the underlying
> predicate,
> i.e. the inner meaning of {bai}, it does not
> negate the
> main selbri which gets an additional place with
> the
> {bai} tag.
>
> Similarly, for UInai, {nai} often negates the
> inner meaning
> of the UI, it generally does not negate the
> bridi which the
> UI modifies.

Some emotions and attitudes clearly have
negations of various sorts: contraries,
contradictories or opposites; it is not clear
that all of them (or even most of them) do while
remaining in the realm of emotions and attitudes.

>
> > Is this
> > fluctuating state what {aicu'i} is
> expressing?
> > That is not what "neutral" suggests — but
> then,
> > it is not clear what the opposite of
> "intention"
> > is in attitudinal terms so it is hard to say
> what
> > lies in between.
>
> I agree there is no obvious meaning for
> {aicu'i}.
>
> I think the opposites intentional -
> unintentional for
> {ai} {ainai} are fairly obvious, but maybe
> that's just me.

In English that is the intentional — accidental
pair, which is the one least likely to be a
matter for expression, while the intend to --
intend to not pairs has clear expression (stress
and the like in English — and the "shall"-"will"
distinction if we knew how it went) and a
meaningful neutral position.

> I also think that the "indecision" proposed in
> the ma'oste
> for {aicu'i} is at least reasonable and can be
> understood
> as an intermediate state between intent and
> unintentionality.

Only when "unintend" means "intend not,"
otherwise "unintend" seems to be indecision
already.

>
> > This whole "system" seems to be getting more
> and
> > more muddled: {cu'i} is the midpoint on a
> seven-
> > point scale of something or other (whether
> you
> > call it strength or not) of which {ru'e},
> {sai}
> > and {cai} are the increasing stronger values,
> > applied going off in the general areas x and
> > {xnai}. As noted, since it is not clear what
> > {ainai} means (except not {ai na}), it is not
> > clear what the midpoint is like nor what
> strength
> > is. The natural reading (in which {ai nai}
> is
> > {ai na})
>
> And I thought you approved of {ainai} not being
> {ai na}!
>
> So, do you have a suggestion, or is this just
> general
> complaining that things are not very clear?
>
Well, it is a complaint that things are not very
clear and I have made that way too often before.
In this case, it seems to me that the status quo
ante was just fine and the move away from it
accomplishes nothing but muddlification.

> would have {ai cu'i} as completely
> > uncommitted in the area, with tending toward
> and
> > against running off through the "strength"
> > markers. But if {ainai} is "uncommitted in
> the
> > area," the polar opposite of "commiitted"
> > ("intends"), the middle point comes out
> somewhere
> > in the middle of {ai sai} or maybe {ai ru'e}
> on
> > the basis of strength, and the position of
> > fluctuating between pro and con doesn't
> really
> > appear at all.
>
> Something like this:
>
> ai cai - extermely determined to
> ai sai - very much intending to
> ai ru'e - somewhat intending to
> ai cu'i - undecided
> ai nai ru'e - not really contemplating
> ai nai sai - quite unconcerned with
> ai nai cai - completely unconcerned with

Ahah! Now, "unconcerned with" introduces (or
make clear what was obscure before) a new aspect
to the whole discussion. We now have the
x-xcu'i-xnai as "decided-undecided-indifferent,"
which fits together sensibly. But can it be what
{ai} was meant to be? {ainai} as "Whatever!" does
not seem to fit with "intend/tion" (which may be
the problem to begin with, although it fit the
old version just fine).

> (The difference between {sai} and {cai} seems
> to be hardly
> ever significant, I think {sai} is the general
> intensifier and {cai}
> is mostly for effect.)



posts: 953

On Mon, 8 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:

> On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
>> Yes, I understand what your proposal is. But you have to bring the section
>> in line with what the CLL and the cmavo list says.
>
> Only if what they say makes sense to me as shepherd
> of the section.
>
> I will not write definitions that are in line with what the CLL
> and the cmavo list say just because that's what they say.
> I try to follow them as much as possible, but when I consider
> those definitions flawed, I will write what I consider better
> definitions.

The CLL's definition doesn't look flawed to me, it only has what could be
considered an unfortunate wording ("refusal"). That the one word for ainai
seems wrong should be no reason to redefine the other points on the scale.

Or is there some other flaw that I have missed?

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
Information wants to be anthropomorphized!


On 8/8/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
> > I couldn't make much sense of "abandon
> > suggestion"
> > for {e'u cu'i} either, so I dropped it from the
> > definitions.
>
> Leaving what? (I can't find your lists in any of
> the usual places, but my looking through wiki are
> often not successful).

Not all {cu'i}'s have definitions. The page under discussion is:
<http://www.lojban.org/tiki/tiki-index.php?page=BPFK%20Section%3A%20Irrealis%20Attitudinals>

> > > > >(and even more so in BAI).
> > > >
> > > > With BAIs, it is never the case that {bai nai
> > > > ko'a} is equated with {bai ko'a naku}.
>
> I guess that I don't see the difference you are
> making here. The last time I checked I thought
> that {no broda ko'a} and {broda ko'a naku} meant
> the same thing by you except when explicit
> quantifiers were involved (they do mean different
> things by me in any case where existence could be
> an issue as well).

{na broda ko'a} and {broda ko'a naku} do mean the same
thing by me, yes.

{bai nai broda} and {na bai broda} mean very different things.

The first one says that broda happens, just not under compulsion.
The second one says that (broda under compulsion) does not
happen. It doesn't say that broda happens.

> > For BAI = fi'o broda, we have BAI nai = fi'o na
> > broda.
> >
> > Notice that {bai nai ko'a} = {fi'o na broda
> > ko'a} is very
> > different from {bai ko'a na ku} = {fi'o broda
> > ko'a na ku}.
>
> As noted, I don't quite get the point here. Is
> it that in the first case the negativity is
> attached only to the buried predicate whereas in
> them latter case it leaks out to the (more) main
> predication?

Indeed.

> A look at the examples suggests
> that at least often this will work in the way
> intended apparently only if {nai} corresponds to
> {to'e}, so the "explanation" is not quite
> serviceable.

For BAI = fi'o broda, we get to'e BAI = fi'o to'e broda,
so no, it is in general not the same thing.

> Putting that in would eliminate the
> possible misinterpretation, but would also
> occasionally get the wrong thing (where only {na}
> is meant, even if not {naku}) or else something
> barely intelligible.

I don't know what you mean by that.

> I think — moving back from BAI — this stuff
> about {ai} falls into the last category as things
> now stand, but I also think that much of this
> results from the whole frame of discourse being
> unclear.
> Does {ai mu klama} implicate (maybe even mean) "I
> intend to come" or "I come intentionally" Tense
> condsiderations aside, these seem rather
> different, especially when mixed with some sort
> of negation.

{ai mi ba klama} is "I intend to come"
{ai mi ca klama} is "I come intentionally"
{ai mi klama} could be either, depending on context.

> "I come accidentally," "I happen to
> come", "I come unintentionally" apply to the
> second with polar negation, though it is hard to
> see what contrary or contradictory negation is
> like here. For the first case, we seem to have
> only "I do not intend to come" as a negation and
> it is as uncertain as "not" usually is: it
> clearly means that I have not formulated an
> intention to come but it is not clear whether
> this means I have formulated an intention
> incompatible with coming (most easily an
> intention not to come) or simply have no
> intention in the area at all.

In English, "I have no intention of coming" usually means
that I do have the intention of not coming, despite the surface
form.

> The traditional
> list seems to take the strong position: {ainai}
> is "intend not," the negation goes into the main
> predication.

Yes, even though the keywords are not really appropriate,
because "intend not" is not necessarily a rejection or a refusal
of something. Nobody need have asked.

> > So, do you have a suggestion, or is this just
> > general
> > complaining that things are not very clear?
> >
> Well, it is a complaint that things are not very
> clear and I have made that way too often before.

Indeed.

> In this case, it seems to me that the status quo
> ante was just fine and the move away from it
> accomplishes nothing but muddlification.

Hm. So you are now in favour of {ainai} = {ai na}?

> > Something like this:
> >
> > ai cai - extermely determined to
> > ai sai - very much intending to
> > ai ru'e - somewhat intending to
> > ai cu'i - undecided
> > ai nai ru'e - not really contemplating
> > ai nai sai - quite unconcerned with
> > ai nai cai - completely unconcerned with
>
> Ahah!

I tremble at those "ahah!" of yours, as they usually mean you
will come up with an interpretation that has little or nothing to do
with what I intended.

>Now, "unconcerned with" introduces (or
> make clear what was obscure before) a new aspect
> to the whole discussion. We now have the
> x-xcu'i-xnai as "decided-undecided-indifferent,"
> which fits together sensibly. But can it be what
> {ai} was meant to be? {ainai} as "Whatever!" does
> not seem to fit with "intend/tion" (which may be
> the problem to begin with, although it fit the
> old version just fine).

I meant "unconcerned" as "not-on-my-mind", not as "indifferent".
Probably not the best choice of word. "Not contemplating" might
be better.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
> The CLL's definition doesn't look flawed to me, it only has what could be
> considered an unfortunate wording ("refusal").

But that single word is all CLL has to say about {ai nai}. There is no
further explanation or example, is there?

> That the one word for ainai
> seems wrong should be no reason to redefine the other points on the scale.

I have left the two other points untouched, haven't I?

> Or is there some other flaw that I have missed?

No, just that one.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 953

On Mon, 8 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:

> On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
>> The CLL's definition doesn't look flawed to me, it only has what could be
>> considered an unfortunate wording ("refusal").
>
> But that single word is all CLL has to say about {ai nai}. There is no
> further explanation or example, is there?

Correct. Hence I appeal to usage.

>> That the one word for ainai
>> seems wrong should be no reason to redefine the other points on the scale.
>
> I have left the two other points untouched, haven't I?

To quote an earlier post:

> What I propose is to use {ai} to express either the intention
> of doing or not doing something: {ai mi klama} if I intend to
> go and {ai mi na klama} if I intend to not go,

This is where I misread. In both these examples, the intention is of the
referent of the main bridi actually happening, and not the opposite. So
there is no change.

> and leave
> {ai nai mi klama} to express that I have no intentions
> about the matter. {ai cu'i mi klama} is something in between:
> I have not yet made up my mind whether or not I intend to go.

Having no intentions and having not made up one's mind seems to amount to
the same thing.

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
Jeg er nok verdens sydligste sengevter. Forutsatt at ingen p basen p
Sydpolen driver med slikt, da. --Erling Kagge: Alene til Sydpolen


On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
>
> Having no intentions and having not made up one's mind seems to amount to
> the same thing.

If I hurt you unintentionally, I have no intention of hurting you.
That's different from my not having made up my mind about
hurting you (or from having a positive intention of not hurting you).

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 953

On Sun, 7 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:

>>> .ai nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti)
>>
>>> ai nai changed from rejection / refusal (which is i'a nai) to unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness.
>>
>> This is at odds with both the CLL, the cmavo list, and usage. You should change it back to rejection/refusal.
>>
>> -arj
>
> rejection/refusal is the opposite of acceptance/accession/consent, not the
> opposite of intent/purpose/design.

This is a wording I would be reasonably happy with:

.ai (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent / avoidance / rejection /
refusal (cf. fanta, rivbi)

As examples, one or both of these:
.ainai mi gunka ca le pavdei
I'm not going to work on Monday.

.ainai mi jmina lo valsi poi mi finti
I actively avoid adding words of my own devising.

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
Assumption is the mother of all screw-ups. (Wethern's Law)


posts: 2388




> On 8/8/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > > I couldn't make much sense of "abandon
> > > suggestion"
> > > for {e'u cu'i} either, so I dropped it from
> the
> > > definitions.
> >
> > Leaving what? (I can't find your lists in any
> of
> > the usual places, but my looking through wiki
> are
> > often not successful).
>
> Not all {cu'i}'s have definitions. The page
> under discussion is:
>
<http://www.lojban.org/tiki/tiki-index.php?page=BPFK%20Section%3A%20Irrealis%20Attitudinals>

Thanx

> > > > > >(and even more so in BAI).
> > > > >
> > > > > With BAIs, it is never the case that
> {bai nai
> > > > > ko'a} is equated with {bai ko'a naku}.
> >
> > I guess that I don't see the difference you
> are
> > making here. The last time I checked I
> thought
> > that {no broda ko'a} and {broda ko'a naku}
> meant
> > the same thing by you except when explicit
> > quantifiers were involved (they do mean
> different
> > things by me in any case where existence
> could be
> > an issue as well).
>
> {na broda ko'a} and {broda ko'a naku} do mean
> the same
> thing by me, yes.
>
> {bai nai broda} and {na bai broda} mean very
> different things.

Is this the issue? This is somewhat clearer than
the earlier discussion, though I think to the
same point.

> The first one says that broda happens, just not
> under compulsion.
> The second one says that (broda under
> compulsion) does not
> happen. It doesn't say that broda happens.
>
> > > For BAI = fi'o broda, we have BAI nai =
> fi'o na
> > > broda.
> > >
> > > Notice that {bai nai ko'a} = {fi'o na broda
> > > ko'a} is very
> > > different from {bai ko'a na ku} = {fi'o
> broda
> > > ko'a na ku}.
> >
> > As noted, I don't quite get the point here.
> Is
> > it that in the first case the negativity is
> > attached only to the buried predicate whereas
> in
> > them latter case it leaks out to the (more)
> main
> > predication?
>
> Indeed.
>
> > A look at the examples suggests
> > that at least often this will work in the way
> > intended apparently only if {nai} corresponds
> to
> > {to'e}, so the "explanation" is not quite
> > serviceable.
>
> For BAI = fi'o broda, we get to'e BAI = fi'o
> to'e broda,
> so no, it is in general not the same thing.
My point was that, as you are setting things up,
{x nai} seems to be a polar opposite not just a
contrary or contradictory negation, so {to'e}
without ever using the word.

> > Putting that in would eliminate the
> > possible misinterpretation, but would also
> > occasionally get the wrong thing (where only
> {na}
> > is meant, even if not {naku}) or else
> something
> > barely intelligible.
>
> I don't know what you mean by that.

Just say that {x nai}is related to {to'e} not
{na} (or, rather, since {to'e} is related to
{na}, that it is related directly to {to'e}). I
am not sure this always works, but that would
make it even more important to note the cases
where it does.

> > I think — moving back from BAI — this stuff
> > about {ai} falls into the last category as
> things
> > now stand, but I also think that much of this
> > results from the whole frame of discourse
> being
> > unclear.
> > Does {ai mu klama} implicate (maybe even
> mean) "I
> > intend to come" or "I come intentionally"
> Tense
> > condsiderations aside, these seem rather
> > different, especially when mixed with some
> sort
> > of negation.
>
> {ai mi ba klama} is "I intend to come"
> {ai mi ca klama} is "I come intentionally"
> {ai mi klama} could be either, depending on
> context.

This looks like amphiboly to me; {ai} changes
meanings — and indeed semantic categories --
from expression an intention to making a claim
about the way I come.

> > "I come accidentally," "I happen to
> > come", "I come unintentionally" apply to the
> > second with polar negation, though it is hard
> to
> > see what contrary or contradictory negation
> is
> > like here. For the first case, we seem to
> have
> > only "I do not intend to come" as a negation
> and
> > it is as uncertain as "not" usually is: it
> > clearly means that I have not formulated an
> > intention to come but it is not clear whether
> > this means I have formulated an intention
> > incompatible with coming (most easily an
> > intention not to come) or simply have no
> > intention in the area at all.
>
> In English, "I have no intention of coming"
> usually means
> that I do have the intention of not coming,
> despite the surface
> form.

I think that that is correct and it fits in with
{ai nai} as "intend not to" rather than either
"accidentally" or "I don't give a damn." At this
point I confess I have forgotten what the
proposal was and who's on what side, but the
matter still (indeed more so) seems muddled.

> > The traditional
> > list seems to take the strong position:
> {ainai}
> > is "intend not," the negation goes into the
> main
> > predication.
>
> Yes, even though the keywords are not really
> appropriate,
> because "intend not" is not necessarily a
> rejection or a refusal
> of something. Nobody need have asked.

We can reject an activity even if nobody has
asked us about it, surely. I suppose that we
have to at least have proposed it to ourselves
then. But I don't think we can reject nor intend
not to do something that we have never
considered.


> > > So, do you have a suggestion, or is this
> just
> > > general
> > > complaining that things are not very clear?
> > >
> > Well, it is a complaint that things are not
> very
> > clear and I have made that way too often
> before.
>
> Indeed.
>
> > In this case, it seems to me that the status
> quo
> > ante was just fine and the move away from it
> > accomplishes nothing but muddlification.
>
> Hm. So you are now in favour of {ainai} = {ai
> na}?
>
> > > Something like this:
> > >
> > > ai cai - extermely determined to
> > > ai sai - very much intending to
> > > ai ru'e - somewhat intending to
> > > ai cu'i - undecided
> > > ai nai ru'e - not really contemplating
> > > ai nai sai - quite unconcerned with
> > > ai nai cai - completely unconcerned with
> >
> > Ahah!
>
> I tremble at those "ahah!" of yours, as they
> usually mean you
> will come up with an interpretation that has
> little or nothing to do
> with what I intended.
>
> >Now, "unconcerned with" introduces (or
> > make clear what was obscure before) a new
> aspect
> > to the whole discussion. We now have the
> > x-xcu'i-xnai as
> "decided-undecided-indifferent,"
> > which fits together sensibly. But can it be
> what
> > {ai} was meant to be? {ainai} as "Whatever!"
> does
> > not seem to fit with "intend/tion" (which may
> > be the problem to begin with, although it
fit > >the old version just fine).

>I meant "unconcerned" as "not-on-my-mind", not
as >"indifferent".
>Probably not the best choice of word. "Not
>contemplating" might
>be better.

Understood: "determined - waffling - unexamined,"
maybe. And this really does seem to be
expressible. Further, {nai} is pretty clearly
not {to'e} in this case, that is closer to
waffling than unexamined, but even that is
contrary, not opposite.


posts: 2388




> On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org>
> wrote:
> > The CLL's definition doesn't look flawed to
> me, it only has what could be
> > considered an unfortunate wording
> ("refusal").
>
> But that single word is all CLL has to say
> about {ai nai}. There is no
> further explanation or example, is there?
>
> > That the one word for ainai
> > seems wrong should be no reason to redefine
> the other points on the scale.
>
> I have left the two other points untouched,
> haven't I?

Not really; {ai} now expresses any intention to
do or not do, while the latter was what {ainai}
(apparently) used to mean.

> > Or is there some other flaw that I have
> missed?
>
> No, just that one.
>
> mu'o mi'e xorxes
>
>
>
>



On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
>
> This is a wording I would be reasonably happy with:
>
> .ai (UI1)
> Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent / avoidance / rejection /
> refusal (cf. fanta, rivbi)

I have no problem with "non-intent", which is basically
what I'm suggesting.

I think "refusal" is clearly {vi'o nai} and "rejection" {i'a nai}.
"Avoidance" is used for {a'a nai}. That doesn't mean
necessarily they couldn't be used again, but I don't think
they are the same as non-intent.

> As examples, one or both of these:
> .ainai mi gunka ca le pavdei
> I'm not going to work on Monday.

OK. It's not that I refuse to, it's just that I have no plans
to do it.

> .ainai mi jmina lo valsi poi mi finti
> I actively avoid adding words of my own devising.

I reject the sense of "actively avoid" in {ainai}.
Simply "I don't mean to add words of my own devising"
(i.e. if I happen to add one, it is because I didn't realize
it was me who coined it.)

For actively avoid I would say: .ai mi na jmina lo valsi poi mi finti

mu'o mi'e xorxes


On 8/8/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > {ai mi ba klama} is "I intend to come"
> > {ai mi ca klama} is "I come intentionally"
> > {ai mi klama} could be either, depending on
> > context.
>
> This looks like amphiboly to me; {ai} changes
> meanings — and indeed semantic categories --
> from expression an intention to making a claim
> about the way I come.

OK, change the second one to:
"I intend to be coming" i.e. whether or not it is the
case that I am actually coming, my intention is that
I am. In general, if I am coming I would know it, but
in some special cases I might not be certain.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388

Let's see if I understand the issues here.
There are like three ideas about what {ai - ai
cu'i - ai nai} should mean.

The original (as near as we can make out) was
intend to — waffling — intend not to.
All of these are clearly expressible in some way.

xorxes' proposal is
have an intention about — am undecided about --
have not considered.
Again, all expressible in some way.

Another reading of xorxes (or another xorxes'
proposal)
intentionally (no clear neutral ground)
unintentionally (accidentally)
These are not so obviously expressible and do not
fit well into the pattern of {aV}, which seem to
be mainly (though not exclusively without a lot
of work) future-oriented irrealis attitudinals
(hope, fear that, desire and the like), whereas
this one is past (including the present) oriented
and realis, indeed affirming. I think this last
case then drops out of consideration, leaving the
other two. Of them — assuming that there is not
a heavy load of usage for the old version --
xorxes' seems the most useful, extending the
system to cover a real situation that is not
otherwise dealt with. On these grounds I wnder if
a similar move might not be called for in the
case of {i'e}, which patterns like the original
{ai} or is disapproval stronger than approving
the negation (yes, it is) and non-approval broad
enough to cover the case where we haven't thought
about the matter as well as the case where we
haven't made up our mind (probably). OK, so skip
that suggestion. I suppose that {ie} can't be
rewritten in this way, since, once the proposal
is made, we can't claim not to have thought about
it, only that we have not yet decided, {iecu'i}.


On 8/8/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > I have left the two other points untouched,
> > haven't I?
>
> Not really; {ai} now expresses any intention to
> do or not do,

{ai} has always been usable for that, hasn't it?
That hasn't changed. Does anyone object to
{ai mi na klama} meaning "I intend not to come"?

> while the latter was what {ainai}
> (apparently) used to mean.

Apparently {ai nai} was taken to mean {ai na}, yes,
but I don't think there was any doubt about {ai na}
itself.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388




> On 8/8/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > > {ai mi ba klama} is "I intend to come"
> > > {ai mi ca klama} is "I come intentionally"
> > > {ai mi klama} could be either, depending on
> > > context.
> >
> > This looks like amphiboly to me; {ai} changes
> > meanings — and indeed semantic categories --
> > from expression an intention to making a
> claim
> > about the way I come.
>
> OK, change the second one to:
> "I intend to be coming" i.e. whether or not it
> is the
> case that I am actually coming, my intention is
> that
> I am. In general, if I am coming I would know
> it, but
> in some special cases I might not be certain.

I don't think "I intend to be coming" in English
can be used when I am actually in the process of
coming — and know I am — unless there is some
doubt about my completing the process. And it
certainly can't be used once I have arrived
(which is the point of your second case, I think).


On 8/9/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
>
> I don't think "I intend to be coming" in English
> can be used when I am actually in the process of
> coming — and know I am — unless there is some
> doubt about my completing the process. And it
> certainly can't be used once I have arrived
> (which is the point of your second case, I think).

OK, but that's a pecularity of English that we need
not import into Lojban. In Lojban {ai} would only
indicate my intentions, independently of
their degree of completion or realization (which
can be indicated by other means).

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388




> On 8/9/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> >
> > I don't think "I intend to be coming" in
> English
> > can be used when I am actually in the process
> of
> > coming — and know I am — unless there is
> some
> > doubt about my completing the process. And
> it
> > certainly can't be used once I have arrived
> > (which is the point of your second case, I
> think).
>
> OK, but that's a pecularity of English that we
> need
> not import into Lojban. In Lojban {ai} would
> only
> indicate my intentions, independently of
> their degree of completion or realization
> (which
> can be indicated by other means).

Well, I think I disagree. I think that in fact
one can only intend something which has not
occurred (is not known to have occurred, at
least, or — even better — whose opportunity for
occurring is not known to be closed). Thus, to
say I am doing something intentionally is to
report on a past situation (and so not be
appropriate for UI) when I had that intention,
which I am now fulfilling. It make no sense to
intend to do something already known done, any
more than it makes sense to hope for something
already known to be decided. The nearest thing
to intending to do something one is doing is to
do it deliberately, which is not a plausible UI either.


posts: 953

On Tue, 9 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:

>> As examples, one or both of these:
>> .ainai mi gunka ca le pavdei
>> I'm not going to work on Monday.
>
> OK. It's not that I refuse to, it's just that I have no plans
> to do it.

Rather, that I have plans of not doing it.

>> .ainai mi jmina lo valsi poi mi finti
>> I actively avoid adding words of my own devising.
>
> I reject the sense of "actively avoid" in {ainai}.
> Simply "I don't mean to add words of my own devising"
> (i.e. if I happen to add one, it is because I didn't realize
> it was me who coined it.)

I'll have to think about that, as I suspect it to be
non-baseline-compliant.

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
Public Notice as Required by Law: Any Use of This Product, in Any
Manner Whatsoever, Will Increase the Amount of Disorder in the
Universe. Although No Liability Is Implied Herein, the Consumer Is
Warned That This Process Will Ultimately Lead to the Heat Death of the
Universe. --Susan Hewitt and Edward Subitzky


posts: 953

From the section:

>.ai nai (UI*1)

> Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent / unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti)

This is not only noncompliant with the baseline, but it is also confusing. Accidentality and unplannedness doesn't have anything to do with it.

Also, if you need help with the keywords, I suppose I could do some.

-arj

> >.ai nai (UI*1)
>
> > Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent / unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti)
>
> This is not only noncompliant with the baseline, but it is also confusing. Accidentality and unplannedness doesn't have anything to do with it.

Nothing to do with what? They are all close synonyms.
>From dictionary.com definitions:

accidental: Without intent.
unplanned: Not intended; unintentional.
intend: To have in mind; plan
unintended: Not deliberate or intentional; unplanned

What you may mean is that they don't correspond
with "intent not to", but we are and have always been
in agreement about that.


> Also, if you need help with the keywords, I suppose I could do some.

In this section, the keywords are basically all the words
that appear in the definitions. Is it worth listing them again?
If I left out some I might add them to the definition itself,
or you are welcome to suggest others if they won't fit well
in the definition. Were you thinking of any words in particular?

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> > >.ai nai (UI*1)
> >
> > > Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent
> / unintentionality / accidentality /
> unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti)
> >
> > This is not only noncompliant with the
> baseline, but it is also confusing.
> Accidentality and unplannedness doesn't have
> anything to do with it.
>
> Nothing to do with what? They are all close
> synonyms.
> >From dictionary.com definitions:
>
> accidental: Without intent.
> unplanned: Not intended; unintentional.
> intend: To have in mind; plan
> unintended: Not deliberate or intentional;
> unplanned
>
> What you may mean is that they don't correspond
>
> with "intent not to", but we are and have
> always been
> in agreement about that.
>
>
> > Also, if you need help with the keywords, I
> suppose I could do some.
>
> In this section, the keywords are basically all
> the words
> that appear in the definitions. Is it worth
> listing them again?
> If I left out some I might add them to the
> definition itself,
> or you are welcome to suggest others if they
> won't fit well
> in the definition. Were you thinking of any
> words in particular?

Now I am confused a bit. I thought that the
spread you had prpared was: determined (intend to
or not to/to not)-- undecided (thought about but
not yet formulated an intention) — not yet
thought about even. All of these formulated as
irrealis attitudes, like the title of the page
says. Now, unless the words are more misleading
than even arj notes, we seem to have to have,
first of all, a factual claim, not an attitude
(something about an occurred or occurring event,
not about a possibility whose time is not yet --
or only just — come). And secondly (and as a
consequent?) the negative is only the
contradictory negation of the simplest form of
the psoitive, not the strong opposite. That is,
it included the neutral case as well the (as I
understood it) negative case and even the
external negation of the original system. that
is, it seems to combine the worst possible
features of all the (apparent) proposals. if we
take out the factual elements (which don't
belong, as noted), especially "accidentality,"
it is possible to stretch the ordinary
understanding of the remaining (insofar as these
odd words have ordinary understandings) to bring
them almost back into line with what I took to be
the proposal before: reading "non-intent" as
having no consideration of intention at all and
similarly for "unintentionality" and
"unplannedness." But then the keywords — or the
definition — needs a footnote warning the the
meaings have stretched in a particular way.


posts: 953

On Wed, 10 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:

>>> .ai nai (UI*1)
>>
>>> Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent / unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti)
>>
>> This is not only noncompliant with the baseline, but it is also confusing. Accidentality and unplannedness doesn't have anything to do with it.
>
> Nothing to do with what? They are all close synonyms.
>> From dictionary.com definitions:
>
> accidental: Without intent.
> unplanned: Not intended; unintentional.
> intend: To have in mind; plan
> unintended: Not deliberate or intentional; unplanned
>
> What you may mean is that they don't correspond
> with "intent not to", but we are and have always been
> in agreement about that.

That is what I meant by non-intent, and the other synonyms which you
removed from the definition suggestion. I want to have a definition that
is baseline-compliant, and I suggested one to you.

>> Also, if you need help with the keywords, I suppose I could do some.
>
> In this section, the keywords are basically all the words
> that appear in the definitions.

Including "used", to", and so on?

> Is it worth listing them again?

Yes, to take the burden off those who are going to put the results of the
section into the dictionary. It is important that they are not seen as
making decisions of their own.

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
<Nixon> Etter revolusjonen har jeg ordnet meg slik at jeg fr meg statue.
<Nixon> Har avtalt dette med nkkelpersoner p venstresiden.
<Nixon> Som takk for min innsats.
<Nixon> Det blir en 150m hy statue i havnebassenget.
<Kre> skal du ha restaurant i hodet?


On 8/10/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
> On Wed, 10 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambías wrote:
> > What you may mean is that they don't correspond
> > with "intent not to", but we are and have always been
> > in agreement about that.
>
> That is what I meant by non-intent, and the other synonyms which you
> removed from the definition suggestion.

Arrghh, this is getting silly.

"Non-intent" is not a standard word, so it is not in most
dictionaries and I can't point you to a standard definition,
but it is plainly not synonymous with "rejection/refusal".
Here is an example of usage of "nonintent":

"This statute is thus different from one that simply outlawed
any public burning or mutilation of the flag, regardless of the
expressive intent or 459 U.S. 949 , 955 nonintent of the
actor."

Taken from:
<http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=459&invol=949>

Where hopefully you will agree that nonintent = lack of intent.

In any case, it is also very clear to me that you don't
want {ai nai} used to indicate lack of intent.

> I want to have a definition that
> is baseline-compliant, and I suggested one to you.

I know. And I gave you my reasons why I reject that
definition.

BTW, if you insist so much on retaining {ai nai} = "intent
not to", shouldn't you argue also for {e'o nai} = "request
not to"?

And if those were adopted, to be systematic we should
also have {e'a nai} = "permission not to", {e'e nai} =
"encouragement not to", {e'i nai} = "command not to",
{e'u nai} = "suggestion not to", {ei nai} = "ought not",
{au nai} = "whish that not", {a'o nai} = "hope that not".

I don't see why {ai} should be the only one following that
pattern. Just because it was oddly glossed as
"rejection/refusal" in the ma'oste?

> >> Also, if you need help with the keywords, I suppose I could do some.
> >
> > In this section, the keywords are basically all the words
> > that appear in the definitions.
>
> Including "used", to", and so on?

Heh.

> > Is it worth listing them again?
>
> Yes, to take the burden off those who are going to put the results of the
> section into the dictionary. It is important that they are not seen as
> making decisions of their own.

If we were writing things in a machine readable format,
that would make sense. Otherwise, I don't see what kind
of decision you mean. Sorting out "used to express"
from the actual content?

The danger of duplicating the lists is that a word is left out
of one of them and then people start making interpretations
about why this or that word is in the definition but not used as
a keyword or viceversa. A keyword list only makes sense if it
adds something that is not there in the definition.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 953

On Wed, 10 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:

> On 8/10/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
>> On Wed, 10 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:
>>> What you may mean is that they don't correspond
>>> with "intent not to", but we are and have always been
>>> in agreement about that.
>>
>> That is what I meant by non-intent, and the other synonyms which you
>> removed from the definition suggestion.

> "Non-intent" is not a standard word, so it is not in most
> dictionaries and I can't point you to a standard definition,
> but it is plainly not synonymous with "rejection/refusal".
> Here is an example of usage of "nonintent":
>
> "This statute is thus different from one that simply outlawed
> any public burning or mutilation of the flag, regardless of the
> expressive intent or 459 U.S. 949 , 955 nonintent of the
> actor."
>
> Taken from:
> <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=459&invol=949>
>
> Where hopefully you will agree that nonintent = lack of intent.
>
> In any case, it is also very clear to me that you don't
> want {ai nai} used to indicate lack of intent.

Okay. I agree that that is misleading. How about simply removing
"non-intent" so that we get:

Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent / avoidance / rejection /
refusal (cf. fanta, rivbi)

?

>> I want to have a definition that
>> is baseline-compliant, and I suggested one to you.
>
> I know. And I gave you my reasons why I reject that
> definition.

Yes, but a poorly worded definition surely can't be a reason good enough
to throw out the intent of the old definition and create a wholly new one.

> BTW, if you insist so much on retaining {ai nai} = "intent
> not to", shouldn't you argue also for {e'o nai} = "request
> not to"?

Actually, I'd completely overlooked that. Thanks for pointing it out!

Suggested new definition:

.e'o (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to make a negative request. (cf. cpedu, pe'u)

Suggested new examples:

.e'onai ri zmadu lemi se cpadji
Don't give me more than I want.

Artificial example:
.e'onai do stapa le mlatu
Don't step on the cat!

> And if those were adopted, to be systematic we should
> also have {e'a nai} = "permission not to", {e'e nai} =
> "encouragement not to", {e'i nai} = "command not to",
> {e'u nai} = "suggestion not to", {ei nai} = "ought not",
> {au nai} = "whish that not", {a'o nai} = "hope that not".

I disagree both that that is more systematic, and that systematicity is
more important than compliance with the baseline and usage.

>>> Is it worth listing them again?
>>
>> Yes, to take the burden off those who are going to put the results of the
>> section into the dictionary. It is important that they are not seen as
>> making decisions of their own.
>
> If we were writing things in a machine readable format,
> that would make sense. Otherwise, I don't see what kind
> of decision you mean. Sorting out "used to express"
> from the actual content?
>
> The danger of duplicating the lists is that a word is left out
> of one of them and then people start making interpretations
> about why this or that word is in the definition but not used as
> a keyword or viceversa. A keyword list only makes sense if it
> adds something that is not there in the definition.

That *is* a good point. I think we should let it stand that way, at least
for now.

On second thought, maybe there could be interjections or adverbs that are
more useful for reverse lookup than "intent", "prohibit", and so on. I see
that you have already used "whoa" as a translation of ".e'e nai" in an
example.

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
Learn languages!
The more languages you know, the more incomprehensible you can get.


On 8/10/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
> On Wed, 10 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambías wrote:
>
> > BTW, if you insist so much on retaining {ai nai} = "intent
> > not to", shouldn't you argue also for {e'o nai} = "request
> > not to"?
>
> Actually, I'd completely overlooked that. Thanks for pointing it out!

You're welcome. :-)

> Suggested new definition:
>
> .e'o (UI1)
> Attitudinal. Used to make a negative request. (cf. cpedu, pe'u)
>
> Suggested new examples:
>
> .e'onai ri zmadu lemi se cpadji
> Don't give me more than I want.
>
> Artificial example:
> .e'onai do stapa le mlatu
> Don't step on the cat!

I'm not changing it, but keep them in case my proposal is
rejected and you or someone else takes over as shepherd for
the section.

> > And if those were adopted, to be systematic we should
> > also have {e'a nai} = "permission not to", {e'e nai} =
> > "encouragement not to", {e'i nai} = "command not to",
> > {e'u nai} = "suggestion not to", {ei nai} = "ought not",
> > {au nai} = "whish that not", {a'o nai} = "hope that not".
>
> I disagree both that that is more systematic,

Would you care to ellucidate? I think {UI nai broda}
= {UI na broda} would be pretty systematic, even though
against what I take the spirit of {nai} to be.

>and that systematicity is
> more important than compliance with the baseline and usage.

This, I think, is the issue. We probably both value systematicity,
compliance with ma'oste/CLL and usage, (and I would add
usability and usefulness) but we weigh them differently.

> > The danger of duplicating the lists is that a word is left out
> > of one of them and then people start making interpretations
> > about why this or that word is in the definition but not used as
> > a keyword or viceversa. A keyword list only makes sense if it
> > adds something that is not there in the definition.
>
> That *is* a good point. I think we should let it stand that way, at least
> for now.
>
> On second thought, maybe there could be interjections or adverbs that are
> more useful for reverse lookup than "intent", "prohibit", and so on. I see
> that you have already used "whoa" as a translation of ".e'e nai" in an
> example.

Yes, that's the kind of thing I had in mind for a keyword that
"adds something that is not there in the definition". I should
point out to you that my definitions of {e'e} and {e'i} *may* also
not agree with ma'oste/CLL. It's just that in these cases it's
harder to interpret what exactly the ma'oste/CLL definitions
are.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388

Personally, I think that trying to find one word
-- or a cluster of single words — to explain how
an expressive word is used is probably oftengoing
to lead to misunderstandings. A scenario would
make more sense: "this word is appropriate when
...." I expect the problems with {ai} can be
repeated mutatis mutandis throughout UI.



> On 8/10/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org>
> wrote:
> > On Wed, 10 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambías wrote:
> > > What you may mean is that they don't
> correspond
> > > with "intent not to", but we are and have
> always been
> > > in agreement about that.
> >
> > That is what I meant by non-intent, and the
> other synonyms which you
> > removed from the definition suggestion.
>
> Arrghh, this is getting silly.
>
> "Non-intent" is not a standard word, so it is
> not in most
> dictionaries and I can't point you to a
> standard definition,
> but it is plainly not synonymous with
> "rejection/refusal".
> Here is an example of usage of "nonintent":
>
> "This statute is thus different from one that
> simply outlawed
> any public burning or mutilation of the flag,
> regardless of the
> expressive intent or 459 U.S. 949 , 955
> nonintent of the
> actor."
>
> Taken from:
>
<http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=459&invol=949>
>
> Where hopefully you will agree that nonintent =
> lack of intent.

The problem remains that "lack of intent" is too
vague for your present purpose: it can occur in
at least four different situations: intent not
to, intent to not, indecision, and lack of
considering the situation at all. Arj wants
either the first or second, presumably the first;
I took xorxes as wanting the fourth. But they
are all non-intent to do x.

> In any case, it is also very clear to me that
> you don't
> want {ai nai} used to indicate lack of intent.
>
> > I want to have a definition that
> > is baseline-compliant, and I suggested one to
> you.
>
> I know. And I gave you my reasons why I reject
> that
> definition.
>
> BTW, if you insist so much on retaining {ai
> nai} = "intent
> not to", shouldn't you argue also for {e'o nai}
> = "request
> not to"?
>
> And if those were adopted, to be systematic we
> should
> also have {e'a nai} = "permission not to", {e'e
> nai} =
> "encouragement not to", {e'i nai} = "command
> not to",
> {e'u nai} = "suggestion not to", {ei nai} =
> "ought not",
> {au nai} = "whish that not", {a'o nai} = "hope
> that not".

The pattern argument is an iffy approach. There
are clear cases among UI of opposites, clear
cases (to me) of either {xnai} as "x to not" or
"x not to," cases where the relation to negation
is unclear, and cases of meanings at right angles
to any obvious axis (more or less what the "never
considered" version of {ainai} is). I am not
sure where the preponderance lies, but there is
no unanimity for any one pattern.

> I don't see why {ai} should be the only one
> following that
> pattern. Just because it was oddly glossed as
> "rejection/refusal" in the ma'oste?

Well, there is also the fact that it seems to
have been used that way by the majority of people
who used it at all.

> > >> Also, if you need help with the keywords,
> I suppose I could do some.
> > >
> > > In this section, the keywords are basically
> all the words
> > > that appear in the definitions.
> >
> > Including "used", to", and so on?
>
> Heh.
>
> > > Is it worth listing them again?
> >
> > Yes, to take the burden off those who are
> going to put the results of the
> > section into the dictionary. It is important
> that they are not seen as
> > making decisions of their own.
>
> If we were writing things in a machine readable
> format,
> that would make sense. Otherwise, I don't see
> what kind
> of decision you mean. Sorting out "used to
> express"
> from the actual content?
>
> The danger of duplicating the lists is that a
> word is left out
> of one of them and then people start making
> interpretations
> about why this or that word is in the
> definition but not used as
> a keyword or viceversa. A keyword list only
> makes sense if it
> adds something that is not there in the
> definition.

See above.


On 8/10/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> Personally, I think that trying to find one word
> — or a cluster of single words — to explain how
> an expressive word is used is probably oftengoing
> to lead to misunderstandings. A scenario would
> make more sense: "this word is appropriate when
> ...." I expect the problems with {ai} can be
> repeated mutatis mutandis throughout UI.

Yes, that's why I think the examples are the most important
part of the definitions.

> The problem remains that "lack of intent" is too
> vague for your present purpose: it can occur in
> at least four different situations: intent not
> to, intent to not,

(I'm not sure my English is up to telling those two appart,
what's the difference? Googling for "I intend not to" and
"I intend to not", all I can figure out is a difference in
register, formal/informal, but I can't really find a difference
in meaning.)

In any case, those two seem to express intent to me. "Negative
intent" if you want, but not a lack of it.

> indecision, and lack of
> considering the situation at all.

The indecision position is admittedly somewhat artificial, I only
included it because it was already there in the ma'oste/CLL and
I can make some sense of it as a middle ground. It can be seen
as a lack of fully formed intent, but it's surely not am absolute
lack of intent.

> Arj wants
> either the first or second, presumably the first;
> I took xorxes as wanting the fourth. But they
> are all non-intent to do x.

Well, yes, intent to not do x requires non-intent to do x,
but it requires more than that.

> The pattern argument is an iffy approach. There
> are clear cases among UI of opposites, clear
> cases (to me) of either {xnai} as "x to not" or
> "x not to," cases where the relation to negation
> is unclear, and cases of meanings at right angles
> to any obvious axis (more or less what the "never
> considered" version of {ainai} is). I am not
> sure where the preponderance lies, but there is
> no unanimity for any one pattern.

Let's list them then, and compare. The more relevant
ones for this are all in the "irrealis" section, and I have
only 11 there (some may want to argue for removing
or adding some, for example you mentioned "fear that..."
recently, which is not there.)

> > I don't see why {ai} should be the only one
> > following that
> > pattern. Just because it was oddly glossed as
> > "rejection/refusal" in the ma'oste?
>
> Well, there is also the fact that it seems to
> have been used that way by the majority of people
> who used it at all.

Yes, usage is one of the factors to take into considaration.
(I don't consider the usage of {ai nai} to have been very
significant, but not surprizingly it did tend to follow the
keywords. I think I even used it in the Alice translation.)

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 953

On Wed, 10 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:

>> Suggested new definition:
>>
>> .e'o (UI1)
>> Attitudinal. Used to make a negative request. (cf. cpedu, pe'u)
>>
>> Suggested new examples:
>>
>> .e'onai ri zmadu lemi se cpadji
>> Don't give me more than I want.
>>
>> Artificial example:
>> .e'onai do stapa le mlatu
>> Don't step on the cat!
>
> I'm not changing it, but keep them in case my proposal is
> rejected and you or someone else takes over as shepherd for
> the section.

Can't you at least point out some parts of the proposal, so that I can
write one that is more acceptable? I'd hate to see you step down as
shepherd for this section, seeing as you have done a fine job with
most/all of the others.

>> and that systematicity is
>> more important than compliance with the baseline and usage.
>
> This, I think, is the issue. We probably both value systematicity,
> compliance with ma'oste/CLL and usage, (and I would add
> usability and usefulness) but we weigh them differently.

Right.

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
If you connect yourself across a 2000V supply, the very best you can
hope for is something like a serious heart attack with severe burns
thrown in for good measure. IT'S MUCH MORE LIKELY THAT YOU'LL BE DEAD.
-- John Nelson: Power Supplies & Control Units, in The VHF/UHF DX Book


posts: 2388




> On 8/10/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > Personally, I think that trying to find one
> word
> > — or a cluster of single words — to explain
> how
> > an expressive word is used is probably
> oftengoing
> > to lead to misunderstandings. A scenario
> would
> > make more sense: "this word is appropriate
> when
> > ...." I expect the problems with {ai} can be
> > repeated mutatis mutandis throughout UI.
>
> Yes, that's why I think the examples are the
> most important
> part of the definitions.

They would be if we knew more about them. As it
stands they are open to almost any available
interpretation.

> > The problem remains that "lack of intent" is
> too
> > vague for your present purpose: it can occur
> in
> > at least four different situations: intent
> not
> > to, intent to not,
>
> (I'm not sure my English is up to telling those
> two appart,
> what's the difference? Googling for "I intend
> not to" and
> "I intend to not", all I can figure out is a
> difference in
> register, formal/informal, but I can't really
> find a difference
> in meaning.)
I am being a logician here so it is a scoping
thing. "I intend to not do x" means that that is
my intention without any further specification --
I will resist doing x." "I intend to do not x"
means that I intend to do something other than
(and incompatible with) x at the time of
opportunity for x. Both of these (and the others
as well) fall into the case "I do not intend to
do x," i.e., "I intend to do x" is false (These
are of course descriptions of appropriate times
to say thing with {ai} and {nai} and {na} and so
on, not actual cases of saying these or rather
translations of such).

> In any case, those two seem to express intent
> to me. "Negative
> intent" if you want, but not a lack of it.

They do indeed and negative intent only in the
sense that what is intended is described
negatively. The problem with "non-intent" is
that it has no real use (the law and related
topics are really real, after all) And most of
the others when used with a mention of what is
not intended, are of the broad sort noted above.
This is why spelling out the conditions — or at
least stating flat out that non-intent to do x,
means having no intent with regard to x, even to
the extent of being not yet determined between
yea and nay. (The example with non-intending
symbolic speech or some such does not clearly
give your menaing but is at least as likely just
"whether or not they intended symbolic speech" or
whatever, that is the whole range of "not
intend.")

> > indecision, and lack of
> > considering the situation at all.
>
> The indecision position is admittedly somewhat
> artificial, I only
> included it because it was already there in the
> ma'oste/CLL and
> I can make some sense of it as a middle ground.
> It can be seen
> as a lack of fully formed intent, but it's
> surely not am absolute
> lack of intent.

You see, it quite literally is just that lack of
intent, because you have not yet formed an
intention to do one or the other (which gives
another of the plausible readings of {ainai}).
You can't intend to do something unless you have
formed that intention (I'm sure there is a
philosopher somewhere who would argue endlessly
against this point, but the broad outline of it
seems correct enough for present purposes).
Intention is a conscious act of will, in other
words, and so until you have made that effort you
don't have an intention.


> > Arj wants
> > either the first or second, presumably the
> first;
> > I took xorxes as wanting the fourth. But
> they
> > are all non-intent to do x.
>
> Well, yes, intent to not do x requires
> non-intent to do x,
> but it requires more than that.

Yes, it is one particular place within the
complement of intending to do x, as is intending
to do something (which happens to be)incompatible
with x and, of course, not having thought about x
at all.

> > The pattern argument is an iffy approach.
> There
> > are clear cases among UI of opposites, clear
> > cases (to me) of either {xnai} as "x to not"
> or
> > "x not to," cases where the relation to
> negation
> > is unclear, and cases of meanings at right
> angles
> > to any obvious axis (more or less what the
> "never
> > considered" version of {ainai} is). I am not
> > sure where the preponderance lies, but there
> is
> > no unanimity for any one pattern.
>
> Let's list them then, and compare. The more
> relevant
> ones for this are all in the "irrealis"
> section, and I have
> only 11 there (some may want to argue for
> removing
> or adding some, for example you mentioned "fear
> that..."
> recently, which is not there.)

I assumed you had alreeady made such a list as
part of preparing these sections (I guess you are
not doing all the VV's, but at least for your
sets). It may well be that — since I just
looked at some cases without thinking about what
sort of UI they were — the patterns are
different for different different classes (if so
that is wortha note somewhere as well). As for
"fear," the relevant one ("fear that") seems to
be just the negative (in the photo sense) version
of "despair": if I despair of x, I fear that not
x. If you think these critters need a closer look
than you have given them, I'll elaborate on that
point a bit in the survey.

> > > I don't see why {ai} should be the only one
> > > following that
> > > pattern. Just because it was oddly glossed
> as
> > > "rejection/refusal" in the ma'oste?
> >
> > Well, there is also the fact that it seems to
> > have been used that way by the majority of
> people
> > who used it at all.
>
> Yes, usage is one of the factors to take into
> considaration.
> (I don't consider the usage of {ai nai} to have
> been very
> significant, but not surprizingly it did tend
> to follow the
> keywords. I think I even used it in the Alice
> translation.)

So there you have arj's argument in a nutshell,
except for the relatively higher value he places
on tradition.



On 8/10/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On 8/10/05, John E Clifford
> > <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > > The problem remains that "lack of intent" is
> > too
> > > vague for your present purpose: it can occur
> > in
> > > at least four different situations: intent
> > not
> > > to, intent to not,
> >
> > (I'm not sure my English is up to telling those
> > two appart,
> > what's the difference? Googling for "I intend
> > not to" and
> > "I intend to not", all I can figure out is a
> > difference in
> > register, formal/informal, but I can't really
> > find a difference
> > in meaning.)
> I am being a logician here so it is a scoping
> thing. "I intend to not do x" means that that is
> my intention without any further specification --
> I will resist doing x." "I intend to do not x"
> means that I intend to do something other than
> (and incompatible with) x at the time of
> opportunity for x.

That I understand, yes, but you did not address the issue,
you introduced a third form:

1) Intend not to do X
2) Intend to not do X
3) Intend to do not X

(3) is clearly different from (1) and (2), which is what you
explain, but the only difference I can see between (1) and
(2) is one of register.


> The problem with "non-intent" is
> that it has no real use (the law and related
> topics are really real, after all)

Did you mean "are not really real"? Otherwise, I don't follow.


...
> I assumed you had alreeady made such a list as
> part of preparing these sections (I guess you are
> not doing all the VV's, but at least for your
> sets).

I am doing all the VV's, yes. You can find the rest here:
<http://www.lojban.org/tiki/tiki-index.php?page=BPFK%20Section%3A%20Realis%20Attitudinals>

> It may well be that — since I just
> looked at some cases without thinking about what
> sort of UI they were — the patterns are
> different for different different classes (if so
> that is wortha note somewhere as well).

I will write some kind of summary of the irrealis later
today. In the end, anyone who is really interested in
finding patterns will have to do the work of looking
for them by themselves, because the classes are not
always obvious and clearcut.

> As for
> "fear," the relevant one ("fear that") seems to
> be just the negative (in the photo sense) version
> of "despair": if I despair of x, I fear that not
> x. If you think these critters need a closer look
> than you have given them, I'll elaborate on that
> point a bit in the survey.

All I'm saying is that "fear that..." is nowhere to be
found on the list of UIs. You are welcome to elaborate
on English expressions, but it would be more useful
if you somehow relate them to the Lojban system (if it
can be called that), since that's what we are defining
here.

> > Yes, usage is one of the factors to take into
> > considaration.
> > (I don't consider the usage of {ai nai} to have
> > been very
> > significant, but not surprizingly it did tend
> > to follow the
> > keywords. I think I even used it in the Alice
> > translation.)
>
> So there you have arj's argument in a nutshell,
> except for the relatively higher value he places
> on tradition.

Indeed. His point was crystal clear from the beginning.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On 8/10/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > > On 8/10/05, John E Clifford
> > > <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > > > The problem remains that "lack of intent"
> is
> > > too
> > > > vague for your present purpose: it can
> occur
> > > in
> > > > at least four different situations:
> intent
> > > not
> > > > to, intent to not,
> > >
> > > (I'm not sure my English is up to telling
> those
> > > two appart,
> > > what's the difference? Googling for "I
> intend
> > > not to" and
> > > "I intend to not", all I can figure out is
> a
> > > difference in
> > > register, formal/informal, but I can't
> really
> > > find a difference
> > > in meaning.)
> > I am being a logician here so it is a
> scoping
> > thing. "I intend to not do x" means that
> that is
> > my intention without any further
> specification --
> > I will resist doing x." "I intend to do not
> x"
> > means that I intend to do something other
> than
> > (and incompatible with) x at the time of
> > opportunity for x.
>
> That I understand, yes, but you did not address
> the issue,
> you introduced a third form:
>
> 1) Intend not to do X
> 2) Intend to not do X
> 3) Intend to do not X
>
> (3) is clearly different from (1) and (2),
> which is what you
> explain, but the only difference I can see
> between (1) and
> (2) is one of register.

A problem in using short forms like "intend not
to" and "intend to not," instead of the fuller
forms. I agree that my "intend not to" might be
either 1 or 2 (as usual, someone could problably
find differences, but I don't see them for the
moment — tone aside). "intend to not" was meant
to be your 3.
>
> > The problem with "non-intent" is
> > that it has no real use (the law and related
> > topics are really real, after all)
>
> Did you mean "are not really real"?

Yes.

Otherwise,
> I don't follow.
>
>
> ...
> > I assumed you had already made such a list
> as
> > part of preparing these sections (I guess you
> are
> > not doing all the VV's, but at least for your
> > sets).
>
> I am doing all the VV's, yes. You can find the
> rest here:
>
<http://www.lojban.org/tiki/tiki-index.php?page=BPFK%20Section%3A%20Realis%20Attitudinals>
>
> > It may well be that — since I just
> > looked at some cases without thinking about
> what
> > sort of UI they were — the patterns are
> > different for different different classes (if
> so
> > that is worth a note somewhere as well).
>
> I will write some kind of summary of the
> irrealis later
> today. In the end, anyone who is really
> interested in
> finding patterns will have to do the work of
> looking
> for them by themselves, because the classes are
> not
> always obvious and clearcut.
>
> > As for
> > "fear," the relevant one ("fear that") seems
> to
> > be just the negative (in the photo sense)
> version
> > of "despair": if I despair of x, I fear that
> not
> > x. If you think these critters need a closer
> look
> > than you have given them, I'll elaborate on
> that
> > point a bit in the survey.
>
> All I'm saying is that "fear that..." is
> nowhere to be
> found on the list of UIs. You are welcome to
> elaborate
> on English expressions, but it would be more
> useful
> if you somehow relate them to the Lojban system
> (if it
> can be called that), since that's what we are
> defining
> here.

As far as I can figure out, "hope that x" is
appropriate for cases where 1) x is a living
possibility (in the speaker's mind, at least) 2)
the speaker has a positive attitude toward x
(maybe even desires that it occur, more than just
approving of it) 3) its coming to be or not is
outside his control (in his opinion again) 4) it
is not clearly the most likely possibility for
the occasion in question (in his opinion yet
again). "despair" agrees with "hope" in 2 and 3
at least (addingg perhaps in 2 that the speaker
has a negative attitude — even fear of — toward
x not occurring or at least some particular --
and likely — alternative), but in place of 4 we
have that x is the least likely of viable
possibilities or maybe not even viable at all
anymore (so 1 may go as well). "fear that x"
agrees with "hope" on 1 and 3 but has a negative
attitude (even desires not) for 2 and has it the
most likely possibility in 4. So the
interrelations here are more complex than can be
dealt with simply by negating some chunk the
surface formula: "despair" is the extreme form of
"hope" in that x need be not only less than most
likely (and this is the least certain part of
"hope") but actually the least likely, even not
viable. It may also have the stronger element in
the speaker's attitude) "fear" seems to be more
than "hope that not x" for a number of reasons:
not-x being most likely does not follow from x
being less than most likely nor conversely,
indeed not-x is too indeterminate to be of much
use here, where the fear is of a prrticular thing
(hope that x as fear that not-x works a bit
better but still misses the part about positive
attitudes: negative toward x does not gurantee
positive toward not-x). And of course, "not hope
that", "noot despair of" and "not feart that"
don't get us anywhere at all toward any of the
other, though "hope" and "fear" as polar
opposites is not too bad (within the context of
viable alternatives outside one's control). I do
think it is the case that if a despairs of x then
a fears that not-x, except that range of not-x is
usually more specific. So what does this say
about {a'o}? On the basis of {nai} giving the
opposite, {ao'nai} should be "fear that"
propbably, but none of this does much about the
affective aspects of these attitudes, which are
quite different and not obviously related in any
way that could be called negation. Ineed, it is
mainly the affect tht separates hope from
despair, probably what coverts — in the
speaker's mind — from "not most likely to "least
likely": once you get, gloomy it spreads. So, as
affects, the two are opposite and it could be
argued that affects are what attitudinals are all
about.


> > > Yes, usage is one of the factors to take
> into
> > > considaration.
> > > (I don't consider the usage of {ai nai} to
> have
> > > been very
> > > significant, but not surprizingly it did
> tend
> > > to follow the
> > > keywords. I think I even used it in the
> Alice
> > > translation.)
> >
> > So there you have arj's argument in a
> nutshell,
> > except for the relatively higher value he
> places
> > on tradition.
>
> Indeed. His point was crystal clear from the
> beginning.
>
> mu'o mi'e xorxes
>
>
>
>



We can sort the "irrealis" attitudinals broadly into three
classes:

a-series: ai, au, a'o, ei ("ei" is an honorary member here)
e-series: e'a, e'e, e'i ,e'o, e'u
i-series: ia, ie

The a-series is used to express the attitude of the speaker
towards a certain situation.

The e-series is used to express the attitude of the speaker
towards a certain situation to be brought about by the
audience or, eventually, by a third party.

The i-series is used to indicate how the speaker evaluates
a proposition in regards to its correspondence with reality.

{au} and {a'o} both indicate a situation that the speaker would
find desirable. The difference is that with {au} the speaker
judges the situation to be impossible (i.e. incompatible with
how things really are) or at least extremely unlikely, whereas
with {a'o} it is judged to be possible and even likely (i.e.
compatible with how things really are, and the speaker is
optimistic), but still uncertain, for if the speaker knew that
the world agreed with their desideratum they would express
hapiness (ui) or pleasure (oinai) rather than hope.

{aunai} and {a'onai} both indicate a situation that the speaker
would find undesirable. The difference is that with {aunai} the
speaker judges the situation to be relatively unlikely, or at
least avoidable, whereas with {a'onai} it is judged to be quite
likely (i.e. the speaker is pessimistic), but still uncertain, for if
the speaker knew for sure that the world agreed with the
undesirable situation they would express unhappiness (uinai)
or complaint (oi) rather than despair.

{aucu'i} (and eventually {a'ocu'i}) indicates a situation that the
speaker finds neither desirable nor undesirable. Since the
speaker is apathetic to the situation, the relative likelihood
loses relevance and perhaps that's why {a'ocu'i} is not even
glossed, but still {aucu'i} could be used for something
considered more unlikely and {a'ocu'i} for something more
likely. When the world agrees with the indifferent situation
the indifference could be expressed as (uicu'i) or (oicu'i)
(neither has been glossed).

{ei} indicates that the speaker judges the situation as described
to be how the world "ought to be". There is no indication as
to whether the speaker considers the world to actually be
that way or not, most often the world will not be as it ought to,
or there would be no need to point out the discrepancy, but
it's also possible to say "this is how it is, and that's just how
it ought to be too"; and there is no indication about what criteria
are used to make the judjement (moral, spiritual, social,
physical, etc. this can probably be indicated with a modifier.)

{einai} indicates that the speaker does not take the situation
as described to be how the world "ought to be". There is no
indication as to whether the speaker considers the world
to actually be thus or not, most often however the world *will*
be that way, or there would be no need to point out that there
is no obligation for it to be that way, but it's also possible to
say "this is not how it is, and there's no need for it to be that
way either".

{ai} indicates a situation that the speakers takes to be the
goal or purpose of their actions. As with {ei}, the situation
may or may not coincide with actuality: it's a target which
may be hit or missed.

{ainai} indicates a situation that the speakers takes not to be
the goal or purpose of their actions. The situation may or
may not coincide with actuality: it is just not a target. In many
cases it *will* coincide with actuality, or at least appear to,
or there would be no reason to bring it up.

{aicu'i} indicates a situation that the speaker contemplates
as a goal or purpose of their actions. The situation
may or may not coincide with actuality: it's just not clear
to the speaker whether it is the target or not.



With the e-series, the speaker makes a transfer of some
kind to the audience:

e'a: the speaker grants permission to the audience
e'e: the speaker gives encouragement to the audience
e'i: the speaker imposes a command to the audience
e'o: the speaker poses a request to the audience
e'u: the speaker offers a suggestion to the audience

The transference language may be metaphorical
but I think it shows that the speaker is placing the
onus for bringing the situation about on the audience
(or eventually a third party). These can all be
accompanied with {ko}, or rather, using {ko} by itself
could replace any of these, losing the specific attitude
of the speaker with respect to the action.

e'anai: the speaker imposes a prohibition to the audience
e'enai: the speaker throws discouragement to the audience
e'inai: the speaker gives freedom to the audience
e'onai: the speaker grants a favor to the audience
e'unai: the speaker proffers a warning to the audience

{e'a} and {e'i} can be seen as duals, in the same way
that "may" and "must" are duals. The difference between
{e'a} (permission) and {e'inai} (unconstrain) is the difference
between "may" and "need not".



{ia} and {ie} are used to indicate that the speaker judges
the situation described to correspond with reality. The
difference between them is that with {ia} the speaker brings
up the situation in question themselves, whereas with {ie}
the speaker is judging a situation brough up by someone
else.

{ianai} and {ienai} are used to indicate that the speaker judges
the situation described to not correspond with reality.

{iacu'i} and {iecu'i} are used to indicate that the speaker
cannot or will not make a definite judgement as to whether
the situation described corresponds with reality or not.

Notice that {ia} and {ie} could be taken to constitute
assertions, because the speaker is indicating that the
proposition in question does properly describe reality
according to them, but I would say that the proposition
is not really asserted in those cases, it is just the attitude
of the speaker towards the proposition that is expressed.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


On 8/11/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
...
> other, though "hope" and "fear" as polar
> opposites is not too bad (within the context of
> viable alternatives outside one's control).

I have added "used to express fear that the situation
ensues" for {a'onai}. I always took the keyword "despair"
in the sense of "despair that..." rather than "despair of...",
which is what you describe. "Despair that..." fits with
"fear that..." in that both refer to situations that the
speaker finds undesirable.

> So what does this say
> about {a'o}? On the basis of {nai} giving the
> opposite, {ao'nai} should be "fear that"
> propbably,

Yes, I agree.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388



> On 8/11/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> ...
> > other, though "hope" and "fear" as polar
> > opposites is not too bad (within the context
> of
> > viable alternatives outside one's control).
>
> I have added "used to express fear that the
> situation
> ensues" for {a'onai}. I always took the keyword
> "despair"
> in the sense of "despair that..." rather than
> "despair of...",
> which is what you describe. "Despair that..."
> fits with
> "fear that..." in that both refer to situations
> that the
> speaker finds undesirable.

I don't think I have "despair that" in my
idiolect. I was worried about the different form
from "hope that" and "fear that" but had nothing
to move to in that direction with "despair."
And it seems I am not alone in this, the OED has
only a couple of citations for "despair that" and
they are old (pre18th century). As for despair
in any case referring to an event that the the
speaker finds undesireable, the event mentioned
is always (I may have missed a case, though the
OED does not give a definition to fit) a
desirable one and despair is the loss of hope
that it will occur. That is "despair that/of x"
means that x is desired, among other things.
Whereas, in "fear that x" x is undesirable. The
bad thing in despair is that what is mentioned
won't happen, in fear it is that it will.


On 8/11/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
>
> I don't think I have "despair that" in my
> idiolect. I was worried about the different form
> from "hope that" and "fear that" but had nothing
> to move to in that direction with "despair."
> And it seems I am not alone in this, the OED has
> only a couple of citations for "despair that" and
> they are old (pre18th century).

These might be more current (from the first page
of "I despair that" by Google):

Today, I despair that too many of us have already
decided to surrender.

I despair that I feel like a stranger in my own land --
as though I don't belong — because the values I hold
dear are so marginalized.

I despair that I had to queue five hours for my ticket;
I despair that a large proportion of the fans who were
there couldn't be bothered to cheer on the...

Sometimes I despair that I'm fighting on a false front.

I despair that very few members of the American
community will follow suit.

I despair that this stupid Western trend is becoming
popular in Japan.

At times I despair that misery truly is the human
condition, and we immortals are certainly not spared
our immortal share of it.

I despair that things will never change.


> As for despair
> in any case referring to an event that the the
> speaker finds undesireable, the event mentioned
> is always (I may have missed a case, though the
> OED does not give a definition to fit) a
> desirable one and despair is the loss of hope
> that it will occur.

That doesn't seem to agree with current usage.

> That is "despair that/of x"
> means that x is desired, among other things.
> Whereas, in "fear that x" x is undesirable. The
> bad thing in despair is that what is mentioned
> won't happen, in fear it is that it will.

In the examples above the x of "I despair that x"
is undesirable for the speaker.

I did find one where x was desirable:

"I despair that I shall ever win to the far end of that
love, there are so many plies in it."

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388




> We can sort the "irrealis" attitudinals broadly
> into three
> classes:
>
> a-series: ai, au, a'o, ei ("ei" is an honorary
> member here)
> e-series: e'a, e'e, e'i ,e'o, e'u
> i-series: ia, ie
>
> The a-series is used to express the attitude of
> the speaker
> towards a certain situation.

I am not even sure what this means, but maybe its
very unclarity helps for the purpose of tying up
one bundle. But it doesn't seem to me to do a
good job even then. Of course, part of the
problem is that strange "attitude" which means
God knows what, if anything.

> The e-series is used to express the attitude of
> the speaker
> towards a certain situation to be brought about
> by the
> audience or, eventually, by a third party.
>
> The i-series is used to indicate how the
> speaker evaluates
> a proposition in regards to its correspondence
> with reality.

These others are better so I take your remarks on
a as being an attempt to cover the garbage
category.
> {au} and {a'o} both indicate a situation that
> the speaker would
> find desirable. The difference is that with
> {au} the speaker
> judges the situation to be impossible (i.e.
> incompatible with
> how things really are) or at least extremely
> unlikely,
Why so? Can't he desire something without also
judging that it is hard to get. He may very well
(and often does) desire something without
(before) considering whether he can get it. I
don't see how this is going to help with {aunai}
as "reluctance" (not a very meaningful word off
hand anyhow). To be sure, I am not clear how this
is something that can be expressed, but that is
by now a generic worry in this list.

whereas
> with {a'o} it is judged to be possible and even
> likely (i.e.
> compatible with how things really are, and the
> speaker is
> optimistic), but still uncertain, for if the
> speaker knew that
> the world agreed with their desideratum they
> would express
> hapiness (ui) or pleasure (oinai) rather than
> hope.

Well, surely not hope then, but maybe not joy yet
either, waiting for it to come to pass before he
throws the party.

> {aunai} and {a'onai} both indicate a situation
> that the speaker
> would find undesirable.

Well, the sentence with the {a'onai} actually
mentions (if "despair" is the right word) a
desirable event — what is undesirable is that it
is very unlikely to occur.

The difference is that
> with {aunai} the
> speaker judges the situation to be relatively
> unlikely, or at
> least avoidable,

I don't see this (indeed, I don't see likelihood
in {au} at all, but then I still can't deal with
"reluctance," whichseems to be about will not
about desire.

whereas with {a'onai}
it is
> judged to be quite
> likely (i.e. the speaker is pessimistic), but
> still uncertain, for if
> the speaker knew for sure that the world agreed
> with the
> undesirable situation they would express
> unhappiness (uinai)
> or complaint (oi) rather than despair.

See above.

> {aucu'i} (and eventually {a'ocu'i}) indicates a
> situation that the
> speaker finds neither desirable nor
> undesirable. Since the
> speaker is apathetic to the situation, the
> relative likelihood
> loses relevance
if it every had any

and perhaps that's why
> {a'ocu'i} is not even
> glossed, but still {aucu'i} could be used for
> something
> considered more unlikely and {a'ocu'i} for
> something more
> likely.

This might, I suppose, be right for {a'o}, since
the difference (assuming "despair" is right) is
just likelihood, but then the {cu'i} form would
have to be about things just balance — as likely
as not.

When the world agrees with the
> indifferent situation
> the indifference could be expressed as (uicu'i)
> or (oicu'i)
> (neither has been glossed).
>
> {ei} indicates that the speaker judges the
> situation as described
> to be how the world "ought to be". There is no
> indication as
> to whether the speaker considers the world to
> actually be
> that way or not, most often the world will not
> be as it ought to,
> or there would be no need to point out the
> discrepancy, but
> it's also possible to say "this is how it is,
> and that's just how
> it ought to be too"; and there is no indication
> about what criteria
> are used to make the judjement (moral,
> spiritual, social,
> physical, etc. this can probably be indicated
> with a modifier.)

Nice. I was taking it as laying down an ob --
along the lines of {e'a} — which got me into
trouble precisely with {e'a}

> {einai} indicates that the speaker does not
> take the situation
> as described to be how the world "ought to be".
> There is no
> indication as to whether the speaker considers
> the world
> to actually be thus or not, most often however
> the world *will*
> be that way, or there would be no need to point
> out that there
> is no obligation for it to be that way, but
> it's also possible to
> say "this is not how it is, and there's no need
> for it to be that
> way either".

Again, "freedom" sounds like something to do with
the will rather than judgment. I am not sure
what to make of this as a judgment; is what you
are doing making {einai} be for things that are
not covered by whatever the person is judging
from? Rather than just things which are in the
area but not given any particular force.

> {ai} indicates a situation that the speakers
> takes to be the
> goal or purpose of their actions. As with {ei},
> the situation
> may or may not coincide with actuality: it's a
> target which
> may be hit or missed.

Here attitude is pretty hopeless. This seems
pretty clearly about will and {ai x} indicates
the intention to bring about x. It can only be
used when x is not the case (so far as the
speaker knows, etc.)

> {ainai} indicates a situation that the speakers
> takes not to be
> the goal or purpose of their actions. The
> situation may or
> may not coincide with actuality: it is just not
> a target. In many
> cases it *will* coincide with actuality, or at
> least appear to,
> or there would be no reason to bring it up.

I liked "has not considered" better — clearer
anyhow, even if you decide it misses the exact
place. I get no very clear idea of what this
means — in particular hwo it differs from
deciding to go for not-x.

> {aicu'i} indicates a situation that the speaker
> contemplates
> as a goal or purpose of their actions.

But has not yet decided whether to go for it or
not.

The
> situation
> may or may not coincide with actuality: it's
> just not clear
> to the speaker whether it is the target or not.

It only makes sense if the event is not present
(so far as the speaker believes)
> ----
>
> With the e-series, the speaker makes a transfer
> of some
> kind to the audience:
>
> e'a: the speaker grants permission to the
> audience
> e'e: the speaker gives encouragement to the
> audience
> e'i: the speaker imposes a command to the
> audience
> e'o: the speaker poses a request to the
> audience
> e'u: the speaker offers a suggestion to the
> audience

This makes for a pretty nice packet, laying out
the common directive uses of language. While th
interactions among them may be interesting, we
don't need them here. However, most of these,
while, they make a lot more sense, are not
obviously what the standard list gives.
Admittedly, the standard list in virtually
unintelligible here and the moves seem to be in
the right direction, but I can see a lot of
people — if anyone has ever used any of these
confidently — being up in arms about the
changes.

> The transference language may be metaphorical
> but I think it shows that the speaker is
> placing the
> onus for bringing the situation about on the
> audience
> (or eventually a third party). These can all be
>
> accompanied with {ko}, or rather, using {ko} by
> itself
> could replace any of these, losing the specific
> attitude
> of the speaker with respect to the action.
>
> e'anai: the speaker imposes a prohibition to
> the audience
> e'enai: the speaker throws discouragement to
> the audience
> e'inai: the speaker gives freedom to the
> audience

This one I don't understand. Releases from a
command or some other form of ob? How is it
different from a permission?

> e'onai: the speaker grants a favor to the
> audience
Nice opposition! Certainly better than "negative
request"

> e'unai: the speaker proffers a warning to the
> audience

Is a warning different from a suggestion that
not. Probably, but it isn the opposite of a
suggestion either.

> {e'a} and {e'i} can be seen as duals, in the
> same way
> that "may" and "must" are duals. The difference
> between
> {e'a} (permission) and {e'inai} (unconstrain)
> is the difference
> between "may" and "need not".

I am not sure what that difference is: "may x"
and "may not-x"? ----
>
> {ia} and {ie} are used to indicate that the
> speaker judges
> the situation described to correspond with
> reality. The
> difference between them is that with {ia} the
> speaker brings
> up the situation in question themselves,
> whereas with {ie}
> the speaker is judging a situation brough up by
> someone
> else.

I would take {ie} to be a performative not a
judgment. But then I tend to think of agreement
and disagreement as about proposals, not about
claims, responses to some {e'V} or other. {ia} on
the other hand is about facts and works as well
if someone else makes the claim as if I do. {ie}
on the other hand has nothing to do with reality
but will intentions or so.

<<{ianai} and {ienai} are used to indicate that
the speaker judges
the situation described to not correspond with
reality.

{iacu'i} and {iecu'i} are used to indicate that
the speaker
cannot or will not make a definite judgement as
to whether
the situation described corresponds with reality
or not.

Notice that {ia} and {ie} could be taken to
constitute
assertions, because the speaker is indicating
that the
proposition in question does properly describe
reality
according to them, but I would say that the
proposition
is not really asserted in those cases, it is just
the attitude
of the speaker towards the proposition that is
expressed.

I would agree for {ie} but not for {ia}, since
{ia} is often used as an intensive, to point to
external factors making the claim in need of stressing.


On 8/11/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
>
> --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > {au} and {a'o} both indicate a situation that
> > the speaker would
> > find desirable. The difference is that with
> > {au} the speaker
> > judges the situation to be impossible (i.e.
> > incompatible with
> > how things really are) or at least extremely
> > unlikely,
>
> Why so?

That's simply how I'm defining it. Similar to the
"Oh that x were the case" in English.

> Can't he desire something without also
> judging that it is hard to get.

That would be {a'o}.

> He may very well
> (and often does) desire something without
> (before) considering whether he can get it.

For example? (I hope by "something" here you don't
mean an object but rather that a situation obtain.

> > whereas
> > with {a'o} it is judged to be possible and even
> > likely (i.e.
> > compatible with how things really are, and the
> > speaker is
> > optimistic), but still uncertain, for if the
> > speaker knew that
> > the world agreed with their desideratum they
> > would express
> > hapiness (ui) or pleasure (oinai) rather than
> > hope.
>
> Well, surely not hope then, but maybe not joy yet
> either, waiting for it to come to pass before he
> throws the party.

For example? I have no problem with something like:

ui la djan ba vitke ca le bavlamdei
Yipee! John will visit tomorrow!

> > {aunai} and {a'onai} both indicate a situation
> > that the speaker
> > would find undesirable.
>
> Well, the sentence with the {a'onai} actually
> mentions (if "despair" is the right word) a
> desirable event — what is undesirable is that it
> is very unlikely to occur.

Which sentence? The one I have is:

.a'o nai ro da ca se cirko
Everything will be lost now.

which mentions an undesirable event.


> > but still {aucu'i} could be used for
> > something
> > considered more unlikely and {a'ocu'i} for
> > something more
> > likely.
>
> This might, I suppose, be right for {a'o}, since
> the difference (assuming "despair" is right) is
> just likelihood, but then the {cu'i} form would
> have to be about things just balance — as likely
> as not.

{a'o} is the more likely: {a'o} desirable/ {a'onai} undesirable
{au} is the more unlikely: {au} desirable / {aunai} undesirable

{cu'i} is neither desirable nor undesirable in both cases..


> I am not sure
> what to make of this as a judgment; is what you
> are doing making {einai} be for things that are
> not covered by whatever the person is judging
> from? Rather than just things which are in the
> area but not given any particular force.

I don't understand the question. I'm proposing that
{einai} indicates that the situation is not (perhaps
against appearances) how things need to be. The
example is:

.ei nai do tolnurcni
You don't have to feel threatened.

i.e. there is no (moral, physical, social, whatever) law
that says that you ought to feel threatened.

> > {ainai} indicates a situation that the speakers
> > takes not to be
> > the goal or purpose of their actions. The
> > situation may or
> > may not coincide with actuality: it is just not
> > a target. In many
> > cases it *will* coincide with actuality, or at
> > least appear to,
> > or there would be no reason to bring it up.
>
> I liked "has not considered" better — clearer
> anyhow, even if you decide it misses the exact
> place. I get no very clear idea of what this
> means — in particular hwo it differs from
> deciding to go for not-x.

One example is:

.ai nai do pu se xrani
I didn't mean for you to get hurt.

Your getting hurt was not the target of my actions, but
that doesn't mean that I ever decided to go for you not
getting hurt.


> > e'a: the speaker grants permission to the
> > audience
> > e'e: the speaker gives encouragement to the
> > audience
> > e'i: the speaker imposes a command to the
> > audience
> > e'o: the speaker poses a request to the
> > audience
> > e'u: the speaker offers a suggestion to the
> > audience
>
> This makes for a pretty nice packet, laying out
> the common directive uses of language. While th
> interactions among them may be interesting, we
> don't need them here. However, most of these,
> while, they make a lot more sense, are not
> obviously what the standard list gives.

{e'e} and {e'i} in particular, which is not really so'e
but it is so'o, yes.

> Admittedly, the standard list in virtually
> unintelligible here and the moves seem to be in
> the right direction, but I can see a lot of
> people — if anyone has ever used any of these
> confidently — being up in arms about the
> changes.

Indeed.


> > e'inai: the speaker gives freedom to the
> > audience
>
> This one I don't understand. Releases from a
> command or some other form of ob? How is it
> different from a permission?

It's a subtle difference. As I say below, similar to the
difference between "you may" and "you need not".

> I am not sure what that difference is: "may x"
> and "may not-x"? ----

Yes.


> I would take {ie} to be a performative not a
> judgment.

Well, usage has consistently been as in {ie go'i}
"I agree with that", as far as I can tell.

> But then I tend to think of agreement
> and disagreement as about proposals, not about
> claims, responses to some {e'V} or other.

That would probably fit {vi'o}.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On 8/11/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> >
> > I don't think I have "despair that" in my
> > idiolect. I was worried about the different
> form
> > from "hope that" and "fear that" but had
> nothing
> > to move to in that direction with "despair."
> > And it seems I am not alone in this, the OED
> has
> > only a couple of citations for "despair that"
> and
> > they are old (pre18th century).
>
> These might be more current (from the first
> page
> of "I despair that" by Google):
>
> Today, I despair that too many of us have
> already
> decided to surrender.
>
> I despair that I feel like a stranger in my own
> land --
> as though I don't belong — because the values
> I hold
> dear are so marginalized.
>
> I despair that I had to queue five hours for my
> ticket;
> I despair that a large proportion of the fans
> who were
> there couldn't be bothered to cheer on the...
>
> Sometimes I despair that I'm fighting on a
> false front.
>
> I despair that very few members of the American
>
> community will follow suit.
>
> I despair that this stupid Western trend is
> becoming
> popular in Japan.
>
> At times I despair that misery truly is the
> human
> condition, and we immortals are certainly not
> spared
> our immortal share of it.
>
> I despair that things will never change.

Well, this is a new usage (and I dread to think
how it came about — it is related to the old in
a peculiar way: despair that x = despair of
not-x). It has not made it into any dictionary I
could find. But, yes, it does offer just the
sort of thing you want: undesirable event likely
to occur (maybe not so strongly as fear that --
or maybe more so insofar as the hope lost carries
over from the older form, which is, happily,
still current). Given that the creators of the
original word list often use what I (and the
dictionaries) think of as nonstandard (indeed,
substandard) usage ("disinterest" elsewhere in
the list, the inability to distinguish between
"Don" and "dawn" and so on) I suppose this is
what they ahd in mind — though a usage that is
over twenty years old must have made it into some
dictionary or other (but my newest dictionary is
from the mid 90s). In any case, I suppose that
the affect and physiology of "despair that" is
like that of "despair of" and hence that "fear
that" (with a different affect and physiology)
is not an exact substitute. I suggest "dread"
for the key word — it is also wroing affectively
(and physiologically) but it is right logically
(actually better than "fear" since it has the
relevant future orientation) and does not
interfere with other sets.
>
> > As for despair
> > in any case referring to an event that the
> the
> > speaker finds undesireable, the event
> mentioned
> > is always (I may have missed a case, though
> the
> > OED does not give a definition to fit) a
> > desirable one and despair is the loss of hope
> > that it will occur.
>
> That doesn't seem to agree with current usage.
Well, I see no evidece that the old usage has
disappeared or event decreased in frequency. The
new seems merely added on. (And, I suspect, there
are some mixed cases, with "despair that" being
used for "despair of".) Hmmm, "despair that" is
roughly the dual of "hope that," affect and
physiology aside.

> > That is "despair that/of x"
> > means that x is desired, among other things.
> > Whereas, in "fear that x" x is undesirable.
> The
> > bad thing in despair is that what is
> mentioned
> > won't happen, in fear it is that it will.
>
> In the examples above the x of "I despair that
> x"
> is undesirable for the speaker.
>
> I did find one where x was desirable:
>
> "I despair that I shall ever win to the far end
> of that
> love, there are so many plies in it."

Ahah, a mixed case as predicted.


posts: 2388


> On 8/11/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> >
> > --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > {au} and {a'o} both indicate a situation
> that
> > > the speaker would
> > > find desirable. The difference is that with
> > > {au} the speaker
> > > judges the situation to be impossible (i.e.
> > > incompatible with
> > > how things really are) or at least
> extremely
> > > unlikely,
> >
> > Why so?
>
> That's simply how I'm defining it. Similar to
> the
> "Oh that x were the case" in English.

OK, but I don't see that that is particularly
what is wanted here. I mean, the old list and
usage must count for something and this does not
seem to be what those pointed to. On the other
hand, we do need something like that and nothing
else seems to do it efficiently.

> > Can't he desire something without also
> > judging that it is hard to get.
>
> That would be {a'o}.

Hope is very different from desire logically and
affectively. One can desire something quite
independently of any judgment about how (or
whether) it can be obtained.

> > He may very well
> > (and often does) desire something without
> > (before) considering whether he can get it.
>
> For example? (I hope by "something" here you
> don't
> mean an object but rather that a situation
> obtain.

In this context, yes (I would argue that we
always want a state of affairs, but that is
contentious). I want the next President to be a
Democrat but I have no idea what the likelihood
of that is — it being three years until the
election and all. Also — against "hope" — it
is not yet essentially out of my control — I can
at least make some contribution toward it.

> > > whereas
> > > with {a'o} it is judged to be possible and
> even
> > > likely (i.e.
> > > compatible with how things really are, and
> the
> > > speaker is
> > > optimistic), but still uncertain, for if
> the
> > > speaker knew that
> > > the world agreed with their desideratum
> they
> > > would express
> > > hapiness (ui) or pleasure (oinai) rather
> than
> > > hope.
> >
> > Well, surely not hope then, but maybe not joy
> yet
> > either, waiting for it to come to pass before
> he
> > throws the party.
>
> For example? I have no problem with something
> like:
>
> ui la djan ba vitke ca le bavlamdei
> Yipee! John will visit tomorrow!

But that is joy in the expectation, not in the
event. Still, I don't expect that Lojban will
make the distinction, so I'll let that one pass.

> > > {aunai} and {a'onai} both indicate a
> situation
> > > that the speaker
> > > would find undesirable.
> >
> > Well, the sentence with the {a'onai} actually
> > mentions (if "despair" is the right word) a
> > desirable event — what is undesirable is
> that it
> > is very unlikely to occur.
>
> Which sentence? The one I have is:
>
> .a'o nai ro da ca se cirko
> Everything will be lost now.
>
> which mentions an undesirable event.

This is the ambiguity of unextended "desire;" I
am reading it in the usual sense "despair of",
you in the rising one "despair that" and it gives
exactly opposite results with respect to the
framing sentence.

> > > but still {aucu'i} could be used for
> > > something
> > > considered more unlikely and {a'ocu'i} for
> > > something more
> > > likely.
> >
> > This might, I suppose, be right for {a'o},
> since
> > the difference (assuming "despair" is right)
> is
> > just likelihood, but then the {cu'i} form
> would
> > have to be about things just balance — as
> likely
> > as not.
>
> {a'o} is the more likely: {a'o} desirable/
> {a'onai} undesirable
> {au} is the more unlikely: {au} desirable /
> {aunai} undesirable
>
> {cu'i} is neither desirable nor undesirable in
> both cases..

Surely the likelihood is a noncentral part of the
notion, if it plays a role in {au} at all (it is
definitely secondary in "hope" and "dread" --
though less in the latter than the former).

>
> > I am not sure
> > what to make of this as a judgment; is what
> you
> > are doing making {einai} be for things that
> are
> > not covered by whatever the person is judging
> > from? Rather than just things which are in
> the
> > area but not given any particular force.
>
> I don't understand the question.

In most cases (moral, legal, etc.) there are
things that fall outside the scope of the rules
(the law and which fork to use, for example) and
there are also matters inside the scope that are
not decided (cell phones while driving was until
about a year ago, and still is in most
jurisdictions — including Missouri, alas). So,
is {einai} about the first (outside the scope of
the rules) or the second (not fixed within the
rules)?

I'm proposing
> that
> {einai} indicates that the situation is not
> (perhaps
> against appearances) how things need to be. The
> example is:
>
> .ei nai do tolnurcni
> You don't have to feel threatened.
>
> i.e. there is no (moral, physical, social,
> whatever) law
> that says that you ought to feel threatened.

This is ambiguous in the way mentioned above. It
is also rather strange, since I can't imagine
what sort of law (in this sense) would require
that. At best I would imagine this comes under
a psychological "law" (in that other sense) and
then there very likely is such a law: that in a
certain situation (like this one) a person
(perhaps further specified) feels threatened. Of
course, that doesn't usually generate an "ought,"
though it might, as might further facts about
the situation (that someone is threatening you,
for example). I suppose the situation is such
that no one is threatening you nor in a position
to actually do you harm even though they might be
expected to want to do so. Of course, if this is
literally feeling threatened (a form of fear)
none of this is really very meaningful. Still, it
is reassuring, if not very literally accurate.
The main question is whether it can be taken as a
reasonable reading of "freedom" (in this context,
as you have developed it, obviously the wrong
word). I suppose it means free of necessity in
either direction, stressing the most helpful one
in each case (there is presumably no need not to
feel threatened either, but that doesn't help
here, where reassurance is called for). While it
is unclear what the original meant, this is
pretty clearly a change, even if a needed one.

> > > {ainai} indicates a situation that the
> speakers
> > > takes not to be
> > > the goal or purpose of their actions. The
> > > situation may or
> > > may not coincide with actuality: it is just
> not
> > > a target. In many
> > > cases it *will* coincide with actuality, or
> at
> > > least appear to,
> > > or there would be no reason to bring it up.
> >
> > I liked "has not considered" better --
> clearer
> > anyhow, even if you decide it misses the
> exact
> > place. I get no very clear idea of what this
> > means — in particular hwo it differs from
> > deciding to go for not-x.
>
> One example is:
>
> .ai nai do pu se xrani
> I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
>
> Your getting hurt was not the target of my
> actions, but
> that doesn't mean that I ever decided to go for
> you not
> getting hurt.

As I have said of this example before, it does
not fit the pattern here at all, being factual
rather than attitudinal. If these are irrealis,
then they presumably don't deal with fait
accompli even negatively. This is clearly a
report of a past intention, not an expression of
a present one. It may be some sort of UI, but
not this one — if the patterns mean anything at
all (which there is some evidence they don't, of
course).
>
> > > e'a: the speaker grants permission to the
> > > audience
> > > e'e: the speaker gives encouragement to the
> > > audience
> > > e'i: the speaker imposes a command to the
> > > audience
> > > e'o: the speaker poses a request to the
> > > audience
> > > e'u: the speaker offers a suggestion to the
> > > audience
> >
> > This makes for a pretty nice packet, laying
> out
> > the common directive uses of language. While
> th
> > interactions among them may be interesting,
> we
> > don't need them here. However, most of
> these,
> > while they make a lot more sense, are not
> > obviously what the standard list gives.
>
> {e'e} and {e'i} in particular, which is not
> really so'e
> but it is so'o, yes.

Huh?! what do most and several have to do with
these items on either reading? The pair mentioned
are the most obviously deviant (they may not be
at all, given the incomprehensibity of the
originals, but they sure look different at first
glance).

> > Admittedly, the standard list in virtually
> > unintelligible here and the moves seem to be
> in
> > the right direction, but I can see a lot of
> > people — if anyone has ever used any of
> these
> > confidently — being up in arms about the
> > changes.
>
message truncated
<<Indeed.


> > e'inai: the speaker gives freedom to the
> > audience
>
> This one I don't understand. Releases from a
> command or some other form of ob? How is it
> different from a permission?

It's a subtle difference. As I say below, similar
to the
difference between "you may" and "you need
not".>>

"You need not do x" amounts to "you may do not-x"
(oddly, I admit), but that doesn't seem to be the
difference involved here.

<<> I am not sure what that difference is: "may
x"
> and "may not-x"? ----

Yes.>>
I need to see some example where this works
itself out; at present it does not look to be
what you are saying.

<<> I would take {ie} to be a performative not a
> judgment.

Well, usage has consistently been as in {ie go'i}
"I agree with that", as far as I can tell.>>
This hardly helps if what is {go'i}d is {e'u x}
example. Otherwise, how does {i'e go'i} differ
from {ia go'i}, which seems also to occur?

<<> But then I tend to think of agreement
> and disagreement as about proposals, not about
> claims, responses to some {e'V} or other.

That would probably fit {vi'o}.>>

Well, at most in the case where what is given is
a command; when negotiation is a possibility
(which it is even with some command forms) then
agreement is different from compliance (logically
and affectively)


On 8/12/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> Well, this is a new usage (and I dread to think
> how it came about — it is related to the old in
> a peculiar way: despair that x = despair of
> not-x).

It's not an unnatural change though, I think this kind
of polarity shifts is not all that rare with words that
have a negative sense in them. It's interesting that
none of the examples is the least bit ambiguous.
I suspect this might be related to the loss of the
subjunctive in English. "I despair that x" with a
desirable (and unlikely, uncertain) x requires x to be
in the subjunctive, whereas with an undesirable
(and likely or certain) x the indicative will do just fine.
Almost all the examples with desirable x's that I
find contain "ever" as a subjunctive marker:

I despair that there ever will be an end to it all.

I despair that Microsoft will ever again play the
part they so badly need to play in our industry:

Sometimes I despair that I shall ever read the
books I want to read


> It has not made it into any dictionary I
> could find. But, yes, it does offer just the
> sort of thing you want: undesirable event likely
> to occur (maybe not so strongly as fear that --
> or maybe more so insofar as the hope lost carries
> over from the older form, which is, happily,
> still current). Given that the creators of the
> original word list often use what I (and the
> dictionaries) think of as nonstandard (indeed,
> substandard) usage ("disinterest" elsewhere in
> the list, the inability to distinguish between
> "Don" and "dawn" and so on) I suppose this is
> what they ahd in mind

I don't know. I think what they had in mind is that
{a'o} and {a'onai} were to express hope and despair
and that was that, not that the accompanying bridi
would describe the hoped for or dreaded situation.

-- though a usage that is
> over twenty years old must have made it into some
> dictionary or other (but my newest dictionary is
> from the mid 90s).

I don't know if dictionaries are that quick to pick up
such usages. If I had to guess, I would say this use
of "despair that" must be much older than twenty years,
but I can't really justify my hunch. It is certainly the
overwhelmingly prevalent one as found by Google.

> In any case, I suppose that
> the affect and physiology of "despair that" is

How do you figure out the physiology of a usage?

> like that of "despair of" and hence that "fear
> that" (with a different affect and physiology)
> is not an exact substitute.

Nature abhors exact synonyms anyway.

> I suggest "dread"
> for the key word --

I will add it, yes.

> Well, I see no evidece that the old usage has
> disappeared or event decreased in frequency. The
> new seems merely added on.

In the "I dispair that x" form as found with Google, the
undesirable x case is clearly prevalent, although there
are cases of desirable x, almost always containing the
word "ever".

mu'o mi'e xorxes


On 8/12/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:

> > .a'o nai ro da ca se cirko
> > Everything will be lost now.
> >
> > which mentions an undesirable event.
>
> This is the ambiguity of unextended "desire;" I
> am reading it in the usual sense "despair of",
> you in the rising one "despair that" and it gives
> exactly opposite results with respect to the
> framing sentence.

Ouch! How do you get "everything is lost" as a desirable
thing?


> In most cases (moral, legal, etc.) there are
> things that fall outside the scope of the rules
> (the law and which fork to use, for example) and
> there are also matters inside the scope that are
> not decided (cell phones while driving was until
> about a year ago, and still is in most
> jurisdictions — including Missouri, alas). So,
> is {einai} about the first (outside the scope of
> the rules) or the second (not fixed within the
> rules)?

I'd say it could be either. We're not talking of any
fixed and clear set of laws anyway. If the distinction
is relevant, {ei cu'i} could be used for the "undecided"
case.

> > .ei nai do tolnurcni
> > You don't have to feel threatened.
> >
> The main question is whether it can be taken as a
> reasonable reading of "freedom" (in this context,
> as you have developed it, obviously the wrong
> word).

Yes. As is "obligation" for "how things ought to be".
The idea is:

ei: "I feel/consider things ought to be this way:"
einai: "I feel/consider things need not be this way:"

> While it
> is unclear what the original meant, this is
> pretty clearly a change, even if a needed one.

Yes, in the case of {ei} a very old one, at least in my
usage.

> If these are irrealis,
> then they presumably don't deal with fait
> accompli even negatively.

I didn't choose the title of the page. I don't think these
words are, in general, irrealis markers. But in most cases
(perhaps all) they are compatible with an irrealis marker
and tend to be non-assertions.

> > > However, most of these,
> > > while they make a lot more sense, are not
> > > obviously what the standard list gives.
> >
> > {e'e} and {e'i} in particular, which is not
> > really so'e
> > but it is so'o, yes.
>
> Huh?! what do most and several have to do with
> these items on either reading?

There were five items in the list, two of which are not
obviously what the standard list gives. The other three,
{e'a}, {e'o} and {e'u} are kept in perfect accordance
with the standard list, so I was just objecting to your
use of "most" there.

> <<> I would take {ie} to be a performative not a
> > judgment.
>
> Well, usage has consistently been as in {ie go'i}
> "I agree with that", as far as I can tell.>>
> This hardly helps if what is {go'i}d is {e'u x}
> example.

I mean {ie go'i}, or a simple {ie}, as response to an
assertion. That's probably the most common use of {ie}.

> Otherwise, how does {i'e go'i} differ
> from {ia go'i}, which seems also to occur?

I can't find any instances of {ia go'i}, but I would use
it instead of {ie go'i} if the previous speaker was
asking a question rather than making an assertion.

> <<> But then I tend to think of agreement
> > and disagreement as about proposals, not about
> > claims, responses to some {e'V} or other.
>
> That would probably fit {vi'o}.>>
>
> Well, at most in the case where what is given is
> a command;

I've used and seen it used mostly as a response to
a request. That's probably because in irc chat people
don't usually go ordering each other about, but requests
do happen.

> when negotiation is a possibility
> (which it is even with some command forms) then
> agreement is different from compliance (logically
> and affectively)

Yes, but {ie} does not seem to be used that way.
At least not in the great majority of cases.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388




> On 8/12/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > Well, this is a new usage (and I dread to
> think
> > how it came about — it is related to the old
> in
> > a peculiar way: despair that x = despair of
> > not-x).
>
> It's not an unnatural change though, I think
> this kind
> of polarity shifts is not all that rare with
> words that
> have a negative sense in them. It's interesting
> that
> none of the examples is the least bit
> ambiguous.
> I suspect this might be related to the loss of
> the
> subjunctive in English. "I despair that x" with
> a
> desirable (and unlikely, uncertain) x requires
> x to be
> in the subjunctive, whereas with an undesirable
>
> (and likely or certain) x the indicative will
> do just fine.
> Almost all the examples with desirable x's that
> I
> find contain "ever" as a subjunctive marker:
>
> I despair that there ever will be an end to it
> all.
>
> I despair that Microsoft will ever again play
> the
> part they so badly need to play in our
> industry:
>
> Sometimes I despair that I shall ever read the
> books I want to read

I now find the "despair that" with desired object
bizarre, but easier to explain (the pattern from
"hope"). In any event, the usage is too new to be
affected by the loss of the subjunctive, which
was long before the usage arose. Nor is "ever"
particularly a mark of subjunctiveness. It is a
mark of subordination (including to negation)
like "any", say, in that it rarely (if ever)
occurs in main clauses. And, in many languages
-- but not in English even when subjunctives were
more vigorous — subordinate clauses are often
subjunctive, often regardless of meaning (English
subjunctives seem to usually have been more
meaning-driven).
>
> > It has not made it into any dictionary I
> > could find. But, yes, it does offer just
> the
> > sort of thing you want: undesirable event
> likely
> > to occur (maybe not so strongly as fear that
> --
> > or maybe more so insofar as the hope lost
> carries
> > over from the older form, which is, happily,
> > still current). Given that the creators of
> the
> > original word list often use what I (and the
> > dictionaries) think of as nonstandard
> (indeed,
> > substandard) usage ("disinterest" elsewhere
> in
> > the list, the inability to distinguish
> between
> > "Don" and "dawn" and so on) I suppose this is
> > what they ahd in mind
>
> I don't know. I think what they had in mind is
> that
> {a'o} and {a'onai} were to express hope and
> despair
> and that was that, not that the accompanying
> bridi
> would describe the hoped for or dreaded
> situation.

Well, the examples — what few there are — and
the classification — as a propositional attitude
(illegitimately so called from the original
context for the phrase)-- and the warning not to
confuse {a'o x} with {mi pacna le nu x} (and
isn't the definition of {pacna} a disaster
waiting to happen!) all suggest that the
accompanying sentence is meant to be the object
of the hope or whatever.

> — though a usage that is
> > over twenty years old must have made it into
> some
> > dictionary or other (but my newest dictionary
> is
> > from the mid 90s).
>
> I don't know if dictionaries are that quick to
> pick up
> such usages. If I had to guess, I would say
> this use
> of "despair that" must be much older than
> twenty years,
> but I can't really justify my hunch. It is
> certainly the
> overwhelmingly prevalent one as found by
> Google.

Nowadays, published dictionaries are only about
five years out of date and online ones even less.
By the way, the online dictionaries I could find
all lack either usage, indeed, "despair that"
altogether.


> > In any case, I suppose that
> > the affect and physiology of "despair that"
> is
>
> How do you figure out the physiology of a
> usage?

Well, it is meant to express an emotion (actually
in ths case, amazingly) and that emotion has a
certain affect and a corresponding physiological
pattern (which nowadays largely "explains" the
affect). Hope is an upper and a dose of
seratonin; despair is a downer and a dose of
whatever it is (GBA?) that counteracts seratonin.
Fear (and dread?) are slightly down but more
preparation for activity in terms of adrenalin
and glucose.

> > like that of "despair of" and hence that
> "fear
> > that" (with a different affect and
> physiology)
> > is not an exact substitute.
>
> Nature abhors exact synonyms anyway.
>
> > I suggest "dread"
> > for the key word --
>
> I will add it, yes.
>
> > Well, I see no evidece that the old usage has
> > disappeared or event decreased in frequency.
> The
> > new seems merely added on.
>
> In the "I dispair that x" form as found with
> Google, the
> undesirable x case is clearly prevalent,
> although there
> are cases of desirable x, almost always
> containing the
> word "ever".

But "despair that" is the new usage in question.
Are there no longer any "despair of" cases to be had?


posts: 2388


> On 8/12/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
>
> > > .a'o nai ro da ca se cirko
> > > Everything will be lost now.
> > >
> > > which mentions an undesirable event.
> >
> > This is the ambiguity of unextended "desire;"
> I
> > am reading it in the usual sense "despair
> of",
> > you in the rising one "despair that" and it
> gives
> > exactly opposite results with respect to the
> > framing sentence.
>
> Ouch! How do you get "everything is lost" as a
> desirable
> thing?

Oops! That should be "despair", not "desire."
Does that answer your question (which I otherwise
don't understand, having lost the discussion that
led up to the line cited).

>
> > In most cases (moral, legal, etc.) there are
> > things that fall outside the scope of the
> rules
> > (the law and which fork to use, for example)
> and
> > there are also matters inside the scope that
> are
> > not decided (cell phones while driving was
> until
> > about a year ago, and still is in most
> > jurisdictions — including Missouri, alas).
> So,
> > is {einai} about the first (outside the scope
> of
> > the rules) or the second (not fixed within
> the
> > rules)?
>
> I'd say it could be either. We're not talking
> of any
> fixed and clear set of laws anyway. If the
> distinction
> is relevant, {ei cu'i} could be used for the
> "undecided"
> case.

So, the pattern you introduced for {ai} is being
carried through more or less consistently.

> > > .ei nai do tolnurcni
> > > You don't have to feel threatened.
> > >
> > The main question is whether it can be taken
> as a
> > reasonable reading of "freedom" (in this
> context,
> > as you have developed it, obviously the wrong
> > word).
>
> Yes. As is "obligation" for "how things ought
> to be".
> The idea is:
>
> ei: "I feel/consider things ought to be this
> way:"
> einai: "I feel/consider things need not be this
> way:"

OK, just checking (though both "obligation" and
"freedom" are lousy word here — misleading at
best). The book examples are pretty useless for
deciding, since they are all first-person and so
could be either my judgement or my obliging
myself. The other words in the same series
(unreliable as that is as a guideline) suggest
that this is will and action oriented; that it is
trying to put someone under an ob (in second and
third person) to do something about the matter.
Of course, it could be argued that this is
inherent in judgments as well, so it may be that
there is no real difference here.

> > While it
> > is unclear what the original meant, this is
> > pretty clearly a change, even if a needed
> one.
>
> Yes, in the case of {ei} a very old one, at
> least in my
> usage.
>
> > If these are irrealis,
> > then they presumably don't deal with fait
> > accompli even negatively.
>
> I didn't choose the title of the page. I don't
> think these
> words are, in general, irrealis markers. But in
> most cases
> (perhaps all) they are compatible with an
> irrealis marker
> and tend to be non-assertions.

But, of course, "I didn't mean to hurt you" is,
if not an assertion, then an apology and start of
a defense, which again is very different from an
intention. As noted, intentions (whatever is the
case for the others — but it seems pretty much
to carry through if we ignore a few things that
problably shouldn't be on the list) are irrealis.
You can't intend what is already the case and
thus you cannot express an intention with regard
to it. You can only report a previous intention
-- which is what the English does. The Lojban is
merely unintelligible.

> > > > However, most of these,
> > > > while they make a lot more sense, are not
> > > > obviously what the standard list gives.
> > >
> > > {e'e} and {e'i} in particular, which is not
> > > really so'e
> > > but it is so'o, yes.
> >
> > Huh?! what do most and several have to do
> with
> > these items on either reading?
>
> There were five items in the list, two of which
> are not
> obviously what the standard list gives. The
> other three,
> {e'a}, {e'o} and {e'u} are kept in perfect
> accordance
> with the standard list, so I was just objecting
> to your
> use of "most" there.

Ah. Well, I think your {ie} is a change as well,
but that still does not make "most." I get
impressed by the magnitude of the deviation and
don't notice how it is distributed.

> > <<> I would take {ie} to be a performative
> not a
> > > judgment.
> >
> > Well, usage has consistently been as in {ie
> go'i}
> > "I agree with that", as far as I can tell.>>
> > This hardly helps if what is {go'i}d is {e'u
> x}
> > example.
>
> I mean {ie go'i}, or a simple {ie}, as response
> to an
> assertion. That's probably the most common use
> of {ie}.

I wonder why not {ia}. I also wonder how to
accept a proposal.

> > Otherwise, how does {i'e go'i} differ
> > from {ia go'i}, which seems also to occur?
>
> I can't find any instances of {ia go'i}, but I
> would use
> it instead of {ie go'i} if the previous speaker
> was
> asking a question rather than making an
> assertion.
>
> > <<> But then I tend to think of agreement
> > > and disagreement as about proposals, not
> about
> > > claims, responses to some {e'V} or other.
> >
> > That would probably fit {vi'o}.>>
> >
> > Well, at most in the case where what is given
> is
> > a command;
>
> I've used and seen it used mostly as a response
> to
> a request. That's probably because in irc chat
> people
> don't usually go ordering each other about, but
> requests
> do happen.

The issue (since commands and requests and
petitions are all the same linguistically in
Lojban) is what works with suggestions and other
less direct directives.

> > when negotiation is a possibility
> > (which it is even with some command forms)
> then
> > agreement is different from compliance
> (logically
> > and affectively)
>
> Yes, but {ie} does not seem to be used that
> way.
> At least not in the great majority of cases.

OK. Even the example in CLL can be read in your
way, though it seems wasteful of space when there
are so many items that were left out. The
question of agreeing to a proposal remains as one
of these. Compliance seems the wrong line
altogether, if for not other reason that
proposals need not take the form of getting the
speaker to do something.

By the way. How does one promise in Lojban? Or
sentence? Or proclaim (promulgate)? These ought
all fit in here somewhere but don't obviously
have a place in your system — or in the CLL
version, come to that.


On 8/12/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> (and
> isn't the definition of {pacna} a disaster
> waiting to happen!)

Waiting to happen? It happened already:
<http://www.lojban.com/tiki/tiki-index.php?page=BPFK+gismu+Proposal%3A+kanpe>

> > How do you figure out the physiology of a
> > usage?
>
> Well, it is meant to express an emotion (actually
> in ths case, amazingly) and that emotion has a
> certain affect and a corresponding physiological
> pattern (which nowadays largely "explains" the
> affect). Hope is an upper and a dose of
> seratonin; despair is a downer and a dose of
> whatever it is (GBA?) that counteracts seratonin.
> Fear (and dread?) are slightly down but more
> preparation for activity in terms of adrenalin
> and glucose.

Thank god that was not in vogue twenty years ago
or the place structure of {pacna} would have probably
been: "x1 hopes/despairs/fears/dreads that x2, with
serotonin level x3, adrenalin level x4 and glucose
level x5". Phew!

> > In the "I dispair that x" form as found with
> > Google, the
> > undesirable x case is clearly prevalent,
> > although there
> > are cases of desirable x, almost always
> > containing the
> > word "ever".
>
> But "despair that" is the new usage in question.
> Are there no longer any "despair of" cases to be had?

Oh, yes, plenty more than "despair that", but that one
was never an issue.

In many cases it's despair of a thing or a person though,
which doesn't really qualify as desirable or undesirable
(although if pressed I would have to say they fall on the
undesirable side: "I despair of the current state of radio")
But when it's dispair *of an event happening*, it's always
a desirable one, as far as I can tell.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


On 8/12/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
> I don't
> > think these
> > words are, in general, irrealis markers. But in
> > most cases
> > (perhaps all) they are compatible with an
> > irrealis marker
> > and tend to be non-assertions.
>
> But, of course, "I didn't mean to hurt you" is,
> if not an assertion, then an apology and start of
> a defense, which again is very different from an
> intention.

Yes, it's different from an intention. {ainai} is meant to
show lack of intention, not intention.

> As noted, intentions (whatever is the
> case for the others — but it seems pretty much
> to carry through if we ignore a few things that
> problably shouldn't be on the list) are irrealis.
> You can't intend what is already the case and
> thus you cannot express an intention with regard
> to it. You can only report a previous intention
> — which is what the English does. The Lojban is
> merely unintelligible.

I don't really see what is gained by imposing the
irrealis condition, so prefer not to do it.


> > I mean {ie go'i}, or a simple {ie}, as response
> > to an
> > assertion. That's probably the most common use
> > of {ie}.
>
> I wonder why not {ia}.

Maybe because {ia} may carry religious overtones?
Just guessing, I don't know. What I do know is that
in my experience {ie} is used very frequently, and {ia}
very rarely.

> I also wonder how to
> accept a proposal.

{.i'a} probably.

> By the way. How does one promise in Lojban?

{nu'e}

> Or sentence?

As in "I hearby declare"? {ca'e}.

> Or proclaim (promulgate)?

Same?

>These ought
> all fit in here somewhere but don't obviously
> have a place in your system — or in the CLL
> version, come to that.

Most COIs should be in UI, as I often say.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On 8/12/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > (and
> > isn't the definition of {pacna} a disaster
> > waiting to happen!)
>
> Waiting to happen? It happened already:
>
<http://www.lojban.com/tiki/tiki-index.php?page=BPFK+gismu+Proposal%3A+kanpe>

Nice. Pacna still mixes hopes and desires,
whihc, while "hope" implies desire, are very
different in other respects. Hope has affect and
physiological correlates, desire does not or very
different ones, but there are other differences
as well. Desire is unrelated to expectations, for
example. And what ever happened to {djica} in all
of this?


> > > How do you figure out the physiology of a
> > > usage?
> >
> > Well, it is meant to express an emotion
> (actually
> > in ths case, amazingly) and that emotion has
> a
> > certain affect and a corresponding
> physiological
> > pattern (which nowadays largely "explains"
> the
> > affect). Hope is an upper and a dose of
> > seratonin; despair is a downer and a dose of
> > whatever it is (GBA?) that counteracts
> seratonin.
> > Fear (and dread?) are slightly down but more
> > preparation for activity in terms of
> adrenalin
> > and glucose.
>
> Thank god that was not in vogue twenty years
> ago
> or the place structure of {pacna} would have
> probably
> been: "x1 hopes/despairs/fears/dreads that x2,
> with
> serotonin level x3, adrenalin level x4 and
> glucose
> level x5". Phew!

This stuff was around 20 years ago (indeed, 40,
though not in as much detail) but happily it was
not out in the popular literature yet (I had a
course in loosely bio-epistemology in grad school
to get what was to be had in the mid 60s).
Otherwise, I fear that you would have been right.
The numbers that there are on {pacna} — and
{kanpe}are suspect enough. In any case this
would not affect the UI; it was just a point
about how emotions are more tricky than their
logic would allow: "fear that" works logically
but not really (and I don't know what is the
norm in actual experience here or if both dread
and despair are possible).

> > > In the "I dispair that x" form as found
> with
> > > Google, the
> > > undesirable x case is clearly prevalent,
> > > although there
> > > are cases of desirable x, almost always
> > > containing the
> > > word "ever".
> >
> > But "despair that" is the new usage in
> question.
> > Are there no longer any "despair of" cases to
> be had?
>
> Oh, yes, plenty more than "despair that", but
> that one
> was never an issue.

The point is that you can't just say that {ainai}
means "despair" and expect folks to get to the
right meaning since the two are so nearly
opposite, with only the affect carrying over.

> In many cases it's despair of a thing or a
> person though,
> which doesn't really qualify as desirable or
> undesirable
> (although if pressed I would have to say they
> fall on the
> undesirable side: "I despair of the current
> state of radio")
> But when it's dispair *of an event happening*,
> it's always
> a desirable one, as far as I can tell.

On my general principle about desires and the
like always being about events, I would take the
the "despair of" and "despair for" with things as
object as being shorthand for appropriate
expressions about events involving those things,
though I would hate to have to claim any
particular expansion was correct.


posts: 2388


> On 8/12/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > I don't
> > > think these
> > > words are, in general, irrealis markers.
> But in
> > > most cases
> > > (perhaps all) they are compatible with an
> > > irrealis marker
> > > and tend to be non-assertions.
> >
> > But, of course, "I didn't mean to hurt you"
> is,
> > if not an assertion, then an apology and
> start of
> > a defense, which again is very different from
> an
> > intention.
>
> Yes, it's different from an intention. {ainai}
> is meant to
> show lack of intention, not intention.

Presumably indicating lack of intention is only
appropriate where indicating intention would be
appropriate, It isn't for acknowledged past
events.

> > As noted, intentions (whatever is the
> > case for the others — but it seems pretty
> much
> > to carry through if we ignore a few things
> that
> > problably shouldn't be on the list) are
> irrealis.
> > You can't intend what is already the case and
> > thus you cannot express an intention with
> regard
> > to it. You can only report a previous
> intention
> > — which is what the English does. The
> Lojban is
> > merely unintelligible.
>
> I don't really see what is gained by imposing
> the
> irrealis condition, so prefer not to do it.

It is not an imposition; it is the nature of
intentions. Now, you may say that {ai} is about
something other than intentions but then we will
have to find something else to do for intentions
and come up with something else for {ai} that can
be fit plausibly around the given definitions for
{ai}.

>
> > > I mean {ie go'i}, or a simple {ie}, as
> response
> > > to an
> > > assertion. That's probably the most common
> use
> > > of {ie}.
> >
> > I wonder why not {ia}.
>
> Maybe because {ia} may carry religious
> overtones?
> Just guessing, I don't know. What I do know is
> that
> in my experience {ie} is used very frequently,
> and {ia}
> very rarely.
>
> > I also wonder how to
> > accept a proposal.
>
> {.i'a} probably.

Wrong kind of acceptance if "blame" is vaguely
right for the negative form (want "rejection" or
some such).

> > By the way. How does one promise in Lojban?
>
> {nu'e}


How strange that that is in COI while so many
related notions are in UI. I wonder how that
works.

> > Or sentence?
>
> As in "I hearby declare"? {ca'e}.


Certainly not if "I define" is at all aaccurate
(though I have to admit I have trouble seeing
this as useful for anyone but a logician most of
the time). Sentencing — and promulgating to go
to the next case — involve a web of rights and
duties that go far beyond anything that
defintions can ever involve.
> > Or proclaim (promulgate)?
>
> Same?
Maybe, but not {ca'e}.

> >These ought
> > all fit in here somewhere but don't obviously
> > have a place in your system — or in the CLL
> > version, come to that.
>
> Most COIs should be in UI, as I often say.

Well, {nu'e} pretty clearly is and, of course, an
irrealis one at that.


On 8/12/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
>
> Otherwise, I fear that you would have been right.

Hmm... I wonder how we would say that in Lojban?
Perhaps something like:

a'o nai va'o nai ku da'i do drani

mu'o mi'e xorxes


On 8/12/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:

> > > I also wonder how to
> > > accept a proposal.
> >
> > {.i'a} probably.
>
> Wrong kind of acceptance if "blame" is vaguely
> right for the negative form (want "rejection" or
> some such).

Yes, I pushed "blame" out of first place anyway:

.i'a (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to express acceptance / acknowledgement / admission
/ assent / consent / acquiescence / conformity / satisfaction (cf.
selmansa, nalpro, no'epro, nalzugjdi, fi'i)
.i'a ta banzu
Okay, that will do.


.i'a nai (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to express refusal / rejection / eschewal /
resistance / dissatisfaction / blame / incrimination / inculpation
(cf. tolselmansa, fi'i nai)
.i'a nai ta mi za'o na mansa
No, that still doesn't satisfy me.


> > > Or sentence?
> >
> > As in "I hearby declare"? {ca'e}.
>
> Certainly not if "I define" is at all aaccurate

It isn't very. Here is Arnt's proposed expanded definition:

ca'e (UI2)
Evidential. Used to mark a performative/speech act,
that is, an utterance that is true because the speaker
says so. See also the preface.

Not that I would call it an evidential, but anyway it's
better than "I define".

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On 8/12/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
>
> > > > I also wonder how to
> > > > accept a proposal.
> > >
> > > {.i'a} probably.
> >
> > Wrong kind of acceptance if "blame" is
> vaguely
> > right for the negative form (want "rejection"
> or
> > some such).
>
> Yes, I pushed "blame" out of first place
> anyway:
>
> .i'a (UI1)
> Attitudinal. Used to express acceptance /
> acknowledgement / admission
> / assent / consent / acquiescence / conformity
> / satisfaction (cf.
> selmansa, nalpro, no'epro, nalzugjdi, fi'i)
> .i'a ta banzu
> Okay, that will do.
>
>
> .i'a nai (UI*1)
> Attitudinal. Used to express refusal /
> rejection / eschewal /
> resistance / dissatisfaction / blame /
> incrimination / inculpation
> (cf. tolselmansa, fi'i nai)
> .i'a nai ta mi za'o na mansa
> No, that still doesn't satisfy me.
>
These look to be a pretty mixed bag of things
some of which maybe go together though still
different, others of which don't fit in at all
(different logics as well as different affects or
whatever). But that is a prima facie judgment;
I'll give it some time and thought.
> > > > Or sentence?
> > >
> > > As in "I hearby declare"? {ca'e}.
> >
> > Certainly not if "I define" is at all
> aaccurate
>
> It isn't very. Here is Arnt's proposed expanded
> definition:
>
> ca'e (UI2)
> Evidential. Used to mark a performative/speech
> act,
> that is, an utterance that is true because the
> speaker
> says so. See also the preface.
>
> Not that I would call it an evidential, but
> anyway it's
> better than "I define"

I suppose evidential in the slightly scewed sense
its used here, but it does seem to cry out for
another category: "performstive speech acts"
springs to mind (and drags {nu'e}in and probably
some others. Still, "I believe it is true
because I say so" makes somewhat the same kind of
sense as
"I believe it true because I saw it/heard it from
Bertel Isaac/deduced it from other stuff" and is
often actually used by people who are actually in
a position to do world-creating acts, mainly
parents (and sargeants).


ai, au, a'o ... and a'i

Let's consider three features that ai, au and a'o might be taken
to indicate: desirable (D+) / undesirable (D-), under-control (C+) /
not-under-control (C-), and likely (L+) / unlikely (L-).

Let's then define:

ai: D+ C+ L+ ainai: D- C+ L+
a'o: D+ C- L+ a'onai: D- C- L+
au: D+ C- L- aunai: D- C- L-

What {nai} does is turn desirable into undesirable, leaving the
control and likelihood features unchanged.

The two remaining combinations happen to fit {a'i} and {a'inai} pretty
well, so I'm bringing those from the "realis" to the "irrealis" camp.
(This is not really a big deal because CLL has them classified
as "propositional attitudes" too.)

The two remaining combinations then are:

a'i: D+ C+ L- a'inai: D- C+ L-

The positive forms are thus all D+, and the nai-forms are all D-.

{ai} and {a'i} are the C+ forms, and {au and a'o} the C-.
{ai} and {a'o} are the L+ forms and {au} and {a'i} the L- ones.

"Likely" and "unlikely" are not to be taken in an absolute
sense, but relative to each other. "Unlikely" includes the impossible
(incompatible with reality) case, and "likely" includes the certain
or actual case.

There are still some issues though. I'm not too sure what aunai (D-C-L-)
would amount to.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> ai, au, a'o ... and a'i
>
> Let's consider three features that ai, au and
> a'o might be taken
> to indicate: desirable (D+) / undesirable (D-),
> under-control (C+) /
> not-under-control (C-), and likely (L+) /
> unlikely (L-).
>
> Let's then define:
>
> ai: D+ C+ L+ ainai: D- C+ L+
> a'o: D+ C- L+ a'onai: D- C- L+
> au: D+ C- L- aunai: D- C- L-
>
> What {nai} does is turn desirable into
> undesirable, leaving the
> control and likelihood features unchanged.

As noted earlier, if "desire" is at all correct
for {au}, then likelihood plays no role at all in
its realization. We can desire the inevitable as
well as the impossible and anything in between.
It is probably also the case that control is not
a part of the definition; indeed, one expect
that, if "desire" is correct in both places {au}
is simply D+. Of course, we might take the "-"
to mean "irrelevant" or some such thing, but that
doesn't fit the C of {a'o}, nor the L of {ai},
where the likelihood is again not important.
And, of course, fits none of the D-s.

> The two remaining combinations happen to fit
> {a'i} and {a'inai} pretty
> well, so I'm bringing those from the "realis"
> to the "irrealis" camp.
> (This is not really a big deal because CLL has
> them classified
> as "propositional attitudes" too.)
>
> The two remaining combinations then are:
>
> a'i: D+ C+ L- a'inai: D- C+ L-

This is a change in {a'i nai}, since it is hard
to see this combination as "repose" in any sense.
Or is it? "Not going to make an effort" is, I
suppose, one way of looking at it and could fit
both slots ({a'inai} and "repose").

> The positive forms are thus all D+, and the
> nai-forms are all D-.
>
> {ai} and {a'i} are the C+ forms, and {au and
> a'o} the C-.
> {ai} and {a'o} are the L+ forms and {au} and
> {a'i} the L- ones.
>
> "Likely" and "unlikely" are not to be taken in
> an absolute
> sense, but relative to each other. "Unlikely"
> includes the impossible
> (incompatible with reality) case, and "likely"
> includes the certain
> or actual case.
>
> There are still some issues though. I'm not too
> sure what aunai (D-C-L-)
> would amount to.

The Ds work throughout (with some appropriate
version of what {a'inai} means. The C in {au}
doesn't belong unless "-" means "irrelevant" and
likewise the L, which also irrelevant for at
least {ai}.


On 8/13/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> As noted earlier, if "desire" is at all correct
> for {au}, then likelihood plays no role at all in
> its realization. We can desire the inevitable as
> well as the impossible and anything in between.
> It is probably also the case that control is not
> a part of the definition; indeed, one expect
> that, if "desire" is correct in both places {au}
> is simply D+.

Right.

The difference between our approaches seems to be that you
are concentrating on the English keyword and its nuances
for each individual word on its own, whereas I'm trying to look
at all the words together and use the English keywords as mere
signposts that may not be all that accurate.

The detailed semantics of the word "desire" doesn't really
interest me here. As I said, I'm taking {au} to indicate
a wish, as in "oh that it were so". If "desire" is not the ideal
keyword for that, that's too bad. Maybe what I'm proposing
is not the optimum meaning for {au} either, but at least I'm
trying to figure out how it all fits together.

> Of course, we might take the "-"
> to mean "irrelevant" or some such thing, but that
> doesn't fit the C of {a'o}, nor the L of {ai},
> where the likelihood is again not important.

Likelihood is what I'm taking (for now at least) to be the
distinction between {ai} and {a'i}. In both cases they indicate
the goal of the actions of the speaker, suggested by "desirable,
under-control". The difference is that with intention the
speaker finds the achievement of the goal more certain or
likely wheras with attempt/effort success is not taken for
granted, and it is at least comparatively unlikely.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388

Ok. So "desire" is the wrong word; I suggest
"wish" (as in "wishful thinking") for the
psoitive side. Nothing suggests itself for the
negative: maybe "worry" in its most pejorative
sense.
On the whole, think the idea of fitting these
notions into sstematic groujpings is a good idea.
May this set be the harbinger and pattern of
many more.



> On 8/13/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > As noted earlier, if "desire" is at all
> correct
> > for {au}, then likelihood plays no role at
> all in
> > its realization. We can desire the
> inevitable as
> > well as the impossible and anything in
> between.
> > It is probably also the case that control is
> not
> > a part of the definition; indeed, one expect
> > that, if "desire" is correct in both places
> {au}
> > is simply D+.
>
> Right.
>
> The difference between our approaches seems to
> be that you
> are concentrating on the English keyword and
> its nuances
> for each individual word on its own, whereas
> I'm trying to look
> at all the words together and use the English
> keywords as mere
> signposts that may not be all that accurate.
>
> The detailed semantics of the word "desire"
> doesn't really
> interest me here. As I said, I'm taking {au} to
> indicate
> a wish, as in "oh that it were so". If "desire"
> is not the ideal
> keyword for that, that's too bad. Maybe what
> I'm proposing
> is not the optimum meaning for {au} either, but
> at least I'm
> trying to figure out how it all fits together.
>
> > Of course, we might take the "-"
> > to mean "irrelevant" or some such thing, but
> that
> > doesn't fit the C of {a'o}, nor the L of
> {ai},
> > where the likelihood is again not important.
>
> Likelihood is what I'm taking (for now at
> least) to be the
> distinction between {ai} and {a'i}. In both
> cases they indicate
> the goal of the actions of the speaker,
> suggested by "desirable,
> under-control". The difference is that with
> intention the
> speaker finds the achievement of the goal more
> certain or
> likely wheras with attempt/effort success is
> not taken for
> granted, and it is at least comparatively
> unlikely.
>
> mu'o mi'e xorxes
>
>
>
>



posts: 953

On Sat, 13 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:

> On 8/13/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
>> As noted earlier, if "desire" is at all correct
>> for {au}, then likelihood plays no role at all in
>> its realization. We can desire the inevitable as
>> well as the impossible and anything in between.
>> It is probably also the case that control is not
>> a part of the definition; indeed, one expect
>> that, if "desire" is correct in both places {au}
>> is simply D+.
>
> Right.
>
> The difference between our approaches seems to be that you
> are concentrating on the English keyword and its nuances
> for each individual word on its own, whereas I'm trying to look
> at all the words together and use the English keywords as mere
> signposts that may not be all that accurate.

I must agree with PC here. This does not seem so much as an issue of a few
poorly chosen signpost keywords, but a featural model that does not seem
to fit the intentions of the originators very well, even if we look at it
holistically.

> Likelihood is what I'm taking (for now at least) to be the
> distinction between {ai} and {a'i}.

This interpretation does not seem to fit well with example 3.4, p 302
("It'll be hard for me to wake you up").

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
Evan, a Quiz Bowl reject, nevertheless knows more than what's good for
him. The son of deposed royalty from some obscure nation whose name is
probably only known to himself, Evan is the life of the party when the
party's over. — Leon Lin: Kissing the Buddha's Feet


On 8/18/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
> I must agree with PC here. This does not seem so much as an issue of a few
> poorly chosen signpost keywords, but a featural model that does not seem
> to fit the intentions of the originators very well, even if we look at it
> holistically.

If you can fathom their intentions from a holistic perspective,
please do explain them.

> > Likelihood is what I'm taking (for now at least) to be the
> > distinction between {ai} and {a'i}.
>
> This interpretation does not seem to fit well with example 3.4, p 302
> ("It'll be hard for me to wake you up").

Why not? I added it as an example precisely because
I thought it did. If it's hard for me to wake you up, it means
that your waking up is relatively unlikely, not a given,
despite mi intentions, doesn't it? In other words, I'll do my
best but the result is not guaranteed.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 953

On Thu, 18 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:

> On 8/18/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
>> I must agree with PC here. This does not seem so much as an issue of a few
>> poorly chosen signpost keywords, but a featural model that does not seem
>> to fit the intentions of the originators very well, even if we look at it
>> holistically.
>
> If you can fathom their intentions from a holistic perspective,
> please do explain them.

Very well.

I believe that the attitudinal system was designed as a bag of loose
senses with no interconnection, selected based on their
perceived usefulness.

To quote the CLL, section 13.6, p 306:

> The Lojban attitudinal system was designed by starting with a long list
> of English emotion words, far too many to fit into the 39 available
> VV-form cmavo. To keep the number of cmavo limited, the emotion words in
> the list were grouped together by common features: each group was then
> assigned a separate cmavo. This was like making tanru in reverse, and
> the result is a collection of indicators that can be combined, like
> tanru, to express very complex emotions.

>>> Likelihood is what I'm taking (for now at least) to be the
>>> distinction between {ai} and {a'i}.
>>
>> This interpretation does not seem to fit well with example 3.4, p 302
>> ("It'll be hard for me to wake you up").
>
> Why not? I added it as an example precisely because
> I thought it did. If it's hard for me to wake you up, it means
> that your waking up is relatively unlikely, not a given,
> despite mi intentions, doesn't it? In other words, I'll do my
> best but the result is not guaranteed.

My interpretation was that your waking up is a given, but this fact is
associated with a feeling of the excertion of effort.

But since the CLL groups it along with propositional indicators, and that
the available usage could be interpreted either way, I'm willing to
concede on this point.

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
Keyboard: The Ultimate Input Device


On 8/23/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
> To quote the CLL, section 13.6, p 306:
>
> > The Lojban attitudinal system was designed by starting with a long list
> > of English emotion words, far too many to fit into the 39 available
> > VV-form cmavo. To keep the number of cmavo limited, the emotion words in
> > the list were grouped together by common features: each group was then
> > assigned a separate cmavo.

It would be quite useful to see the original list. I wonder
if anyone has it or remembers where it was taken from.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


Jorge Llambías scripsit:

> It would be quite useful to see the original list. I wonder
> if anyone has it or remembers where it was taken from.

If it's anywhere it's in the LeChevaliers' basement, probably in hard copy.

--
John Cowan jcowan@reutershealth.com www.reutershealth.com www.ccil.org/~cowan
It's the old, old story. Droid meets droid. Droid becomes chameleon.
Droid loses chameleon, chameleon becomes blob, droid gets blob back
again. It's a classic tale. --Kryten, Red Dwarf


posts: 2388

wrote:

> Jorge Llambías scripsit:
>
> > It would be quite useful to see the original
> list. I wonder
> > if anyone has it or remembers where it was
> taken from.
>
> If it's anywhere it's in the LeChevaliers'
> basement, probably in hard copy.

It might be recomstructable. My guess
(recollection?)is that a large part of it came
from a topical thesaurus (not a dictionary one)
and the words listed under "Emotion" or "Feeling"
or so. there may have been other sources, but I
believe this was a main one.


posts: 162

I spotted this in response to Robin's call for assistance, and am not
sure of the context.

Jorge Llambas wrote:
> On 8/23/05, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
>>To quote the CLL, section 13.6, p 306:
>>
>>>The Lojban attitudinal system was designed by starting with a long list
>>>of English emotion words, far too many to fit into the 39 available
>>>VV-form cmavo. To keep the number of cmavo limited, the emotion words in
>>>the list were grouped together by common features: each group was then
>>>assigned a separate cmavo.
>
> It would be quite useful to see the original list. I wonder
> if anyone has it or remembers where it was taken from.

I dunno if it is useful, but a bit of digging uncovered the 2nd step in
this process, which was the attempt to group attitudes together by
properties, before we considered how to assign the VVs to those attitudes.

At this point, we had clearly decided on the use of two extremes and a
middle/neutral position, and we had come up with the 5 (now 6)
classifiers (social, physical, sexual) to simplify the list

The first step was a big long list of probably 200-odd emotion words
written down as they came to mind over a week or two. As those words
were put onto the 2nd step list, they were crossed off, and I have no
particular reason to believe that we saved the list of entirely
scribbled out words.

This second list is pretty scribbly too, though I can read it all. All
squeezed into one sheet with 5-6 problem "attitudes" listed on the back
that we had not decided were fully dealt with.

The work is undated, but there is a date clue in some transactions I
needed to enter into the balance data base. Based on these, I'd guess
this list was made in Sep 88 or Sept 89; I could determine which by
looking up the transactions that were entered.

lojbab



posts: 162

John E Clifford wrote:
> --- "John.Cowan" <jcowan@reutershealth.com>
> wrote:
>>Jorge Llambas scripsit:
>>
>>>It would be quite useful to see the original
>>list. I wonder
>>>if anyone has it or remembers where it was
>>taken from.
>>
>>If it's anywhere it's in the LeChevaliers'
>>basement, probably in hard copy.
>
>
> It might be recomstructable. My guess
> (recollection?)is that a large part of it came
> from a topical thesaurus (not a dictionary one)
> and the words listed under "Emotion" or "Feeling"
> or so. there may have been other sources, but I
> believe this was a main one.

Actually, the original list was a group-grope by a half-dozen
prospective Lojban students in New Jersey at Art Wieners's house. That
was where the original idea of expanding and systematizing the
attitudinals was suggested. Then Nora and I added to the list at home,
possibly indeed by looking in a thesaurus among other places. I also
went to the library once, and looked for books or articles on emotion,
and I recall reading something in Psychology Today on someone else's
attempt to classify emotions, that made me feel that we were doing
something good. Actually attempting to systematize the list added to
the list, as we tried to think of opposites and neutrals. If we came up
with multiple scales, we selected one, and added the others to the list
to be dealt with.

The concept of realis/irrealis had I think come up a bit before this,
though not using those words. I believe that when I visited him in Oct
1986(?), PC explained a possible grouping of the old set of attitudinals
in terms of "possible worlds", and I think I have some notes on that
somewhere, possible in correspondence from PC (though I might be
remembering conversations from that visit or from his appearances at
LogFests). I know his classification informed our assignment of cmavo
to some extent, though we found it difficult to match the new list with
PC's formulation.

lojbab



posts: 162

Arnt Richard Johansen wrote:
> I must agree with PC here. This does not seem so much as an issue of a
> few poorly chosen signpost keywords, but a featural model that does not
> seem to fit the intentions of the originators very well, even if we look
> at it holistically.
>
>> Likelihood is what I'm taking (for now at least) to be the
>> distinction between {ai} and {a'i}.
>
> This interpretation does not seem to fit well with example 3.4, p 302
> ("It'll be hard for me to wake you up").

I am intentionally NOT reading CLL and the byfy page before addressing
this, since the question is the original intent of the originators (i.e.
me). I am looking at the draft list, though ity doesn't exactly match
the final cmavo list scales.

1. There is no particular relationship implied between ai and a'i just
because they use the same letters. We had to squeeze the scales in, and
couldn't be too picky.

2. The classic a'i might be used by a worker exerting themselves at a
task. The extreme of a'inai is non-effort or an avoidance of effort. I
have the word "laziness" down on the negative side along with repose, as
the opposite of effort. Passivity might be the term used in a sexual
context. No effort to interact in a social context (we always tried to
look at these words using the 5 ro'V groupings in trying to interpret
them. I hope that Jorge (or whoever) is considering the current 6
groupings in formalizing the definitions, because they are important in
achieving the fullest expressive/definitional scope, even if people
don't use them much these days.

3. Intent (ai) has nothing at all to do with whether one is making any
significant effort to bring that which is intended about. I could use
"ai" in a discussion about interplanetary exploration, even though there
isn't much I could do to bring it about, effort-wise.

4. ai is distinguished from a'o in that a'o suggests to me a more
personal emotional investment in the proposition. a'o is thus close to
au - neither a'o nor au suggests in the slightest to me that the speaker
necessarily would do anything about it. ai suggests that the speaker
might do something to bring it about, but does not necessarily require
any personal effort in that direction - a commander giving orders might
use ai, but would not use a'i if the commander was not himself involved
in bringing the result about.

The example above quoted from CLL seems not especially indicative of any
of the attitudinals.
> This interpretation does not seem to fit well with example 3.4, p 302
> ("It'll be hard for me to wake you up").
though that might be because the example has been distanced in time from
any actual effort.

"Boy, are you hard to wake up" does suggest that the speaker has or is
making some effort. "I've tried to wake you up, but you don't want to
respond, and I've got to get ready for work myself" might be an a'icu'i.
"Go set your alarm yourself if you want to get up; don't expect any
help from me" is an a'inai response.

In the mental arena, a'iro'e is someone striving mightily to work out
the problems on the examination. a'icu'iro'e is the expression s/he
might uses when the problem is done as well as the speaker intends.
a'inaicairo'e is used by someone who answers randomly on a multiple
choice question without even reading the problem, or who skips the
problem because even a random answer is too much effort. Social and
sexual effort is understood in terms of activity/passivity. Physical
effort should be self-explanatory. Emotional effort, I think of as a
sort of angst.

One can expend considerable effort on a process without necessarily
having a particular intent or desire for any particular outcome for that
process.

a'oro'e I have confused the issue enough for one post.

lojbab


On 9/6/05, Robert LeChevalier <lojbab@lojban.org> wrote:
>
> a'oro'e I have confused the issue enough for one post.

I don't have any major objections to what you say here.

The most contentious issue about these words was
on the meaning of {ai nai}, in particular, whether it
could be used to indicate "unintentionality", as in
for example:

.ai nai do pu se xrani
Oops! I didn't mean for you to get hurt.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 162

Jorge Llambas wrote:
> On 9/6/05, Robert LeChevalier <lojbab@lojban.org> wrote:
>>a'oro'e I have confused the issue enough for one post.
>
> I don't have any major objections to what you say here.

How rare! zo'o

> The most contentious issue about these words was
> on the meaning of {ai nai}, in particular, whether it
> could be used to indicate "unintentionality", as in
> for example:
>
> .ai nai do pu se xrani
> Oops! I didn't mean for you to get hurt.

I don't have a problem with it from an attitudinal standpoint. But ...

The thing to remember is that attitudinals are immediate emotional
expressions, and I think it is rare that they will be used in a
past-tense expression, except when one is explicitly recalling (ba'anai)
and even then the ba'a may render tense unnecessary (unless we've
concocted some elaborate time-travel scenario).

I thus wouldn't expect that "pu" to be in there.

do se xrani .ainai
You're hurt! I didn't mean it!

Now if you are trying to reconcile this with the keywords, then you
still have to take into account that this is referring to a past tense
event (being hurt). It doesn't make sense to refuse to perform
something that you already did, and the keywords thus cannot apply as
they are.

Now if you are trying to reassure a child about to ride a roller
coaster, you might say

.ainai do (ba) se xrani
I won't let you get hurt.

And that makes more sense in terms of the keyword of "refusal".

And if I was wearing my "original intent" hat and disagreeing with you,
I might use ainai in "rejection" of a definition that you were proposing.

For the context of the byfy work, I would hope that all of the
definitions are being expanded considerably from one word keywords, and
I will not object just because this results in examples inconsistent
with the keywords, provided that there is an expanded definition that is
coherent, and consistent with the times when the keyword might in fact
apply. English doesn't have a true set of attitudinals and there are no
true keywords for many of them - they cover tone of voice, facial
expression, and interjections that outside of the context are
indistinguishable from others.

As Nora says, most of the attitudinals have as their best literal
translation "Oh" or "Ah", with only punctuation used to make the minimal
distinctions possible in print. (Nora did note that for a'i - effort
the English expression would more likely be something like "Oof" - the
sound one might make when making a sudden exertion %^)

But those would neither be definitional, or unique for purposes of
LogFlash, and it is important to realize that the keywords were created
for LogFlash, not to serve in lieu of a dictionary, though of course
we've had 15 years where that is in fact what has happened.

lojbab



posts: 14214

On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 07:05:06PM -0400, Robert LeChevalier wrote:
> Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> >The most contentious issue about these words was on the meaning
> >of {ai nai}, in particular, whether it could be used to indicate
> >"unintentionality", as in for example:
> >
> > .ai nai do pu se xrani
> > Oops! I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
>
> I don't have a problem with it from an attitudinal standpoint. But ...

The objection is that it conflicts with the ma'oste and CLL for no
good reason.

-Robin


On 9/7/05, Robert LeChevalier <lojbab@lojban.org> wrote:
> Jorge Llambías wrote:
>
> > I don't have any major objections to what you say here.
>
> How rare! zo'o

I had lots of _minor_ objections that I started to write, but in
the end decided they were not worth pursuing. :-)

> > .ai nai do pu se xrani
> > Oops! I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
>
> I don't have a problem with it from an attitudinal standpoint. But ...
>
> The thing to remember is that attitudinals are immediate emotional
> expressions, and I think it is rare that they will be used in a
> past-tense expression, except when one is explicitly recalling (ba'anai)
> and even then the ba'a may render tense unnecessary (unless we've
> concocted some elaborate time-travel scenario).

In this case, the hurting has already happened (if at all, it is not
actually claimed, but the occasion for it happening was in the past).
Doesn't the "Oops" suggest that the event is very recent and fresh in the
speaker's mind?

> I thus wouldn't expect that "pu" to be in there.
>
> do se xrani .ainai
> You're hurt! I didn't mean it!

That would work too, yes. Are you saying that it would be incorrect to use
{pu} there? Can {ai nai} never accompany a past event, in your opinion?


> Now if you are trying to reconcile this with the keywords, then you
> still have to take into account that this is referring to a past tense
> event (being hurt). It doesn't make sense to refuse to perform
> something that you already did, and the keywords thus cannot apply as
> they are.

Right. That's why this one is controversial: I'm proposing to change
the keywords.

> Now if you are trying to reassure a child about to ride a roller
> coaster, you might say
>
> .ainai do (ba) se xrani
> I won't let you get hurt.
>
> And that makes more sense in terms of the keyword of "refusal".

For that meaning you could say {ai do na (ba) se xrani}.
The keywords do indeed suggest identifying {ai nai} with {ai na},
but I think that's not the normal pattern for attitudinals.

> And if I was wearing my "original intent" hat and disagreeing with you,
> I might use ainai in "rejection" of a definition that you were proposing.

Wouldn't {.i'a nai} be better for that? The opposite of "acceptance"?

> For the context of the byfy work, I would hope that all of the
> definitions are being expanded considerably from one word keywords, and
> I will not object just because this results in examples inconsistent
> with the keywords, provided that there is an expanded definition that is
> coherent, and consistent with the times when the keyword might in fact
> apply.

Have you had a chance to look at the expanded proposed definitions?

<http://www.lojban.org/tiki/tiki-index.php?page=BPFK%20Section%3A%20Realis%20Attitudinals>

<http://www.lojban.org/tiki/tiki-index.php?page=BPFK%20Section%3A%20Irrealis%20Attitudinals>

> As Nora says, most of the attitudinals have as their best literal
> translation "Oh" or "Ah", with only punctuation used to make the minimal
> distinctions possible in print.

Yes those are very vague, but there are others (somewhat) more
specific, like "aha!", "whoa!", "yaaawn!", "yuck!", "yay!", "ouch!", "wow!",
"snif", etc. which even if they are not a perfect fit for Lojban's they do
approximate some of them.

> (Nora did note that for a'i - effort
> the English expression would more likely be something like "Oof" - the
> sound one might make when making a sudden exertion %^)

Right, but even according to the CLL example, {a'i} need not be about
a _current_ effort. It simply indicates that the speaker has some
sort of control over the event, that they attempt to bring it about,
but that it is not at all a given that they succeed, precisely because
an effort is involved.

> But those would neither be definitional, or unique for purposes of
> LogFlash, and it is important to realize that the keywords were created
> for LogFlash, not to serve in lieu of a dictionary, though of course
> we've had 15 years where that is in fact what has happened.

Yes. Some of the keywords are very transparent, but others have given
people headaches trying to figure out how they could possibly fit.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


On 9/7/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> > > .ai nai do pu se xrani
> > > Oops! I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
> >
> > I don't have a problem with it from an attitudinal standpoint. But ...
>
> The objection is that it conflicts with the ma'oste and CLL for no
> good reason.

Or, depending on you point of view, for the very good reasons that:

  • {nai} on an attitudinal is not normally used to negate the bridi that the

attitudinal modifies.

  • rejection/refusal is already handled much better by other words

(i'anai/vi'onai)

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 14214

On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 08:49:55PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> On 9/7/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani Oops! I didn't mean for you to get
> > > > hurt.
> > >
> > > I don't have a problem with it from an attitudinal standpoint.
> > > But ...
> >
> > The objection is that it conflicts with the ma'oste and CLL for
> > no good reason.
>
> Or, depending on you point of view, for the very good reasons
> that:
>
> * {nai} on an attitudinal is not normally used to negate the bridi
> that the attitudinal modifies.

This is a fundamental disagreement we have: to me, *your*
definitions of .ai and .ai nai are a bridi negation, and the old
ones are not. I don't buy the snuti vs. to'e snuti thing;
"intentional" is not the opposite of "accidental" to me. I don't
think that Englaish has a word for the opposite of accidental, but
it would be something like "intended and achieved successfully".

> * rejection/refusal is already handled much better by other words
> (i'anai/vi'onai)

"blame" is very different from refusal to do something. vi'o nai is
pretty close, though.

I don't call either of those reasons "very good"; I call them
tinkering.

-Robin


On 9/7/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 08:49:55PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> >
> > * {nai} on an attitudinal is not normally used to negate the bridi
> > that the attitudinal modifies.
>
> This is a fundamental disagreement we have: to me, *your*
> definitions of .ai and .ai nai are a bridi negation, and the old
> ones are not.

I oppose {ai nai nroda} = {ai na broda}.

> I don't buy the snuti vs. to'e snuti thing;
> "intentional" is not the opposite of "accidental" to me. I don't
> think that Englaish has a word for the opposite of accidental, but
> it would be something like "intended and achieved successfully".

This page: <http://thesaurus.reference.com/search?q=accidental>
gives "designed, intended, intentional, planned, premeditated" as
antonyms of "accidental". Sounds right to me.

> > * rejection/refusal is already handled much better by other words
> > (i'anai/vi'onai)
>
> "blame" is very different from refusal to do something.

Yes. I was thinking of "rejection" as the opposite of "acceptance" rather
than of the keyword "blame".

> vi'o nai is pretty close, though.

Yes, I think {vi'o nai} is "refusal".

> I don't call either of those reasons "very good"; I call them
> tinkering.

I know, that's why I said "depending on your point of view".

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 162

Jorge Llambas wrote:
> On 9/7/05, Robert LeChevalier <lojbab@lojban.org> wrote:
>>Jorge Llambas wrote:
>>> .ai nai do pu se xrani
>>> Oops! I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
>>
>>I don't have a problem with it from an attitudinal standpoint. But ...
>>
>>The thing to remember is that attitudinals are immediate emotional
>>expressions, and I think it is rare that they will be used in a
>>past-tense expression, except when one is explicitly recalling (ba'anai)
>>and even then the ba'a may render tense unnecessary (unless we've
>>concocted some elaborate time-travel scenario).
>
> In this case, the hurting has already happened (if at all, it is not
> actually claimed, but the occasion for it happening was in the past).
> Doesn't the "Oops" suggest that the event is very recent and fresh in the
> speaker's mind?
>
>>I thus wouldn't expect that "pu" to be in there.
>>
>>do se xrani .ainai
>>You're hurt! I didn't mean it!
>
> That would work too, yes. Are you saying that it would be incorrect to use
> {pu} there? Can {ai nai} never accompany a past event, in your opinion?

I could never say never, but I think that *I* would be unlikely to use a
one. To me, the essence of attitudinals are immediate and present
tense, and the sorts of things I would express a reactive attitudinal
about would be as observative-like as possible in expression.

I guess one can have a tensed observative, but a place where I would use
one doesn't come to mind.

There are other attitudinals that are more reflective than reactive, and
they might be used with tensed statements. There is no prescriptive
force to a division between reactive and reflective attitudinal usages,
but it is a distinction that comes to mind when I try to concoct
examples, such that my mind resists using the kinds I consider reactive
in a reflective context. I would be more likely to predicate my
reaction in such sentences than to express it as an attitudinal.

>>Now if you are trying to reconcile this with the keywords, then you
>>still have to take into account that this is referring to a past tense
>>event (being hurt). It doesn't make sense to refuse to perform
>>something that you already did, and the keywords thus cannot apply as
>>they are.
>
> Right. That's why this one is controversial: I'm proposing to change
> the keywords.

I'd prefer addition to change, but do what you have to do, and I
personally will be more flexible on attitudinal keywords than other
areas of the language, because I know that our first cut was very ad
hoc. If there is no known contradictory usage, that would be more of a
plus.

>>Now if you are trying to reassure a child about to ride a roller
>>coaster, you might say
>>
>>.ainai do (ba) se xrani
>>I won't let you get hurt.
>>
>>And that makes more sense in terms of the keyword of "refusal".
>
> For that meaning you could say {ai do na (ba) se xrani}.
> The keywords do indeed suggest identifying {ai nai} with {ai na},
> but I think that's not the normal pattern for attitudinals.

There are several attitudinals where the nai could be replaced by an
appropriate negation, with ianai and ienai being the classic examples.
If you've managed to deal with those (I haven't looked), I suspect that
ainai should be handled similarly.

>>And if I was wearing my "original intent" hat and disagreeing with you,
>>I might use ainai in "rejection" of a definition that you were proposing.
>
> Wouldn't {.i'a nai} be better for that? The opposite of "acceptance"?

Hmm. The difference for me between acceptance and intent is a matter of
degree, but moreover of willingness to act on my reaction. Saying
.i'anai doesn't necessarily to me imply active refusal. I can see where
others might use it though.

>>For the context of the byfy work, I would hope that all of the
>>definitions are being expanded considerably from one word keywords, and
>>I will not object just because this results in examples inconsistent
>>with the keywords, provided that there is an expanded definition that is
>>coherent, and consistent with the times when the keyword might in fact
>>apply.
>
> Have you had a chance to look at the expanded proposed definitions?

I looked the beginning of the irrealis page and then I realized that I
should answer your questions about "original intent" untainted by what
has been written later, by you or by CLL.

My very-spotty contributions in this effort are not up to the sorts of
careful analysis under time pressure that byfy is doing, so in the
interest of keeping my stress level down, and also to keep from enraging
Robin again, I am trying to stay out of the actual byfy process, except
as needed to speak for original intent.

Nora is more willing to give opinions on such things, but has even less
time to actually write them up.

>>(Nora did note that for a'i - effort
>>the English expression would more likely be something like "Oof" - the
>>sound one might make when making a sudden exertion %^)
>
> Right, but even according to the CLL example, {a'i} need not be about
> a _current_ effort. It simply indicates that the speaker has some
> sort of control over the event, that they attempt to bring it about,
> but that it is not at all a given that they succeed, precisely because
> an effort is involved.

That's a plausible argument, and one I would probably accept as an
addition to a core definition that explicates the usage. But I don't
think that is the core meaning, and thus it might mislead if there isn't
a more normal usage first.

>>But those would neither be definitional, or unique for purposes of
>>LogFlash, and it is important to realize that the keywords were created
>>for LogFlash, not to serve in lieu of a dictionary, though of course
>>we've had 15 years where that is in fact what has happened.
>
> Yes. Some of the keywords are very transparent, but others have given
> people headaches trying to figure out how they could possibly fit.

Feel free to ask questions (you might want to ask me privately if I
don't seem to be answering the thread - I tune out the byfy most of the
time, since I remain overcommitted to other pursuits that I let slide
for 17 years). I can't remember how thoroughly I reviewed Cowan's
effort before CLL was published, so I can imagine that there are some
areas of confusion. I can at least say what I intended, and in the case
of attitudinals, may even be able to come up with examples (or Nora can).

lojbab



posts: 14214

On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 10:04:59PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> On 9/7/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 08:49:55PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> > >
> > > * {nai} on an attitudinal is not normally used to negate the
> > > bridi that the attitudinal modifies.
> >
> > This is a fundamental disagreement we have: to me, *your*
> > definitions of .ai and .ai nai are a bridi negation, and the old
> > ones are not.
>
> I oppose {ai nai nroda} = {ai na broda}.

You keep saying that, but you keep supporting a definition that
means exactly that, as far as I can tell. It's very confusing.

-Robin


On 9/8/05, Robert LeChevalier <lojbab@lojban.org> wrote:
> To me, the essence of attitudinals are immediate and present
> tense, and the sorts of things I would express a reactive attitudinal
> about would be as observative-like as possible in expression.

What do you think about things like:

ui la djan ba vitke mi'o ca le bavlamdei
Whee! John will visit us tomorrow!

ua ko'a pu mutce melbi ca li 1940
Wow! She was really beautiful in 1940!

It seems to me that one thing is the tense of the event
one is reacting to, and a different thing is the attitude.
I don't see a problem in showing attitudes towards
past or future events, actual or potential.

> I guess one can have a tensed observative, but a place where I would use
> one doesn't come to mind.

If by "observative" you mean something you are observing,
it doesn't seem possible it could be tensed. It could
be aspectual: {pu'o farlu} "It's about to fall!", or
{ba'o porpi} "It's broken!", but it always has to be nau,
the speaker's here & now.

If by "observative" you mean a bridi without an explicit x1,
then of course it is possible to say things like {ba carvi
ca le bavlamdei} "It will rain tomorrow", and there is no
problem as far as I can tell in showing an attitude
there: {oi ba carvi ca le bavlamdei}.


> > The keywords do indeed suggest identifying {ai nai} with {ai na},
> > but I think that's not the normal pattern for attitudinals.
>
> There are several attitudinals where the nai could be replaced by an
> appropriate negation, with ianai and ienai being the classic examples.

{ie nai broda} (disagreement that broda) is clearly different
from {ie na broda} (agreement that not broda).

{ia nai broda} (disbelief that broda) is also different from
{ia na broda} (belief that not broda).

> If you've managed to deal with those (I haven't looked), I suspect that
> ainai should be handled similarly.

One case I did change is {e'o nai}, from "negative request"
to "offer" as the opposite of "request". I'm not exactly sure
what "negative request" means, but it would seem to be
"request not to", i.e. {e'o na}.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 10:04:59PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> > On 9/7/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 08:49:55PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> > > >
> > > > * {nai} on an attitudinal is not normally used to negate the
> > > > bridi that the attitudinal modifies.
> > >
> > > This is a fundamental disagreement we have: to me, *your*
> > > definitions of .ai and .ai nai are a bridi negation, and the old
> > > ones are not.
> >
> > I oppose {ai nai nroda} = {ai na broda}.
>
> You keep saying that, but you keep supporting a definition that
> means exactly that, as far as I can tell. It's very confusing.

Which definition means exactly that? Certainly not the one
I support.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388

Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis
attitudinals" is closely related to its apparent
meaning and is not some strange Lojbanic jargon
of the all too usual type, then it ought to refer
to expressions of attitudes toward events that
are not yet determined (known to have occurred or
not). In particular, they are not indications of
claims about those events or about the speaker's
attitude toward those events. Hence, they have
no role in connection with events whose
occurrence (or non-occurrence on the occasion for
them to occur) is known; all that can be done
about these is to report that one had such and
such an attitude when the event was unknown and
such reports are, of course, not expressed with
attitudinals but with predicates, like any other
report (including one about one's present
attitudes). In this sense, of the listed forms
in the old discussions, {ai}, {a'o} and {au},
intent, hope and desire are the most clearly
irrealis attitudinals (you can't hope for,
intend, or desire what is already the case).
{a'i}, effort, if applied to a present project is
iffy as irrealis — the task is under way and the
effort is directed toward its present existence
(it is hard). In that sense, the suggestion that
the attitudinal reflects an assessment of the
difficulty of achieving or even undertaking some
future task makes more sense. Assuming, of
course, that the segregation of attitudinals into
realis and irrealis is more or less correct,
which is clearly iffy: {a'a}, {a'e}, and {a'u}
attentive, alert, and interested take some work
maybe more than we are capable of) to be made to
fit.
As for the negative forms (again assuming that
these notions make *sense as attitudinals*), one
part of the problem is the muddle between the
neutral position on a scale and the negative
extreme and the latter is caught up in the
uncertainty about what type of negation is
involved ({nai} doing duty for all of them on
various occasions). Negating an attitude may be
expressing the opposite attitude or it may be the
neutral position: I may not intend something
because I have never thought or it or don't give
a damn just as readily (or more so) as because I
intend the opposite. Indeed, if "intend" means
something like "commit to bringing about" (the
desirability of the event is assumable, its being
in the speaker's scope of influence is
inferable), we can stick the negation in in a
couple of places and different sorts of
negations. Non-commitment to do p may be simply
having no commitments with regard to p one way or
the other ("disinterested" in the traditional
sense) or it may at least embrace the possibility
that I have a commitment to not-p. The first of
these seems to be a neutral commitment, the
second more obviously negative. Similarly with
bringing about as what one is committed to. Not
bringing about p may mean doing nothing to affect
the occurrence or not
of p. Commitment to this is recusal in the legal
sense. But it also can mean not doing anything to
bring p about but not necessarily refraining from
doing things to prevent it. And, of course, here
there is the third possibility, actively working
to prevent p. Putting these together we get "not
intend p" may mean being indifferent whether p
occurs or not or being committed to not-bringing-
about p. And this latter may refraining from
doing anything affecting the occurrence of p or
doing nothing to bring p about but possibly doing
something to prevent it or working to prevent
entirely. I take it that either the first sense
of "not-commit" or the first for
"not-bring-about" points to the neutral position
on the intention scale. The second sense of
"not-bring-about" seems sorta wishy-washy, so the
thrid seems to be the natural negative form. But
there is not good word for this,largely because
it is indistinguishable from "intend not-p." the
situations are clearer with some of the others
that are clearly irrealis in this series. The
directive irrealis (most of eV) have negation
problems (and neutral ones as well).


posts: 2388


> On 9/8/05, Robert LeChevalier
> <lojbab@lojban.org> wrote:
> > To me, the essence of attitudinals are
> immediate and present
> > tense, and the sorts of things I would
> express a reactive attitudinal
> > about would be as observative-like as
> possible in expression.
>
> What do you think about things like:
>
> ui la djan ba vitke mi'o ca le bavlamdei
> Whee! John will visit us tomorrow!
>
> ua ko'a pu mutce melbi ca li 1940
> Wow! She was really beautiful in 1940!
>
> It seems to me that one thing is the tense of
> the event
> one is reacting to, and a different thing is
> the attitude.
> I don't see a problem in showing attitudes
> towards
> past or future events, actual or potential.


Some attitudinals yes and some no. I take it
that the irrealis is a definitional part of
meanings of the irrealis attitudinals. It is not
a part of the "raw emotions" like your examples.

> > I guess one can have a tensed observative,
> but a place where I would use
> > one doesn't come to mind.
>
> If by "observative" you mean something you are
> observing,
> it doesn't seem possible it could be tensed. It
> could
> be aspectual: {pu'o farlu} "It's about to
> fall!", or
> {ba'o porpi} "It's broken!", but it always has
> to be nau,
> the speaker's here & now.
>
> If by "observative" you mean a bridi without an
> explicit x1,
> then of course it is possible to say things
> like {ba carvi
> ca le bavlamdei} "It will rain tomorrow", and
> there is no
> problem as far as I can tell in showing an
> attitude
> there: {oi ba carvi ca le bavlamdei}.
>
>
> > > The keywords do indeed suggest identifying
> {ai nai} with {ai na},
> > > but I think that's not the normal pattern
> for attitudinals.
> >
> > There are several attitudinals where the nai
> could be replaced by an
> > appropriate negation, with ianai and ienai
> being the classic examples.
>
> {ie nai broda} (disagreement that broda) is
> clearly different
> from {ie na broda} (agreement that not broda).
>
> {ia nai broda} (disbelief that broda) is also
> different from
> {ia na broda} (belief that not broda).

It is a bit hard to lay out the other position
here without falling back on
don't-give-a-damn-itude or simple suspension of
willing to accept, but these really work here.
The same happens with "intend" but there we take
that middle case to be the neutral position, not
the negative.

> > If you've managed to deal with those (I
> haven't looked), I suspect that
> > ainai should be handled similarly.
>
> One case I did change is {e'o nai}, from
> "negative request"
> to "offer" as the opposite of "request". I'm
> not exactly sure
> what "negative request" means, but it would
> seem to be
> "request not to", i.e. {e'o na}.

Sensible choice from a practical point of view,
but not clearly generalizable by rules of the
sort we seem to want.



posts: 2388


> On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell
> <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 10:04:59PM -0300,
> Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> > > On 9/7/05, Robin Lee Powell
> <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 08:49:55PM -0300,
> Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > * {nai} on an attitudinal is not
> normally used to negate the
> > > > > bridi that the attitudinal modifies.
> > > >
> > > > This is a fundamental disagreement we
> have: to me, *your*
> > > > definitions of .ai and .ai nai are a
> bridi negation, and the old
> > > > ones are not.
> > >
> > > I oppose {ai nai nroda} = {ai na broda}.
> >
> > You keep saying that, but you keep supporting
> a definition that
> > means exactly that, as far as I can tell.
> It's very confusing.
>
> Which definition means exactly that? Certainly
> not the one
> I support.

As near as I can make out your scheme, {ainai}
out to be "committed to preventing," which is
indeed indistinguishable form "intending not."
But, as is often the case, I am not sure just
what your proposal is in concrete terms.


John E Clifford scripsit:

> Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis attitudinals" is closely
> related to its apparent meaning and is not some strange Lojbanic jargon
> of the all too usual type, then it ought to refer to expressions of
> attitudes toward events that are not yet determined (known to have
> occurred or not). In particular, they are not indications of claims
> about those events or about the speaker's attitude toward those events.

a) "Irrealis attitudinal" is shorthand for "attitudinal normally used in an
irrealis way." It is possible to use the irrealis attitudinals in a realis
fashion, and the realis attitudinals in an irrealis fashion, as CLL points out.
Such switcheroos are more likely for some attitudinals than for others.

b) What is it, then, to use an attitudinal in an irrealis way? It means that
the predication to which the attitudinal is attached is not claimed by the
speaker as true.

--
John Cowan <jcowan@reutershealth.com>
http://www.ccil.org/~cowan http://www.reutershealth.com
Charles li reis, nostre emperesdre magnes,
Set anz totz pleinz ad ested in Espagnes.


On 9/8/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis
> attitudinals" is closely related to its apparent
> meaning and is not some strange Lojbanic jargon
> of the all too usual type, then

I think it would be safer to assume it is some strange
Lojbanic jargon of the all too usual type. CLL calls them
"propositional attitude indicators", not "irrealis".

The names "realis attitiudinals" and "irrealis attitudinals"
I think were chosen by Nick when he created the
BPFK sections, but he didn't do the actual sorting.
I did the sorting when I started working on them based
more or less on whether it seemed to me that the
attitudinal interfered or not with the default assumption
of assertion for an otherwise unmarked bridi. I also
made a few changes back and forth as I was working
on them, as can be seen from the history of the pages.

> Assuming, of
> course, that the segregation of attitudinals into
> realis and irrealis is more or less correct,
> which is clearly iffy: {a'a}, {a'e}, and {a'u}
> attentive, alert, and interested take some work
> maybe more than we are capable of) to be made to
> fit.

That's why I preferred to leave them with the "realis"
bunch, despite CLL classifying them as propositional
attitudes.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388

wrote:

> John E Clifford scripsit:
>
> > Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis
> attitudinals" is closely
> > related to its apparent meaning and is not
> some strange Lojbanic jargon
> > of the all too usual type, then it ought to
> refer to expressions of
> > attitudes toward events that are not yet
> determined (known to have
> > occurred or not). In particular, they are
> not indications of claims
> > about those events or about the speaker's
> attitude toward those events.
>
> a) "Irrealis attitudinal" is shorthand for
> "attitudinal normally used in an
> irrealis way." It is possible to use the
> irrealis attitudinals in a realis
> fashion, and the realis attitudinals in an
> irrealis fashion, as CLL points out.
> Such switcheroos are more likely for some
> attitudinals than for others.

Well, I confess I can't find anything that could
reasonably be taken to be a case of the
switcheroo, but that is probably because I do not
have any idea what such a switch would be like:
How could I intend what is already (known to me
to be) the case or hope for it or desire it or
expect or ...? Using at least some realis cases
in an irrealis way is pretty easy: xorxes'
example of anticipatory pleasure (you can muck
about with the psychology here, but the
grammar/semantics is not a problem).

> b) What is it, then, to use an attitudinal in
> an irrealis way? It means that
> the predication to which the attitudinal is
> attached is not claimed by the
> speaker as true.

I would have gone for the stronger: that using
such a form implicates,that the speaker believes
the claim not yet to be true (or rahter that he
does not know /believe it to be true).


John E Clifford scripsit:

> Well, I confess I can't find anything that could
> reasonably be taken to be a case of the
> switcheroo, but that is probably because I do not
> have any idea what such a switch would be like:
> How could I intend what is already (known to me
> to be) the case or hope for it or desire it or
> expect or ...?

Consider this two-line dialogue:

A: do catra le mi patfu
B: .ai

A: You killed my father!
B: That was the whole idea.

> > b) What is it, then, to use an attitudinal in
> > an irrealis way? It means that
> > the predication to which the attitudinal is
> > attached is not claimed by the
> > speaker as true.
>
> I would have gone for the stronger: that using
> such a form implicates,that the speaker believes
> the claim not yet to be true (or rahter that he
> does not know /believe it to be true).

I prefer the terminology "propositional attitude" to "irrealis"
for reasons like this: it is clearer.

--
A rabbi whose congregation doesn't want John Cowan
to drive him out of town isn't a rabbi, http://www.ccil.org/~cowan
and a rabbi who lets them do it jcowan@reutershealth.com
isn't a man. --Jewish saying http://www.reutershealth.com


posts: 2388


> On 9/8/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis
> > attitudinals" is closely related to its
> apparent
> > meaning and is not some strange Lojbanic
> jargon
> > of the all too usual type, then
>
> I think it would be safer to assume it is some
> strange
> Lojbanic jargon of the all too usual type. CLL
> calls them
> "propositional attitude indicators", not
> "irrealis".

I suppose the jargon claim is probably true, but
it does seem that you endeavored to give it some
content not totally separate from the
non-jargonic apparent meaning. "Propositional
attitude" is, in this case, again a piece of
jargon only dimly related to its use as a term of
art in early to mid-20th century philosophy, so
the shift in terminology is welcome (thoug
admittedly some propositional attitudes in the
extra-Lojbanic sense are included among those in
the Lojbanic sense).

> The names "realis attitiudinals" and "irrealis
> attitudinals"
> I think were chosen by Nick when he created the
>
> BPFK sections, but he didn't do the actual
> sorting.
> I did the sorting when I started working on
> them based
> more or less on whether it seemed to me that
> the
> attitudinal interfered or not with the default
> assumption
> of assertion for an otherwise unmarked bridi. I
> also
> made a few changes back and forth as I was
> working
> on them, as can be seen from the history of the
> pages.

That is, it does not make a claim of the sort the
bridi looks to make — nor of course one about
the speaker's attitude. It does not make a claim
at all, in fact. But it still has an apprpriate
context of use (in at least many cases)and these
are often defining and often hinge on the truth
of the embedded bridi or the speaker's belief
about that truth. One does not direct a course
of action (in any of the various ways provided)
if that course of action is already under way or
the opportunity for it is past (or believed to be
in each case).

> > Assuming, of
> > course, that the segregation of attitudinals
> into
> > realis and irrealis is more or less correct,
> > which is clearly iffy: {a'a}, {a'e}, and
> {a'u}
> > attentive, alert, and interested take some
> work
> > maybe more than we are capable of) to be made
> to
> > fit.
>
> That's why I preferred to leave them with the
> "realis"
> bunch, despite CLL classifying them as
> propositional
> attitudes.

I think that was a good move (and I would throw
in "effort" if Lojbab's interpretation is
definitive).



posts: 2388

wrote:

> John E Clifford scripsit:
>
> > Well, I confess I can't find anything that
> could
> > reasonably be taken to be a case of the
> > switcheroo, but that is probably because I do
> not
> > have any idea what such a switch would be
> like:
> > How could I intend what is already (known to
> me
> > to be) the case or hope for it or desire it
> or
> > expect or ...?
>
> Consider this two-line dialogue:
>
> A: do catra le mi patfu
> B: .ai
>
> A: You killed my father!
> B: That was the whole idea.

Well, I guess I couldn't read it that way. That
to me has to be some attitude other than
intention (satisfaction, perhaps, or something
more complex). Of course, there may be some
rubric under which all these various things fit,
discriminating exactly on the status of the event
(subjunctive satisfaction, maybe, though that
doesn't get the commitment part in). But actually
I would take B's remark as improperly
substituting for a claim that B intended to kill
A's father.

> > > b) What is it, then, to use an attitudinal
> in
> > > an irrealis way? It means that
> > > the predication to which the attitudinal is
> > > attached is not claimed by the
> > > speaker as true.
> >
> > I would have gone for the stronger: that
> using
> > such a form implicates,that the speaker
> believes
> > the claim not yet to be true (or rahter that
> he
> > does not know /believe it to be true).
>
> I prefer the terminology "propositional
> attitude" to "irrealis"
> for reasons like this: it is clearer.

Not hardly quite. "Irrealis" at least gives a
clue, even if a bad one. Of course, I am blocked
by the original meaninng of "propositional
attitude" from the 1950s or so.


On 9/8/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > > Assuming, of
> > > course, that the segregation of attitudinals
> > into
> > > realis and irrealis is more or less correct,
> > > which is clearly iffy: {a'a}, {a'e}, and
> > {a'u}
> > > attentive, alert, and interested take some
> > work
> > > maybe more than we are capable of) to be made
> > to
> > > fit.
> >
> > That's why I preferred to leave them with the
> > "realis"
> > bunch, despite CLL classifying them as
> > propositional
> > attitudes.
>
> I think that was a good move (and I would throw
> in "effort" if Lojbab's interpretation is
> definitive).

I had "effort" with the realis originally, but moved it
with the irrealis because I think it forms part of a
set wit ai, au and a'o. "Attempt" might be a better
one-word gloss than "effort".

Effort in the sense of difficult exertion might be better
expressed (or complemented) with {fu'inai}.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 14214

On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 01:42:52AM -0700, Robin Lee Powell wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 10:04:59PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> > On 9/7/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 08:49:55PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > * {nai} on an attitudinal is not normally used to negate the
> > > > bridi that the attitudinal modifies.
> > >
> > > This is a fundamental disagreement we have: to me, *your*
> > > definitions of .ai and .ai nai are a bridi negation, and the
> > > old ones are not.
> >
> > I oppose {ai nai nroda} = {ai na broda}.
>
> You keep saying that, but you keep supporting a definition that
> means exactly that, as far as I can tell. It's very confusing.

Erm. I was smoking crack here. Sorry.

The current {.ai nai broda} is, in fact, equal to {.ai na broda}
(assuming broda is a positive action, of course). xorxes proposal
is not.

I'm really not sure how much I care about that, though.

xorxes: For how many other UI is this true, *before* you started
tinkering with them?

-Robin


On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> The current {.ai nai broda} is, in fact, equal to {.ai na broda}
> (assuming broda is a positive action, of course). xorxes proposal
> is not.
>
> I'm really not sure how much I care about that, though.
>
> xorxes: For how many other UI is this true, *before* you started
> tinkering with them?

Besides {ai}, only {e'o} I think.

(Assuming "negative request" means "request not to",
i.e. {e'o na}.)

mu'o mi'e xorxes


Robin Lee Powell scripsit:

> The current {.ai nai broda} is, in fact, equal to {.ai na broda}
> (assuming broda is a positive action, of course). xorxes proposal
> is not.

Sticking my toe in the water, it seems to me that what we want is a
four-way distinction:

intentional action (I intended to go to the store)
intentional inaction (I intended not to go to the store)
unintentional action (I went to the store not meaning to)
unintentional inaction (I failed to go to the store contrary to my intention)

The first two are ai, the last two are ainai, and the 2nd and 4th have na.

--
But you, Wormtongue, you have done what you could for your true master. Some
reward you have earned at least. Yet Saruman is apt to overlook his bargains.
I should advise you to go quickly and remind him, lest he forget your faithful
service. --Gandalf John Cowan <jcowan@reutershealth.com>


On 9/8/05, John.Cowan <jcowan@reutershealth.com> wrote:
> Sticking my toe in the water, it seems to me that what we want is a
> four-way distinction:
>
> intentional action (I intended to go to the store)
> intentional inaction (I intended not to go to the store)
> unintentional action (I went to the store not meaning to)
> unintentional inaction (I failed to go to the store contrary to my intention)
>
> The first two are ai, the last two are ainai, and the 2nd and 4th have na.

Exactly. That's what I'm proposing.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


Jorge Llambías scripsit:
> On 9/8/05, John.Cowan <jcowan@reutershealth.com> wrote:
> > Sticking my toe in the water, it seems to me that what we want is a
> > four-way distinction:
> >
> > intentional action (I intended to go to the store)
> > intentional inaction (I intended not to go to the store)
> > unintentional action (I went to the store not meaning to)
> > unintentional inaction (I failed to go to the store contrary to my intention)
> >
> > The first two are ai, the last two are ainai, and the 2nd and 4th have na.
>
> Exactly. That's what I'm proposing.
>

However, my third and fourth examples are badly worded, as they sound realis:

3 should be: I have no intention of going to the store, and 4 should be:
I have no intention of not going to the store.

--
When I wrote it I was more than a little John Cowan
febrile with foodpoisoning from an antique carrot jcowan@reutershealth.com
that I foolishly ate out of an illjudged faith www.ccil.org/~cowan
in the benignancy of vegetables. --And Rosta www.reutershealth.com


posts: 953

On Thu, 8 Sep 2005, John.Cowan wrote:

> John E Clifford scripsit:
>
>> Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis attitudinals" is closely
>> related to its apparent meaning and is not some strange Lojbanic jargon
>> of the all too usual type, then it ought to refer to expressions of
>> attitudes toward events that are not yet determined (known to have
>> occurred or not). In particular, they are not indications of claims
>> about those events or about the speaker's attitude toward those events.
>
> a) "Irrealis attitudinal" is shorthand for "attitudinal normally used in an
> irrealis way." It is possible to use the irrealis attitudinals in a realis
> fashion, and the realis attitudinals in an irrealis fashion, as CLL points out.
> Such switcheroos are more likely for some attitudinals than for others.

I think you must be referring to the second paragraph on page 302.

IMO, the example of ".u'u" as "I regret that X" is bogus. If ".u'u" were
used as a "propositional attitude indicator", it would be possible for X
to be false, and "I regret that X" to still be true. I find that
particularly counter-intuitive.

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
Information wants to be anthropomorphized!


On 9/8/05, John.Cowan <jcowan@reutershealth.com> wrote:
> > > intentional action (I intended to go to the store)
> > > intentional inaction (I intended not to go to the store)
> > > unintentional action (I went to the store not meaning to)
> > > unintentional inaction (I failed to go to the store contrary to my intention)
> However, my third and fourth examples are badly worded, as they sound realis:
>
> 3 should be: I have no intention of going to the store, and 4 should be:
> I have no intention of not going to the store.

Yes, but the problem with that is that, in English, "I have
no intention of going to the store" is more or less
interchangeable with "I intend not to go to the store".
What is wanted for 3 is "it may very well turn out that I
do end up going to the store, but if that is so it won't be
on purpose", which the wording "I have no intention..."
sort of precludes, even if _logically_ it would apply.
This English usage might have influenced the keyword
choice for {ai nai}.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 149

Jorge Llamb?as scripsit:

> Yes, but the problem with that is that, in English, "I have
> no intention of going to the store" is more or less
> interchangeable with "I intend not to go to the store".
> What is wanted for 3 is "it may very well turn out that I
> do end up going to the store, but if that is so it won't be
> on purpose", which the wording "I have no intention..."
> sort of precludes, even if _logically_ it would apply.
> This English usage might have influenced the keyword
> choice for {ai nai}.

+1


--
May the hair on your toes never fall out! John Cowan
--Thorin Oakenshield (to Bilbo) cowan@ccil.org


posts: 14214

On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 02:34:38PM -0400, John.Cowan wrote:
> Robin Lee Powell scripsit:
>
> > The current {.ai nai broda} is, in fact, equal to {.ai na broda}
> > (assuming broda is a positive action, of course). xorxes
> > proposal is not.
>
> Sticking my toe in the water, it seems to me that what we want is
> a four-way distinction:
>
> intentional action (I intended to go to the store)
> intentional inaction (I intended not to go to the store)
> unintentional action (I went to the store not meaning to)
> unintentional inaction (I failed to go to the store contrary to my intention)

I agree whole-heartedly that we want to be able to emote all these
things, except that the tenses are wierd. I don't believe that it
is *possible* to say "I intended to go to the store" using
attitudinals, because the attitudinals scope outside the tenses.
{pu ku .ai mi klama} == {.ai mi pu klama} == "I intend that in the
past I went to the store". WTF that means, I have no idea, but "I
intended to go to the store" it is not, I'm pretty sure.

So I'm going to ignore the past-tense-ness in the sentences above,
beacuse it's confusing me.

> The first two are ai, the last two are ainai, and the 2nd and 4th
> have na.

Well, that's the contention, isn't it?

.ai mi klama
.ai mi na klama

So far, I'm good.

.ai nai mi klama

Under the current definition, that means "I refuse to go to the
store". xorxes believes this to be equivalent of {.ai mi na klama},
and hence a waste of UI space. I believe he's right on both counts;
the question is, is breaking past usage worth such a fiddly little
problem?

-Robin

--
http://www.digitalkingdom.org/~rlpowell/ *** http://www.lojban.org/
Reason #237 To Learn Lojban: "Homonyms: Their Grate!"
Proud Supporter of the Singularity Institute - http://singinst.org/


posts: 14214

On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 08:55:00PM +0200, Arnt Richard Johansen
wrote:
> On Thu, 8 Sep 2005, John.Cowan wrote:
>
> >John E Clifford scripsit:
> >
> >>Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis attitudinals" is
> >>closely related to its apparent meaning and is not some strange
> >>Lojbanic jargon of the all too usual type, then it ought to
> >>refer to expressions of attitudes toward events that are not yet
> >>determined (known to have occurred or not). In particular, they
> >>are not indications of claims about those events or about the
> >>speaker's attitude toward those events.
> >
> >a) "Irrealis attitudinal" is shorthand for "attitudinal normally
> >used in an irrealis way." It is possible to use the irrealis
> >attitudinals in a realis fashion, and the realis attitudinals in
> >an irrealis fashion, as CLL points out. Such switcheroos are more
> >likely for some attitudinals than for others.
>
> I think you must be referring to the second paragraph on page 302.

AKA Chapter 13, section 3.

> IMO, the example of ".u'u" as "I regret that X" is bogus. If
> ".u'u" were used as a "propositional attitude indicator", it would
> be possible for X to be false, and "I regret that X" to still be
> true. I find that particularly counter-intuitive.

+1 as stated. However, note the English gloss for .u'u in that

usage would be "I would regret it if...". IMO, that's what da'i is
for.

I'm with Arnt that the division between those UI that default to
realis and those that default to irrealis should be as clear as
humanly possible, and da'i and da'i nai should be used if you want
the other.

-Robin

--
http://www.digitalkingdom.org/~rlpowell/ *** http://www.lojban.org/
Reason #237 To Learn Lojban: "Homonyms: Their Grate!"
Proud Supporter of the Singularity Institute - http://singinst.org/


posts: 2388


> On 9/8/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > > > Assuming, of
> > > > course, that the segregation of
> attitudinals
> > > into
> > > > realis and irrealis is more or less
> correct,
> > > > which is clearly iffy: {a'a}, {a'e}, and
> > > {a'u}
> > > > attentive, alert, and interested take
> some
> > > work
> > > > maybe more than we are capable of) to be
> made
> > > to
> > > > fit.
> > >
> > > That's why I preferred to leave them with
> the
> > > "realis"
> > > bunch, despite CLL classifying them as
> > > propositional
> > > attitudes.
> >
> > I think that was a good move (and I would
> throw
> > in "effort" if Lojbab's interpretation is
> > definitive).
>
> I had "effort" with the realis originally, but
> moved it
> with the irrealis because I think it forms part
> of a
> set wit ai, au and a'o. "Attempt" might be a
> better
> one-word gloss than "effort".
>
> Effort in the sense of difficult exertion might
> be better
> expressed (or complemented) with {fu'inai}.

Well just what attitudinal modifiers do or how
they work is not crystalline, but presumably they
modify other attitudinals and none suggests
itself for the groan of hard labor (or the sigh
of ease or the "om shanti shanti" of total
nondoing.



posts: 2388


> On 9/8/05, John.Cowan
> <jcowan@reutershealth.com> wrote:
> > Sticking my toe in the water, it seems to me
> that what we want is a
> > four-way distinction:
> >
> > intentional action (I intended to go
> to the store)
> > intentional inaction (I intended not
> to go to the store)
> > unintentional action (I went to the
> store not meaning to)
> > unintentional inaction (I failed to go
> to the store contrary to my intention)
> >
> > The first two are ai, the last two are ainai,
> and the 2nd and 4th have na.
>
> Exactly. That's what I'm proposing.

This seems to me to be a different sense of
"intention" than the one apparently meant for
{ai}. In fact, this is not an attitude at all,
but a report of a way of doing something,
deliberately or not. To make it {ai} is to
confuse an expression of an attitude with a claim
to have had that attitude in the past. Bow could
you *express* lack of intention (or indeed, how
have it as an *attitude* at all)?


On 9/8/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Effort in the sense of difficult exertion might
> > be better
> > expressed (or complemented) with {fu'inai}.
>
> Well just what attitudinal modifiers do or how
> they work is not crystalline, but presumably they
> modify other attitudinals and none suggests
> itself for the groan of hard labor (or the sigh
> of ease or the "om shanti shanti" of total
> nondoing.

o'u/o'unai ?

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388

wrote:

> Jorge Llambías scripsit:
> > On 9/8/05, John.Cowan
> <jcowan@reutershealth.com> wrote:
> > > Sticking my toe in the water, it seems to
> me that what we want is a
> > > four-way distinction:
> > >
> > > intentional action (I intended to go
> to the store)
> > > intentional inaction (I intended not
> to go to the store)
> > > unintentional action (I went to the
> store not meaning to)
> > > unintentional inaction (I failed to
> go to the store contrary to my intention)
> > >
> > > The first two are ai, the last two are
> ainai, and the 2nd and 4th have na.
> >
> > Exactly. That's what I'm proposing.
> >
>
> However, my third and fourth examples are badly
> worded, as they sound realis:
>
> 3 should be: I have no intention of going to
> the store, and 4 should be:
> I have no intention of not going to the store.

Better, perhaps. I still have a problem with the
attitude of non-intending in what appears to be
the sense here.



posts: 2388


> On Thu, 8 Sep 2005, John.Cowan wrote:
>
> > John E Clifford scripsit:
> >
> >> Taking as a working hypothesis that
> "irrealis attitudinals" is closely
> >> related to its apparent meaning and is not
> some strange Lojbanic jargon
> >> of the all too usual type, then it ought to
> refer to expressions of
> >> attitudes toward events that are not yet
> determined (known to have
> >> occurred or not). In particular, they are
> not indications of claims
> >> about those events or about the speaker's
> attitude toward those events.
> >
> > a) "Irrealis attitudinal" is shorthand for
> "attitudinal normally used in an
> > irrealis way." It is possible to use the
> irrealis attitudinals in a realis
> > fashion, and the realis attitudinals in an
> irrealis fashion, as CLL points out.
> > Such switcheroos are more likely for some
> attitudinals than for others.
>
> I think you must be referring to the second
> paragraph on page 302.
>
> IMO, the example of ".u'u" as "I regret that X"
> is bogus. If ".u'u" were
> used as a "propositional attitude indicator",
> it would be possible for X
> to be false, and "I regret that X" to still be
> true. I find that
> particularly counter-intuitive.

Thanks for the reference (it is not at all what I
was expecting given Cowan's description of what
it said). Of course, {u'u} is probably odd in
various ways and what one might do with it does
not obviously transfer to others. In particular
for present purposes, {u'u} appears to be realis
in the sense that it expresses an attitude (or
whatever) that is only possible with an event
that (the speaker believes) has actually
occurred. So, {u'u X} is appropriate (not true
or false, note) only if the speaker at least
thinks x is true. Failing this, the expression
of the emotion of regret (etc) is inept and
possibly meant to mislead, and the claim to have
that emtion is simply always false (I am not
clear what "I regret that X" means but, since it
is true or false independently of X, it cannot be
{u'u X}.}


Robin Lee Powell scripsit:

> I agree whole-heartedly that we want to be able to emote all these
> things, except that the tenses are wierd. I don't believe that it
> is *possible* to say "I intended to go to the store" using
> attitudinals, because the attitudinals scope outside the tenses.

+1


--
John Cowan jcowan@reutershealth.com http://www.ccil.org/~cowan
Does anybody want any flotsam? / I've gotsam.
Does anybody want any jetsam? / I can getsam.
--Ogden Nash, No Doctors Today, Thank You


posts: 2388

<rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 08:55:00PM +0200, Arnt
> Richard Johansen
> wrote:
> > On Thu, 8 Sep 2005, John.Cowan wrote:
> >
> > >John E Clifford scripsit:
> > >
> > >>Taking as a working hypothesis that
> "irrealis attitudinals" is
> > >>closely related to its apparent meaning and
> is not some strange
> > >>Lojbanic jargon of the all too usual type,
> then it ought to
> > >>refer to expressions of attitudes toward
> events that are not yet
> > >>determined (known to have occurred or not).
> In particular, they
> > >>are not indications of claims about those
> events or about the
> > >>speaker's attitude toward those events.
> > >
> > >a) "Irrealis attitudinal" is shorthand for
> "attitudinal normally
> > >used in an irrealis way." It is possible to
> use the irrealis
> > >attitudinals in a realis fashion, and the
> realis attitudinals in
> > >an irrealis fashion, as CLL points out. Such
> switcheroos are more
> > >likely for some attitudinals than for
> others.
> >
> > I think you must be referring to the second
> paragraph on page 302.
>
> AKA Chapter 13, section 3.

This says (over and over) that the division under
various headings ("reealis" and irrealis: not
among them) is arbitrary and porous in at least
some cases. It does not say that semantic
restrictions on a particular expression can be
junked at will, which is what seems to be
hap0pening in some of these cases. You can't
intend or order or hope for or fear or.... an
even you believe has occurred. That is built
inot the meaning ("commit to bring about" and the
like). Whatever is happening in the realis cases
and is called intention is something else and
might be worth looking at in its own right. But
so far it looks to be sim0ply reports of past
attitudes, not expressions of current one (note
ONLY current attitudes can be expressed).
> > IMO, the example of ".u'u" as "I regret that
> X" is bogus. If
> > ".u'u" were used as a "propositional attitude
> indicator", it would
> > be possible for X to be false, and "I regret
> that X" to still be
> > true. I find that particularly
> counter-intuitive.
>
> +1 as stated. However, note the English gloss
> for .u'u in that
> usage would be "I would regret it if...". IMO,
> that's what da'i is
> for.
>
> I'm with Arnt that the division between those
> UI that default to
> realis and those that default to irrealis
> should be as clear as
> humanly possible, and da'i and da'i nai should
> be used if you want
> the other.
>
> -Robin
>
> —
> http://www.digitalkingdom.org/~rlpowell/ ***
> http://www.lojban.org/
> Reason #237 To Learn Lojban: "Homonyms: Their
> Grate!"
> Proud Supporter of the Singularity Institute -
> http://singinst.org/
>
>
>
>



On 9/8/05, John.Cowan <jcowan@reutershealth.com> wrote:
> Robin Lee Powell scripsit:
> > I agree whole-heartedly that we want to be able to emote all these
> > things, except that the tenses are wierd. I don't believe that it
> > is *possible* to say "I intended to go to the store" using
> > attitudinals, because the attitudinals scope outside the tenses.
>
> +1

Consider this two-line dialogue:

A: do pu catra le mi patfu
B: .ai go'i

A: You killed my father!
B: That was the whole idea.

I find nothing objectionable in that dialogue.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On 9/8/05, John.Cowan
> <jcowan@reutershealth.com> wrote:
> > Robin Lee Powell scripsit:
> > > I agree whole-heartedly that we want to be
> able to emote all these
> > > things, except that the tenses are wierd.
> I don't believe that it
> > > is *possible* to say "I intended to go to
> the store" using
> > > attitudinals, because the attitudinals
> scope outside the tenses.
> >
> > +1
>
> Consider this two-line dialogue:
>
> A: do pu catra le mi patfu
> B: .ai go'i
>
> A: You killed my father!
> B: That was the whole idea.
>
> I find nothing objectionable in that dialogue.

Well, as noted an expression has to be of a
present attitude and I can't think of a present
attitude that refers to a past event and is like
intention enough to use the same word. The
English for B is pretty coearly a claim, object
to truth condition rejection: "To Hell it was,
you just lucked out."



On 9/8/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Consider this two-line dialogue:
> >
> > A: do pu catra le mi patfu
> > B: .ai go'i
> >
> > A: You killed my father!
> > B: That was the whole idea.
> >
> > I find nothing objectionable in that dialogue.
>
> Well, as noted an expression has to be of a
> present attitude and I can't think of a present
> attitude that refers to a past event and is like
> intention enough to use the same word.

Well, if you really consider {ai go'i} meaningless/incomprehensible
in that context I guess there isn't much more I can say. To me it
is fairly obvious, so I won't object if someone uses expressions
like that, and I probably will use them too (maybe I already have,
I don't really remember.)

The
> English for B is pretty coearly a claim, object
> to truth condition rejection: "To Hell it was,
> you just lucked out."

Yes, translations of attitudinals often have to be approximated in
English as full claims because interjections in English tend to be
much more vague and imprecise than Lojban attitudinals. Attitudinals
can also be challenged in Lojban, of course, as can interjections
in English: "Oops, did I hurt you?" "'Oops' my foot! You did that
on purpose, you ...!"

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 14214

On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 06:00:43PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> On 9/8/05, John.Cowan <jcowan@reutershealth.com> wrote:
> > Robin Lee Powell scripsit:
> > > I agree whole-heartedly that we want to be able to emote all
> > > these things, except that the tenses are wierd. I don't
> > > believe that it is *possible* to say "I intended to go to the
> > > store" using attitudinals, because the attitudinals scope
> > > outside the tenses.
> >
> > +1
>
> Consider this two-line dialogue:
>
> A: do pu catra le mi patfu
> B: .ai go'i
>
> A: You killed my father!
> B: That was the whole idea.
>
> I find nothing objectionable in that dialogue.

{.ai} by itself can mean pretty much anything, so sure, whatever.

But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do patfu}, which means "I
intend that in the past I killed your father" which, as I said, I
don't know what it means.

-Robin


On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do patfu}, which means "I
> intend that in the past I killed your father" which, as I said, I
> don't know what it means.

OK, don't use then. :-)
To me it is fairly clear, as I said, but I don't think any direct
English translation does justice to it, so I won't try.

BTW, I have made a transcript of the handwritten material Lojban
sent us. I haven't examined it in detail yet but it seems very close
to the final product, not a whole lot of reduction as the CLL quote
seemed to suggest. Here is the list for those interested:

social intention scale
physical
emotional non-specific emotions
mental/reasoning
sexual

conformance/(obedience) agree/meek? disharmony/challenge/defiance
(obligation/duty)
(freedom/exemption)
desire indiference reluctance
pity/compassion
rashness
caution
hope hopelessness
request
negative request
suggestion
abandon suggestion
promise
release from promise
choice/decision/willing/voluntary lack of choice/mandatory
against choice/rejection/unwilling
indecision
aggressive passive defensive
belief unbelief/doubt disbelief
attention/vigilance inattention/neglect
avoidance/active neglect
happy/cheerful/rejoice up!
unhappy/dejected/sad/depressed down!
comfort discomfort
exaggeration acuracy
understatement
anticipation/future present/current past/memory
effort/exertion relaxation
repose/laziness
self-orientation/privacy
other orientation/conviviality
interest/attraction disinterest
repulsion/repugnance/avoidance
confidence lack of confidence fear
closeness/familiarity
distance/alienation
agree/concord/harmony disagree
innocence guilt
(attonement/repentance lack of regret
impenitence) (pity/obligation/guilt)
worship/sacredness sacrilege
energy/excitement passive
laziness/ennui
certainty uncertainty impossibility
dignity
indignation/offense
forgiveness/acceptance
blame/rejection
love/endearment/affection
hate/disaffection
relief
irritation/aggravation
forbearance/patience
anger/rage/frustration
permission/assent/consent agree/rank prohibition
appreciation envy/jealousy
approval non-approval
disapproval/rejection/ridicule/derision
truth
falsity (sarcasm/irony/flattery)
amusement/diversion
boredom/weariness
humor/jest dullness/matter of fact
gravity/seriousness
(pride)
(humility) infamy)
hauteur/rank
meekness/lack of rank
wonder expectation
(friendship)
success failure
surprise deja vu boredom/passe
discovery/find/gain
confusion/absence/searching
tension/stress/anxiety calm relaxation
control lack of control
opposed to control
ease
difficulty/futility
competion
incompleteness
alertness exhaustion


posts: 14214

On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 09:37:16PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> > But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do patfu}, which means "I
> > intend that in the past I killed your father" which, as I said,
> > I don't know what it means.
>
> OK, don't use then. :-)

Don't use what, exactly?

> To me it is fairly clear, as I said, but I don't think any direct
> English translation does justice to it, so I won't try.

Oh, please? :-)

-Robin


On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 09:37:16PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> > On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> > > But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do patfu}, which means "I
> > > intend that in the past I killed your father" which, as I said,
> > > I don't know what it means.
> >
> > OK, don't use then. :-)
>
> Don't use what, exactly?

{ai} with a past tense bridi.

> > To me it is fairly clear, as I said, but I don't think any direct
> > English translation does justice to it, so I won't try.
>
> Oh, please? :-)

I think John Cowan's translation got the meaning quite well, even
if it was not a literal one. It often happens that you can't translate
literally from one language to another and some rewording is
necessary to get the meaning across.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 162

Jorge Llambas wrote:
> On 9/8/05, Robert LeChevalier <lojbab@lojban.org> wrote:
>>To me, the essence of attitudinals are immediate and present
>>tense, and the sorts of things I would express a reactive attitudinal
>>about would be as observative-like as possible in expression.
>
> What do you think about things like:
> ui la djan ba vitke mi'o ca le bavlamdei
> Whee! John will visit us tomorrow!

There is an elliptical ba'a there, is there not?

> ua ko'a pu mutce melbi ca li 1940
> Wow! She was really beautiful in 1940!

Likewise a ba'anai.

If one is anticipating or recalling, there is some degree of reflective
consideration going on. If on the other hand you are reacting to a
picture of the lady in 1940, I probably wouldn't think to use the pu,
but merely try to qualify it as "in the picture".

But I think this is personal taste.

> It seems to me that one thing is the tense of the event
> one is reacting to, and a different thing is the attitude.
> I don't see a problem in showing attitudes towards
> past or future events, actual or potential.

I'm not sure I see a problem with doing so, but rather that I would be
inclined to mark with ba'a/ba'anai rather than pu/ba.

>>If you've managed to deal with those (I haven't looked), I suspect that
>>ainai should be handled similarly.
>
> One case I did change is {e'o nai}, from "negative request"
> to "offer" as the opposite of "request". I'm not exactly sure
> what "negative request" means, but it would seem to be
> "request not to", i.e. {e'o na}.

There are times when one attitudinally says "Please don't!" Usually
something someone really expects the other person to do, but you don't
want them to do; you could express this as "Please" with a negation, but
I think that the negation is attitudinal rather than propositional. The
relatively recent postfixed "Not!" in English slang has an attitudinal
nature that could fit with ianai, ienai or e'onai depending on the context.

But I'm willing to consider your alternative, even though it is clearly
a change, though I thought we had a COI vocative that conveyed an offer.
Things are muddy in my mind at the moment, and I have no time to look
things up.

lojbab



posts: 162

John E Clifford wrote:
> Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis
> attitudinals" is closely related to its apparent
> meaning and is not some strange Lojbanic jargon
> of the all too usual type,

I've been interpreting irrealis as being a technical term for what you
used to refer to as "possible worlds". If that is not correct (and
maybe even if it is), I think a definition of the term as used in the
classification of those particular attitudinals as "irrealis" should be
right at the top of the section. I am presuming that there is no such
definition or you would not need to be making a working hypothesis as to
what the word means.


>you can't hope for,
> intend, or desire what is already the case).

You can, but only if you lack certainty that it is indeed the case. "a'o
you (unlike me) have actually read Jorge's definitions" is an example.
It probably is true, but my reaction is one of hope that it is indeed true.

> As for the negative forms (again assuming that
> these notions make *sense as attitudinals*), one
> part of the problem is the muddle between the
> neutral position on a scale and the negative
> extreme and the latter is caught up in the
> uncertainty about what type of negation is
> involved ({nai} doing duty for all of them on
> various occasions). Negating an attitude may be
> expressing the opposite attitude or it may be the
> neutral position: I may not intend something
> because I have never thought or it or don't give
> a damn just as readily (or more so) as because I
> intend the opposite.

The use of nai for scalar opposite in attitudinals was concocted long
before the negation paper and our attempt to make negation rational.
Thus it isn't necessarily "negation" on a UI. If it is required by
perceived brokenness to make nai uniformly a true negation in all
contexts, then we need a different word a'onaicai (a perfect example, I
think, and it just came out!)

lojbab



posts: 2388


> On 9/8/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > Consider this two-line dialogue:
> > >
> > > A: do pu catra le mi patfu
> > > B: .ai go'i
> > >
> > > A: You killed my father!
> > > B: That was the whole idea.
> > >
> > > I find nothing objectionable in that
> dialogue.
> >
> > Well, as noted an expression has to be of a
> > present attitude and I can't think of a
> present
> > attitude that refers to a past event and is
> like
> > intention enough to use the same word.
>
> Well, if you really consider {ai go'i}
> meaningless/incomprehensible
> in that context I guess there isn't much more I
> can say. To me it
> is fairly obvious, so I won't object if someone
> uses expressions
> like that, and I probably will use them too
> (maybe I already have,
> I don't really remember.)

I don't necessarily consider it meaningless or
incomprehnsible; I just note that *it is not an
expression of an attitude* in this case. Now,
what it is here and how that is to be brought
together with its official use as an expression
of an attitude and how it is to avoid making a
claim are matters that someone who wants to use
things like {ai} in these cases has to figure
out, formulate and justify. So far we have only
the raw translations (ambiguous as you are about
to note) without any explanation or
justification, that is without fitting it in the
Lojban context from which it arises. Maybe all
that can be done, but I don't see any reason to
accept these usages until it has been.

> The
> > English for B is pretty coearly a claim,
> object
> > to truth condition rejection: "To Hell it
> was,
> > you just lucked out."
>
> Yes, translations of attitudinals often have to
> be approximated in
> English as full claims because interjections in
> English tend to be
> much more vague and imprecise than Lojban
> attitudinals.

Well, since it can't be an interjection, I mean
to say that B in Lojban either is a claim and
thus improper for {ai} or that it is
unintelligible in the present sense of {ai}. The
bit about the translation is just to point out
how it has to appear (the translation can't be of
an expression of an attitude).

Attitudinals
> can also be challenged in Lojban, of course, as
> can interjections
> in English: "Oops, did I hurt you?" "'Oops' my
> foot! You did that
> on purpose, you ...!"

Yes, we can challenge the sincerity of an
attitudinal, even by challenging the implicit
claims (note, not a claim about a present
attitude — regret, say — but a past attitude).



posts: 2388



<rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 06:00:43PM -0300, Jorge
> Llamb?as wrote:
> > On 9/8/05, John.Cowan
> <jcowan@reutershealth.com> wrote:
> > > Robin Lee Powell scripsit:
> > > > I agree whole-heartedly that we want to
> be able to emote all
> > > > these things, except that the tenses are
> wierd. I don't
> > > > believe that it is *possible* to say "I
> intended to go to the
> > > > store" using attitudinals, because the
> attitudinals scope
> > > > outside the tenses.
> > >
> > > +1
> >
> > Consider this two-line dialogue:
> >
> > A: do pu catra le mi patfu
> > B: .ai go'i
> >
> > A: You killed my father!
> > B: That was the whole idea.
> >
> > I find nothing objectionable in that
> dialogue.
>
> {.ai} by itself can mean pretty much anything,
> so sure, whatever.
>
> But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do
> patfu}, which means "I
> intend that in the past I killed your father"
> which, as I said, I
> don't know what it means.

Rather literally: "I am announcing my commitment
to bringing it about that I have killed your
father in the past," which is, I think, simply contradictory.


posts: 2388




> On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell
> <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> > But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do
> patfu}, which means "I
> > intend that in the past I killed your father"
> which, as I said, I
> > don't know what it means.
>
> OK, don't use then. :-)
> To me it is fairly clear, as I said, but I
> don't think any direct
> English translation does justice to it, so I
> won't try.

The issue isn't about whether I use it or not,
but about whether it makes any sense as part of
the language regardless of its actually being
used. The work needed to make the case that it
does has not been done. As is often the case,
you have an intuition about how something should
wor, but haven't done the scut work to fit it
into frame of the language. Since your
intuitions usually eventually turn out to be
pretty good, I don't see rejecting your usage out
of hand. But I see NO reason for accepting it at
the moment.


posts: 2388




> On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell
> <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 09:37:16PM -0300,
> Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> > > On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell
> <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> > > > But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do
> patfu}, which means "I
> > > > intend that in the past I killed your
> father" which, as I said,
> > > > I don't know what it means.
> > >
> > > OK, don't use then. :-)
> >
> > Don't use what, exactly?
>
> {ai} with a past tense bridi.
>
> > > To me it is fairly clear, as I said, but I
> don't think any direct
> > > English translation does justice to it, so
> I won't try.
> >
> > Oh, please? :-)
>
> I think John Cowan's translation got the
> meaning quite well, even
> if it was not a literal one. It often happens
> that you can't translate
> literally from one language to another and some
> rewording is
> necessary to get the meaning across.

So far as I can tell, the intended meaning has
never been in doubt; the issue is how to squeeze
that meaning out of the expression — which comes
down to how to expand upon the meaning and use of
attitudinals to cover these cases which are so
different (not expressions of attitudes,
apparently factual, and so on). That is your
job, not finding a decent translation into English.


posts: 2388


> Jorge Llambías wrote:
> > On 9/8/05, Robert LeChevalier
> <lojbab@lojban.org> wrote:
> >>To me, the essence of attitudinals are
> immediate and present
> >>tense, and the sorts of things I would
> express a reactive attitudinal
> >>about would be as observative-like as
> possible in expression.
> >
> > What do you think about things like:
> > ui la djan ba vitke mi'o ca le bavlamdei
> > Whee! John will visit us tomorrow!
>
> There is an elliptical ba'a there, is there
> not?
>
> > ua ko'a pu mutce melbi ca li 1940
> > Wow! She was really beautiful in 1940!
>
> Likewise a ba'anai.
>
> If one is anticipating or recalling, there is
> some degree of reflective
> consideration going on. If on the other hand
> you are reacting to a
> picture of the lady in 1940, I probably
> wouldn't think to use the pu,
> but merely try to qualify it as "in the
> picture".
>
> But I think this is personal taste.

I think that this is probably psychologically
correct, but I see no reason why it needs to be
required linguistically or even implicated. I
can be happy about a future event or admire a
person from the past without any logical problem,
but what works with those more or less realis
cases doesn't work (yet, at least) for
definitionally irrealis cases like intention.

> It seems to me that one thing is the tense of
> the event
> > one is reacting to, and a different thing is
> the attitude.
> > I don't see a problem in showing attitudes
> towards
> > past or future events, actual or potential.
>
> I'm not sure I see a problem with doing so, but
> rather that I would be
> inclined to mark with ba'a/ba'anai rather than
> pu/ba.

It depends on the attitude, they each have a
unique logic, for some of which, irrealis is an
essential part. There are also some realis cases
and some that either can g0o either way or are
indifferent to the issue.

> >>If you've managed to deal with those (I
> haven't looked), I suspect that
> >>ainai should be handled similarly.
> >
> > One case I did change is {e'o nai}, from
> "negative request"
> > to "offer" as the opposite of "request". I'm
> not exactly sure
> > what "negative request" means, but it would
> seem to be
> > "request not to", i.e. {e'o na}.
>
> There are times when one attitudinally says
> "Please don't!" Usually
> something someone really expects the other
> person to do, but you don't
> want them to do; you could express this as
> "Please" with a negation, but
> I think that the negation is attitudinal rather
> than propositional. The
> relatively recent postfixed "Not!" in English
> slang has an attitudinal
> nature that could fit with ianai, ienai or
> e'onai depending on the context.
>
> But I'm willing to consider your alternative,
> even though it is clearly
> a change, though I thought we had a COI
> vocative that conveyed an offer.
> Things are muddy in my mind at the moment,
> and I have no time to look
> things up.
>
> lojbab
>
>
>
>
>



posts: 2388


> John E Clifford wrote:
> > Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis
> > attitudinals" is closely related to its
> apparent
> > meaning and is not some strange Lojbanic
> jargon
> > of the all too usual type,
>
> I've been interpreting irrealis as being a
> technical term for what you
> used to refer to as "possible worlds". If that
> is not correct (and
> maybe even if it is), I think a definition of
> the term as used in the
> classification of those particular attitudinals
> as "irrealis" should be
> right at the top of the section. I am
> presuming that there is no such
> definition or you would not need to be making a
> working hypothesis as to
> what the word means.

Well, there isn't really yet a secrtion on
irrealis attitudinals at all, so no such
introduction yet. And, given the history of
terminology in this racket, such an introduction
does not guarantee that it is clear what it means
or what it commits us to. The possible worlds
involved here are nothing elaborate; just a
recognition that some events have happened or are
happening (realis) and other have not but still
might yet (irrealis)

>
> >you can't hope for,
> > intend, or desire what is already the case).
>
> You can, but only if you lack certainty that it
> is indeed the case. "a'o
> you (unlike me) have actually read Jorge's
> definitions" is an example.
> It probably is true, but my reaction is one of
> hope that it is indeed true.

Oops, I forgot the caveat I usually put in
explicitly "what the speaker believes/knows" You
don't bhave any confidence that I have read
xorxes' definitions so you can still hope I have.
Once you know I have not, you can hope I will.
But the most you can do if you know I have is
wish that I hadn't or hope that I will put my
reading to good use (better than so far, anyhow).

> > As for the negative forms (again assuming
> that
> > these notions make *sense as attitudinals*),
> one
> > part of the problem is the muddle between the
> > neutral position on a scale and the negative
> > extreme and the latter is caught up in the
> > uncertainty about what type of negation is
> > involved ({nai} doing duty for all of them on
> > various occasions). Negating an attitude may
> be
> > expressing the opposite attitude or it may be
> the
> > neutral position: I may not intend something
> > because I have never thought or it or don't
> give
> > a damn just as readily (or more so) as
> because I
> > intend the opposite.
>
> The use of nai for scalar opposite in
> attitudinals was concocted long
> before the negation paper and our attempt to
> make negation rational.
> Thus it isn't necessarily "negation" on a UI.
> If it is required by
> perceived brokenness to make nai uniformly a
> true negation in all
> contexts, then we need a different word
> a'onaicai (a perfect example, I
> think, and it just came out!)

Oddly, I think xorxes analysis of {a'o} and its
congeners is pretty, much right. I would read
{a'onaicai} as "I really dread that" in the
expressive sense, "May God Almighty forfend that"
if you want to get more overtly expressive.



Robin Lee Powell scripsit:

> But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do patfu}, which means "I
> intend that in the past I killed your father" which, as I said, I
> don't know what it means.

IOW, the intention began some time before the killing and is still
ongoing even afterwards (as opposed to, say, I intended to kill him,
did it, and then decided I shouldn't have done it after all).

--
John Cowan jcowan@reutershealth.com http://www.ccil.org/~cowan
Does anybody want any flotsam? / I've gotsam.
Does anybody want any jetsam? / I can getsam.
--Ogden Nash, No Doctors Today, Thank You


On Thursday 08 September 2005 20:25, Robin Lee Powell wrote:
> {.ai} by itself can mean pretty much anything, so sure, whatever.
>
> But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do patfu}, which means "I
> intend that in the past I killed your father" which, as I said, I
> don't know what it means.

{.ai} doesn't have a tense. So the tense of "intend" is whatever makes sense:
"I intended to kill your father".

phma


On 9/8/05, Robert LeChevalier <lojbab@lojban.org> wrote:
> But I'm willing to consider your alternative, even though it is clearly
> a change, though I thought we had a COI vocative that conveyed an offer.
> Things are muddy in my mind at the moment, and I have no time to look
> things up.

No, I don't see anything like offer. Here's the list of vovatives:

<http://www.lojban.org/tiki/tiki-index.php?page=BPFK%20Section%3A%20Vocatives>

{fi'i} "hospitality" would be the only thing vaguely like it.
(Does it come from {friti} perchance?)

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388

wrote:

> Robin Lee Powell scripsit:
>
> > But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do
> patfu}, which means "I
> > intend that in the past I killed your father"
> which, as I said, I
> > don't know what it means.
>
> IOW, the intention began some time before the
> killing and is still
> ongoing even afterwards (as opposed to, say, I
> intended to kill him,
> did it, and then decided I shouldn't have done
> it after all).

As a matter of simple logic, whatever it is that
occurs after the event, it can't be intention.
It may be satisfaction, or lack of regret or
agreement with the previous intention or
whatever, but intent — as an attitude — ends
with the event and so does its expression. Now,
as noted elsewhere, if you want to continue using
{ai} you are under the obligation to explain how
it works and to find a way to fit it into the
established system in Lojban. So far all we have
seen is empty assertions that it is OK, without
any attempt to show how to make it so.


posts: 2388

As an expression of an attitude, {ai} can only be
of a present attitude. To make it work as
representing a past attiude requires some as yet
unworked out extension of the nature of words
like {ai}.



> On Thursday 08 September 2005 20:25, Robin Lee
> Powell wrote:
> > {.ai} by itself can mean pretty much
> anything, so sure, whatever.
> >
> > But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do
> patfu}, which means "I
> > intend that in the past I killed your father"
> which, as I said, I
> > don't know what it means.
>
> {.ai} doesn't have a tense. So the tense of
> "intend" is whatever makes sense:
> "I intended to kill your father".
>
> phma
>
>
>
>



On 9/8/05, Robert LeChevalier <lojbab@lojban.org> wrote:
> The use of nai for scalar opposite in attitudinals was concocted long
> before the negation paper and our attempt to make negation rational.
> Thus it isn't necessarily "negation" on a UI. If it is required by
> perceived brokenness to make nai uniformly a true negation in all
> contexts, then we need a different word a'onaicai (a perfect example, I
> think, and it just came out!)

If I remember correctly back in '94 (I was just starting with
Lojban then) you proposed to add {nei} as a companion of
{nai} for one of the meanings, but there wasn't much support
for it so you dropped it.

I don't really think a new word is needed though, {nai}
by itself seems to work quite fine as long as it acts on
the attitudinal it modifies and not on the bridi that the
attitudinal relates to.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388

Of course it works just fine if it modifies the
attached bridi. It just sometimes gives
different results. The issues are 1. which way
does it work in each particular case and 2 what
does the negation of a particular emotion amount
to in detail — just saying it negates the
attitude helps hardly at all. I take xorxes'
{a'onai} as being a successful case, even though
it goes against the old meaning.



> On 9/8/05, Robert LeChevalier
> <lojbab@lojban.org> wrote:
> > The use of nai for scalar opposite in
> attitudinals was concocted long
> > before the negation paper and our attempt to
> make negation rational.
> > Thus it isn't necessarily "negation" on a UI.
> If it is required by
> > perceived brokenness to make nai uniformly a
> true negation in all
> > contexts, then we need a different word
> a'onaicai (a perfect example, I
> > think, and it just came out!)
>
> If I remember correctly back in '94 (I was just
> starting with
> Lojban then) you proposed to add {nei} as a
> companion of
> {nai} for one of the meanings, but there wasn't
> much support
> for it so you dropped it.
>
> I don't really think a new word is needed
> though, {nai}
> by itself seems to work quite fine as long as
> it acts on
> the attitudinal it modifies and not on the
> bridi that the
> attitudinal relates to.
>
> mu'o mi'e xorxes
>
>
>
>



John E Clifford scripsit:

> As an expression of an attitude, {ai} can only be
> of a present attitude. To make it work as
> representing a past attiude requires some as yet
> unworked out extension of the nature of words
> like {ai}.

To summarize my position, then: I agree that attitudinals indicate
current attitudes rather than past ones, but I believe the attitude
tagged by "ai" can persist even after the intended act is consummated.

For example, I intended to eat breakfast today, and (having now eaten it),
I continue to intend it. I could, however, decide that I now repent
(non-emotionally) of eating it, that I no longer intend it.

Contrariwise, I could decide to treat a non-intentional, accidental,
act of mine as intentional, by "adopting" it.

--
Si hoc legere scis, nimium eruditionis habes.


posts: 2388

wrote:

> John E Clifford scripsit:
>
> > As an expression of an attitude, {ai} can
> only be
> > of a present attitude. To make it work as
> > representing a past attiude requires some as
> yet
> > unworked out extension of the nature of words
> > like {ai}.
>
> To summarize my position, then: I agree that
> attitudinals indicate
> current attitudes rather than past ones, but I
> believe the attitude
> tagged by "ai" can persist even after the
> intended act is consummated.
>
> For example, I intended to eat breakfast today,
> and (having now eaten it),
> I continue to intend it. I could, however,
> decide that I now repent
> (non-emotionally) of eating it, that I no
> longer intend it.
>
> Contrariwise, I could decide to treat a
> non-intentional, accidental,
> act of mine as intentional, by "adopting" it.
>
Well, Lojban's founders were cclose enough to H.
Dumpty that using words any way one wants is a
matter of group habit if not policy. But I
think, in the interest of not hopelessly muddling
people not used to the local ways, we should set
at some limits. I think that calling an

  • attitude* toward a past event that one is
  • expressing* "intention" is beyond those limits.

It is — for the familiar use of the word
"intent" contradictory and I am not convinced
that there is any attitude or expression of one
that comes close enough to expression an
intention toward a potential act to justify using
the same expression for it. I am willing to be
convinced, since this is xorxes' intuition, but
so far all I have seen is the malglico argument:
the English expression corresponding to {ai} can
occur in the past tense, therefore {ai} can occur
in the past tense (or referring to past events),
skipping over the difference in meaning of the
English expression. (It occurs to me that you may
rather mean something different by "attitude" or
"expression," but that still requires a lot of
explaining, since the old — more or less normal
outside Lojbanistan — meanings seem to fit the
forms so well as they were previously developed.)


posts: 162

John.Cowan wrote:
> John E Clifford scripsit:
>>As an expression of an attitude, {ai} can only be
>>of a present attitude. To make it work as
>>representing a past attiude requires some as yet
>>unworked out extension of the nature of words
>>like {ai}.
>
> To summarize my position, then: I agree that attitudinals indicate
> current attitudes rather than past ones, but I believe the attitude
> tagged by "ai" can persist even after the intended act is consummated.
>
> For example, I intended to eat breakfast today, and (having now eaten it),
> I continue to intend it. I could, however, decide that I now repent
> (non-emotionally) of eating it, that I no longer intend it.
>
> Contrariwise, I could decide to treat a non-intentional, accidental,
> act of mine as intentional, by "adopting" it.

I guess that makes sense. In a language that easily express
superfective aspect, we now can also express inchoative and superfective
emotions. And emotions indeed have a way of not shutting off after the
event that triggers them - we usually change the name for the emotion
after the fact - from "intent" or "effort" to "accomplishment" for example.

But documenting aspectual attitudes should be orthogonal to documenting
their basic present-tense meaning, as associated with the 6 classifiers.
With just inchoative, superfective, and present attitudes, 6
classifiers, and positive, negative and neutral scalar meanings, each of
the attitudinals might need up to 54 examples to fully explicate its
meaning.

Is Jorge having fun yet? %^)

lojbab


posts: 2388




> John.Cowan wrote:
> > John E Clifford scripsit:
> >>As an expression of an attitude, {ai} can
> only be
> >>of a present attitude. To make it work as
> >>representing a past attiude requires some as
> yet
> >>unworked out extension of the nature of words
> >>like {ai}.
> >
> > To summarize my position, then: I agree that
> attitudinals indicate
> > current attitudes rather than past ones, but
> I believe the attitude
> > tagged by "ai" can persist even after the
> intended act is consummated.
> >
> > For example, I intended to eat breakfast
> today, and (having now eaten it),
> > I continue to intend it. I could, however,
> decide that I now repent
> > (non-emotionally) of eating it, that I no
> longer intend it.
> >
> > Contrariwise, I could decide to treat a
> non-intentional, accidental,
> > act of mine as intentional, by "adopting" it.
>
> I guess that makes sense.

Bad guess; it doesn't.

In a language that
> easily express
> superfective aspect, we now can also express
> inchoative and superfective
> emotions. And emotions indeed have a way of
> not shutting off after the
> event that triggers them - we usually change
> the name for the emotion
> after the fact - from "intent" or "effort" to
> "accomplishment" for example.

The change is what is essential here (assuming
that there really is some kind of continuity in
any useful sense). I can get a sort of sense of
saying "I keep on intending to do what I did
yesterday" — not meaning doing the same sort of
thing again, but the particular event — but
involves someone in a moderate phase of
Alzheimer's. And notice that even that is not

  • expressing* that intention but reporting it. It

may be that the same attitude persists but that
it logically has to have a different name. This
would be an easier case to make if the attitude
were reliably connected with some physical signs
-- expression or, better, heart rate and
cchemical in the blood. Intention does not seem
to be one of those and so I don't see any reason
to say that sayisfaction or accomplishment or ...
is "the same attitude" with a different name. It
seems that the intention might just as well be
"continued" in disappointment or some stronger
form.
The same applies to the hypothesized inchoative
emotions. Intention arises more or less
consciously and is not intention until it has
arisen; there does not seem to be any other
emotion that is a precursor (for that is what an
inchoative expression of emotion would have to be
-- the real expression of a precursor) that is
reliably connected to intention.

> But documenting aspectual attitudes should be
> orthogonal to documenting
> their basic present-tense meaning, as
> associated with the 6 classifiers.
> With just inchoative, superfective, and
> present attitudes, 6
> classifiers, and positive, negative and neutral
> scalar meanings, each of
> the attitudinals might need up to 54 examples
> to fully explicate its
> meaning.
>
> Is Jorge having fun yet? %^)
>
> lojbab
>
>
>
>



On 9/9/05, Robert LeChevalier <lojbab@lojban.org> wrote:
>
> Is Jorge having fun yet? %^)

Lots, but my job is basically done. Now people should stop
philosophising, go and look at the definitions and examples
and comment on those, and eventually propose improvements.
{ai} is not the only one that needs checking either. And then vote.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 14214

On Fri, Sep 09, 2005 at 08:51:20PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> On 9/9/05, Robert LeChevalier <lojbab@lojban.org> wrote:
> >
> > Is Jorge having fun yet? %^)
>
> Lots, but my job is basically done. Now people should stop
> philosophising, go and look at the definitions and examples and
> comment on those, and eventually propose improvements. {ai} is not
> the only one that needs checking either. And then vote.

Erm. What's the point? It looks like you've got at least two "No"
votes at this point.

-Robin


On 9/10/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 09, 2005 at 08:51:20PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> > On 9/9/05, Robert LeChevalier <lojbab@lojban.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > Is Jorge having fun yet? %^)
> >
> > Lots, but my job is basically done. Now people should stop
> > philosophising, go and look at the definitions and examples and
> > comment on those, and eventually propose improvements. {ai} is not
> > the only one that needs checking either. And then vote.
>
> Erm. What's the point? It looks like you've got at least two "No"
> votes at this point.

I see only one vote against (I suppose it's Arnt's) and one in favour (mine).
But even if there were two or more against, it would still be necessary for
people to say which definitions they oppose (is it just {ainai}? What about
{e'onai}?, what about {e'e} and {e'i}?), so that whoever takes over as
shepherd can change them. And it is necessary for as many people as
possible to check all the definitions so that there are no inadvertent errors.
The BPFK has something like 18 voting members, it would be great if at
least a third of them actually voted.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388

Well, in addition to running discussions, here is
a start.



> On 9/9/05, Robert LeChevalier
> <lojbab@lojban.org> wrote:
> >
> > Is Jorge having fun yet? %^)
>
> Lots, but my job is basically done. Now people
> should stop
> philosophising, go and look at the definitions
> and examples
> and comment on those, and eventually propose
> improvements.
> {ai} is not the only one that needs checking
> either. And then vote.

.a'i (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to express effort / endeavor /
exertion / labor / pains / strife / toil. (cf.
troci, gunka, slunandu, selprogunka, fu'i nai)
.a'i mi ze'a ba ralte
I'm trying to hold it!
.a'i mi ba gasnu lo nu do cikna binxo
It'll be hard for me to wake you up.
These seem to be two separate notions. The one
is for a present effort, the other for a future
one. I cannot now be experiencing (and so canÂ’t
be expressing) the future effort. It may be,
however, that I presently experiencing something
like fear-that where the character of the
predicted event is not that it is undesirable but
that it is difficult, involves labor on my part.
This is not common in English, though not unheard
of (the comic strip version is “Groan!” – e.g.,
“I have to get him up tomorrow”). That, in turn,
might be extended to the present case (just as
fear-that can become real fear), though with a
change (as from {aÂ’onai} to {ii}), though what
else might be used is not clear. From the
surrounding forms, {aV}, {aÂ’I} seems to be about
the future case.
.a'i cu'i (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to express effortlessness /
ease / facility / no special effort (cf.
selfrili, fu'i)
.a'i cu'i ti frili
Ah, this is easy.

This, however, seems to be about the present
case, rather than “That will be a piece of cake,”
looking ahead.

.a'i nai (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to express repose / inaction /
inactivity / passivity / lackadaisicalness /
indolence(cf. toltoi, cando, guksurla)
.a'i nai cikre ta
Nah, why bother fixing it.

And this is projective, apparently.

.ai (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to express intent /
intentionality / purpose / design (cf. zukte,
platu)
.ai mi ze'e ba jmive
I intend to live forever.
.ai le mi cukta do sidju gi'e pacnygau
I intend for my book to give you help and hope.
.ai cu'i (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to express indecision /
hesitation / vacillation / wavering.
.ai cu'i mi ti ba te vecnu
I don't know whether I'll purchase these or not.

This is having no intention either to do or
refrain or do contrarily

.ai nai (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent /
unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness.
(cf. selsnuti)
.ai nai mi gunka ca le pavdei
I'm not planning to work on Monday.
.ai nai mi jmina lo valsi poi mi finti
I don't mean to add words of my own devising.
.ai nai do pu se xrani
I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
This is the puzzle. We can ignore the last
example for now, since it is clearly up to
something different from intention in the
operating sense. It appears to be that {ainai p}
means “not intend p,” but allows that I intend
not-p. So it is more overtly committed than
{aicuÂ’iI}, half the commitment process has been
eliminated but still not necessarily decided. On
a scale, this is not obviously the extreme, which
would be “intend not-p.” The third example seems
to be about some attitude inherited from a
completed intention (more or less analogous to
actual exertion fulfilling expected exertion in
{aÂ’i}) . The problem is that there does not seem
to be such an attitude, or, at least, that no one
has pointed to a clear case of it nor explained
how it is related to the future-looking case.
.au (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to express desire / wish /
yearning / aspiration. (cf. djica)
.au lo tricu cu krati lo ro se genja gi'e sfasa
lo kusru be gy
Would that the trees might speak on behalf of all
things that have roots, and punish those that
wrong them!

Here the componential analysis works: attitude
toward a desireable event outside my control and
not seen as likely.

.au cu'i (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to express indifference /
apathy / disinterest. (cf. nordji)
.au cu'i makau jinga
I don't really care who wins.

Attitude toward an event which is neither
desirable or not, but rather toward which one is
indifferent. The likelihood of occurrence seems
to drop out as well.
As far as I can tell, {kau} – even if it covers
all kinds of things other than indirect questions
– is still restricted to subordinate clauses,
which, if true, makes (au cuÂ’i) subordinating
and, thus, presumably something more akin to
asserting than one would expect for an
attitudinal.

.au nai (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to express reluctance /
averseness / disinclination. (cf. toldji)
.au nai mi cliva
I'm reluctant to leave.

This seems to negate two factors. The event is
undesirable and it is likely to occur ({cuÂ’i} can
be seen as similarly taking neutral positions on
both factors). The example seems to suggest that
my leaving is not significantly under my control.

.a'o (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to express hope / longing. (cf.
pacna)
.a'o le nobli cu gidva lo se zukte be mi
Oh, that the Lord would guide my ways.

It is not clear how this example differs from
{au}, but presumably it is that the event is seen
more as a lively option, i.e., as a less remote
possibility (though probably not the most
likely).

.a'o nai (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to express despair /
hopelessness / dread / fear that a situation
ensues. (cf. tolpacna)
.a'o nai ro da ca se cirko
Everything will be lost now.

The key words here go in two directions
directions: one “dread that” (as I take it to be)
is the opposite of hope in the sense that it is
an undesirable event mentioned (again a live
option and not under my control). This comes
very close to “hope not” except that perhaps the
option is more likely than one merely hoped for.
The other, despair, is a fullblown emotion
(complete with affects and physiological
markers). It need not even have a propositional
object, though it can have one. In one sense it
is not projective; the disaster is here. But it
is typically reported (when propositional) in
terms of potential things that will now not occur
(“despair of p”, where p is desirable, is a
locution at least as common as “despair that p,”
(where p is undesirable) if not more so, but
with totally different polarities) . It in both
cases it is a denial of hope: not just “not the
case that I hope that p” but “not the case that I
can hope that p” (for the “despair of” version,
the “despair that” needs appropriate adjustments.
). In the projective sense, “despair that” seems
best – for the extreme case (“dread” is slightly
weaker). Here it seems likely that (aÂ’onai} can
be used without a proposition for the global
sense of despair and {ao} for the less obvious
but detectable corresponding sense of “hope”
(maybe “hopeful”).

.ei (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to express obligation / how
things ought to be. (cf. bilga)
.ei mi cliva co'o
Gotta go now, bye!
.ei le jatna cu ckeji
The president ought to be ashamed.
.ei do djuno
You ought to know.
Here the various fields of attitudinals and the
like has familiar play: we regularly distinguish
between moral oughts and practical one and
prudential ones and probably several others. In
each the reference is to a possible world just
like this one except that the appropriate rules
are fa\ollowed. So here we say what would happen
in that world in this case. And then, if need
be, we flag for which rules we mean (including
some pretty ad hoc one as in the first example as
typically employed “if I am to keep my sanity”,
say). The relation to {bilga} is some what
tenuous: {bilga} seems to relate only the
obligations laid on one by the appropriate
ceremonial acts; not tose that come from, for
example, oneÂ’s simply being human. This is
irrealis, of course (you never are told you ought
to do what you are already doing or have done)
but it functions more like the directive cases
(eV) than like those that hinge on desirability ,
control, and likelihood: the last plays no role,
desirability is implicit – but not actually
required, except the desirability of following
the rules. And control is assumed. The “have
to” reading suggests more likely meeting one’s
obligations than seems appropriate (if likelihood
is involved at all, “ought “ talk comes up when
the odds are against).
.ei nai (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to express freedom / lack of
obligation / how things need not be. (cf. zifre)
.ei nai do tolnurcni
You don't have to feel threatened.

Permission is the dual of obligation and seems
to be a sort of neutral ground here. The idea
for the negative end seems to be “There are no
rules in this area.” The literal negation would
seem to be something like “You can obey all the
rules and still not do this” which does seem to
allow that it is forbidden, though I donÂ’t think
that was intended to be allowed. The short form
is “There are no rules covering this.”


.e'a (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to permit / allow / grant
permission / authorization / consent / license.
(cf. curmi)
.e'a do tsebi'o
You may sit down.

Closely related to {ei} (its dual?) but
apparently about making up rules rather than
citing the preexistent (in the speakerÂ’s mind, at
least) ones. This seems to be more subjective
and its utterance a world-creating speech act,
whereas {ei} is more objective (in form) and the
speech act closer to an assertion. But, on the
other hand, {ei} might just as well also be a
part of an obligation-making speech act, laying
an ob on someone, where in a formal ceremony or
not. These possibilities need to be clarified –
which is actually involved or if both how can we
tell which is going on in a particular case>

.e'a nai (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to prohibit / forbid / deny
permission / authorization / consent / license.
(cf. tolcru)
.e'a nai do ti stali
You can't stay here.

Again, the subjectiver version of {ei na}

.e'e (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to exhort / incite / motivate /
encourage / entreat / stimulate / challenge /
dare / provoke / invite competition. (cf. talsa)
.e'e ko jarco lo se kakne be do
Show them what you can do! Go for it!
.e'e mi do bajra jivna fe'e co'u le karce
I'll race you to the car!
Again a twoway split: a present and a projctive
sense. The projective “You can do it” sense fits
with other eVs as parts of getting others to do
things by speech. The present sense, “Good job!”
(calling it competent as the older list has it is
not a very strong complement , if one at all),
looks back to the split on {aÂ’i} to which it is
related in an obvious way.
.e'e nai (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to discourage / intimidate /
demoralize / deprecate / dampen / bridle / avoid
/ dodge / elude / duck / evade / back off /
withdraw. (cf. zunti, dicra)
.e'e nai doi nelis
Whoa, Nelly!
.e'e nai mi bilga lo nu zukte lo drata
Sorry, I have other things to do.
The split continues here. The last example
doesnÂ’t seem to fit (i.e., needs more
explanation) since it seems more an apology (or
excuse) rather than directly affecting someone
elseÂ’s behavior.
.e'i (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to command / dictate / instruct
/ order / oblige / constrain / impose an
obligation. (cf. minde, ri'urgau)
.e'i ko ta mi dunda
Give that to me!

The example raises the question (if it were not
already in play) of what {e’i} adds to – or how
it differs from – simple imperatives. {e’o}
below has been taken to ameliorate the command
form, getting glossed at one time as “Please”
(and {e’ocai} as “pretty please with sugar on
it”); does {e’i} strenthen it to its most
imperious form? It should be noted that {eÂ’i},
unlike the imperative forms, can be third person
(and even first): “the troops shall proceed to
the intersection” and the like. The last gloss
suggests that this is what is to be used for
laying on obs, leaving {ei} for noting them.
These projective senses are at variance with the
apparent present-feeling sense of the older
lists, but that is a rather suspect case, for the
most part.

.e'i nai (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to discharge / absolve /
dismiss / exonerate / liberate / release / unbind
/ free of an obligation. (cf. zi'ergau)
.e'i nai ko zukte lo se djica be do
Do whatever you please!

This example looks like releasing from an ob, the
converse of one reading of {eÂ’i}. Pragmatically,
the two readings come to much the same thing. If
one is in a position to command, then those you
are addressing are already under an obligation to
obey (what the command position amounts to) and
this merely gives present content to that
obligation. So this form releases from this
particular but not from the general obligation.

.e'o (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to make a request. (cf. cpedu,
pe'u)
.e'o do dunda le silna mi
Can you pass me the salt, please?

See {eÂ’i} for relation to {ko} forms. The notion
of obligations and permissions donÂ’t really fit
here – except when asking permission to do
something. Again, like {eÂ’i} this can third or
first person.

.e'o nai (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to grant / cede / proffer /
make an offer. (cf. friti)
.e'o nai ko lebna lo titla
Here, have some candy.

This seems out of pattern. Taking it as norm
would make {e’inai} a way to say “Yessir.”
Conversely this should mean “Nevermind”
withdrawing a request. On the other hand, this
seems to be a useful notion to have and fits
nicely with the notion of {nai} as opposite.

.e'u (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to suggest / persuade / advise.
(cf. stidi)
.e'u mi'o salci
Let's party!

Weaker than any of the preceding, not definitely
pointing to a course, merely putting one
foreward, for others to accept or not. It does
seem that it is not limited to actions; we can
suggest factual possibilities (which we can order
or request) as well as practical ones.

.e'u nai (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to dissuade / warn / disadvise.
(cf. kajde, o'i)
.e'u nai do kargau le moklu
You better not open your mouth.

This looks very like {eÂ’u na}, it does not
suggest for an alternative, merely against the
stated proposition. Other possibilities are to
use this for withdrawing a suggestion or for
accepting one and so on.

ia (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to express belief / conviction
/ faith / certainty (cf. krici, birti, jinvi)
ia lo cevni cu zasti
Indeed God exists.

ia cu'i (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to express skepticism / doubt /
agnosticism / uncertainty. (cf. senpi)
ia cu'i lo cevni cu zasti
Hmm ... God may or may not exist.

ia nai (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to express disbelief /
incredulity / rejection (cf. tolkri)
ia nai lo cevni cu zasti
I don't believe God exists.

As you might expect with a notion close to truth,
the negation seems to just negate the claim. You
can arge that not believing p is different from
believig not-p, but the alternative, of having no
belief either way, is covered by the neutral
form.

ie (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to express agreement /
concordance / accord / concurrence. (cf. tugni)
ie ta melbi
Yes, that's beautiful.

This is a response to suggestions rather than to
claims, possibly also to requests and commands
(the example seems odd, but may be in response to
something like “Isn’t it beautiful” but {ia}
still seems to be more apt. The relation of the
two needs some working out).

ie nai (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to express disagreement /
dissent / contention / difference / argument.
(cf. toltu'i)
ie nai go'i
I disagree with that.

Looks a lot like {ie na} but to make that needs a
middle case for suspended judgment .



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posts: 2388

Is it just me or do we have trouble with gmail
again?



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posts: 14214

On Wed, Sep 14, 2005 at 08:21:37AM -0700, John E Clifford wrote:
> Is it just me or do we have trouble with gmail again?

We never stopped. I haven't fixed the bug yet.

-Robin


posts: 14214

Replying to this just so people can see the decoded version.

-Robin

On Tue, Sep 13, 2005 at 10:52:55PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> On 9/13/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > .a'i mi ze'a ba ralte
> > I'm trying to hold it!
> > .a'i mi ba gasnu lo nu do cikna binxo
> > It'll be hard for me to wake you up.
> >
> > These seem to be two separate notions. The one
> > is for a present effort, the other for a future
> > one.
>
> Right, that's what the tense of the bridi indicates. The question
> is, are the two notions so separate that they can't be covered
> by the same word, or are they related enough that they
> can? My take is the latter. There is in principle no impediment
> for a UI to accompany a past, present or future bridi. There
> is no requirement that the bridi be marked as present tense.
>
> > I cannot now be experiencing (and so can't
> > be expressing) the future effort.
>
> I can't be experiencing a future effort (can I experience a present
> one, or are efforts made rather than experienced?) But why not
> express that I anticipate having to make one? Many attitudinals
> are not for expressing what one is experiencing. Some are: {ui}
> for example, I experience happiness, I express happiness. Others
> aren't: {oi} is for expressing a complaint, but one does not experience
> the complaint, and one can complain about things being experienced
> now but also about things that were experienced in the past or
> will be experienced in the future.
>
> > It may be,
> > however, that I presently experiencing something
> > like fear-that where the character of the
> > predicted event is not that it is undesirable but
> > that it is difficult, involves labor on my part.
>
> Right.
>
> > This is not common in English, though not unheard
> > of (the comic strip version is "Groan!" ? e.g.,
> > "I have to get him up tomorrow"). That, in turn,
> > might be extended to the present case (just as
> > fear-that can become real fear), though with a
> > change (as from {a'onai} to {ii}), though what
> > else might be used is not clear. From the
> > surrounding forms, {aV}, {a'I} seems to be about
> > the future case.
>
> {a'onai} can also apply to the past or the present.
>
> > .a'i cu'i (UI*1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to express effortlessness /
> > ease / facility / no special effort (cf.
> > selfrili, fu'i)
> > .a'i cu'i ti frili
> > Ah, this is easy.
> >
> > This, however, seems to be about the present
> > case, rather than "That will be a piece of cake,"
> > looking ahead.
>
> {a'i cu'i ti ca frili} "Ah, this is easy."
> {a'i cu'i ti ba frili} "This will be a piece of cake."
>
> > .a'i nai (UI*1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to express repose / inaction /
> > inactivity / passivity / lackadaisicalness /
> > indolence(cf. toltoi, cando, guksurla)
> > .a'i nai cikre ta
> > Nah, why bother fixing it.
> >
> > And this is projective, apparently.
>
> One could also say {a'i nai pu cikre ta}.
>
>
> > .ei (UI1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to express obligation / how
> > things ought to be.
> >
> > This is
> > irrealis, of course (you never are told you ought
> > to do what you are already doing or have done)
>
> I think {ei} is not incompatible with an assertion: this
> is how it is, and indeed how it ought to be as well.
> So although often irrealis, it doesn't necessarily
> impy that things are not how they ought to:
>
> A: oi mi ca'a klama le zarci
> B: ei go'i
>
> A: Oy, I'm going to the store.
> B: And so you should.
>
> > but it functions more like the directive cases
> > (eV) than like those that hinge on desirability ,
> > control, and likelihood: the last plays no role,
> > desirability is implicit ? but not actually
> > required, except the desirability of following
> > the rules. And control is assumed.
>
> Not sure about whose control we are talking about:
>
> ei lo xlali na se lifri lo xamgu prenu
> Bad things ought not to happen to good people.
>
> God's? Fate's?
>
> > .e'a (UI1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to permit / allow / grant
> > permission / authorization / consent / license.
> > (cf. curmi)
> > .e'a do tsebi'o
> > You may sit down.
> >
> > Closely related to {ei} (its dual?)
>
> I think {e'a} is the dual of {e'i}, both assume that the speaker has
> some kind of authority over the event in question. ({ei} does not.)
>
> > But, on the
> > other hand, {ei} might just as well also be a
> > part of an obligation-making speech act, laying
> > an ob on someone, where in a formal ceremony or
> > not.
>
> I'd say that's {e'i}.
>
> > .e'o nai (UI*1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to grant / cede / proffer /
> > make an offer. (cf. friti)
> > .e'o nai ko lebna lo titla
> > Here, have some candy.
> >
> > This seems out of pattern. Taking it as norm
> > would make {e'inai} a way to say "Yessir."
>
> I think all the e'V are basically {ko} modifiers (even though
> they work with third person too). "Yessir" wouldn't fit that
> pattern. "Yessir" is {vi'o}.
>
>
> > .e'u nai (UI*1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to dissuade / warn / disadvise.
> > (cf. kajde, o'i)
> > .e'u nai do kargau le moklu
> > You better not open your mouth.
> >
> > This looks very like {e'u na}, it does not
> > suggest for an alternative, merely against the
> > stated proposition.
>
> I'm not very happy with this one. I suspect it should be
> {e'u nai do na kargau le moklu}.
>
> > Other possibilities are to
> > use this for withdrawing a suggestion or for
> > accepting one and so on.
>
> Neither seems very attractive to me, they seem too ad hoc.
>
> > ia (UI1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to express belief / conviction
> > / faith / certainty (cf. krici, birti, jinvi)
> > ia lo cevni cu zasti
> > Indeed God exists.
> >
> > ia cu'i (UI*1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to express skepticism / doubt /
> > agnosticism / uncertainty. (cf. senpi)
> > ia cu'i lo cevni cu zasti
> > Hmm ... God may or may not exist.
> >
> > ia nai (UI*1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to express disbelief /
> > incredulity / rejection (cf. tolkri)
> > ia nai lo cevni cu zasti
> > I don't believe God exists.
> >
> > As you might expect with a notion close to truth,
> > the negation seems to just negate the claim. You
> > can arge that not believing p is different from
> > believig not-p,
>
> Yes, that's what I would argue.
>
> >but the alternative, of having no
> > belief either way, is covered by the neutral
> > form.
>
> I think doubt is different from absence of belief. It's similar to
> the aicu'i/ainai distinction, wavering vs. lack of intention.
>
>
> > ie (UI1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to express agreement /
> > concordance / accord / concurrence. (cf. tugni)
> > ie ta melbi
> > Yes, that's beautiful.
> >
> > This is a response to suggestions rather than to
> > claims, possibly also to requests and commands
> > (the example seems odd, but may be in response to
> > something like "Isn't it beautiful" but {ia}
> > still seems to be more apt. The relation of the
> > two needs some working out).
>
> {ie} has always been used as a response to claims, as far as
> I can tell, and it is one of the most frequently used UIs.
>
> {ia} tags a belief of the speaker, {ie} tags a belief that the
> speaker shares with their interlocutor.
>
> > ie nai (UI*1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to express disagreement /
> > dissent / contention / difference / argument.
> > (cf. toltu'i)
> > ie nai go'i
> > I disagree with that.
> >
> > Looks a lot like {ie na} but to make that needs a
> > middle case for suspended judgment .
>
> I agree it doesn't look like {ie na}. :-)
>
> mu'o mi'e xorxes

--
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Reason #237 To Learn Lojban: "Homonyms: Their Grate!"
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On 9/13/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> .a'i mi ze'a ba ralte
> I'm trying to hold it!
> .a'i mi ba gasnu lo nu do cikna binxo
> It'll be hard for me to wake you up.
>
> These seem to be two separate notions. The one
> is for a present effort, the other for a future
> one.

Right, that's what the tense of the bridi indicates. The question
is, are the two notions so separate that they can't be covered
by the same word, or are they related enough that they
can? My take is the latter. There is in principle no impediment
for a UI to accompany a past, present or future bridi. There
is no requirement that the bridi be marked as present tense.

> I cannot now be experiencing (and so can't
> be expressing) the future effort.

I can't be experiencing a future effort (can I experience a present
one, or are efforts made rather than experienced?) But why not
express that I anticipate having to make one? Many attitudinals
are not for expressing what one is experiencing. Some are: {ui}
for example, I experience happiness, I express happiness. Others
aren't: {oi} is for expressing a complaint, but one does not experience
the complaint, and one can complain about things being experienced
now but also about things that were experienced in the past or
will be experienced in the future.

> It may be,
> however, that I presently experiencing something
> like fear-that where the character of the
> predicted event is not that it is undesirable but
> that it is difficult, involves labor on my part.

Right.

> This is not common in English, though not unheard
> of (the comic strip version is "Groan!" – e.g.,
> "I have to get him up tomorrow"). That, in turn,
> might be extended to the present case (just as
> fear-that can become real fear), though with a
> change (as from {a'onai} to {ii}), though what
> else might be used is not clear. From the
> surrounding forms, {aV}, {a'I} seems to be about
> the future case.

{a'onai} can also apply to the past or the present.

> .a'i cu'i (UI*1)
> Attitudinal. Used to express effortlessness /
> ease / facility / no special effort (cf.
> selfrili, fu'i)
> .a'i cu'i ti frili
> Ah, this is easy.
>
> This, however, seems to be about the present
> case, rather than "That will be a piece of cake,"
> looking ahead.

{a'i cu'i ti ca frili} "Ah, this is easy."
{a'i cu'i ti ba frili} "This will be a piece of cake."

> .a'i nai (UI*1)
> Attitudinal. Used to express repose / inaction /
> inactivity / passivity / lackadaisicalness /
> indolence(cf. toltoi, cando, guksurla)
> .a'i nai cikre ta
> Nah, why bother fixing it.
>
> And this is projective, apparently.

One could also say {a'i nai pu cikre ta}.


> .ei (UI1)
> Attitudinal. Used to express obligation / how
> things ought to be.
>
> This is
> irrealis, of course (you never are told you ought
> to do what you are already doing or have done)

I think {ei} is not incompatible with an assertion: this
is how it is, and indeed how it ought to be as well.
So although often irrealis, it doesn't necessarily
impy that things are not how they ought to:

A: oi mi ca'a klama le zarci
B: ei go'i

A: Oy, I'm going to the store.
B: And so you should.

> but it functions more like the directive cases
> (eV) than like those that hinge on desirability ,
> control, and likelihood: the last plays no role,
> desirability is implicit – but not actually
> required, except the desirability of following
> the rules. And control is assumed.

Not sure about whose control we are talking about:

ei lo xlali na se lifri lo xamgu prenu
Bad things ought not to happen to good people.

God's? Fate's?

> .e'a (UI1)
> Attitudinal. Used to permit / allow / grant
> permission / authorization / consent / license.
> (cf. curmi)
> .e'a do tsebi'o
> You may sit down.
>
> Closely related to {ei} (its dual?)

I think {e'a} is the dual of {e'i}, both assume that the speaker has
some kind of authority over the event in question. ({ei} does not.)

> But, on the
> other hand, {ei} might just as well also be a
> part of an obligation-making speech act, laying
> an ob on someone, where in a formal ceremony or
> not.

I'd say that's {e'i}.

> .e'o nai (UI*1)
> Attitudinal. Used to grant / cede / proffer /
> make an offer. (cf. friti)
> .e'o nai ko lebna lo titla
> Here, have some candy.
>
> This seems out of pattern. Taking it as norm
> would make {e'inai} a way to say "Yessir."

I think all the e'V are basically {ko} modifiers (even though
they work with third person too). "Yessir" wouldn't fit that
pattern. "Yessir" is {vi'o}.


> .e'u nai (UI*1)
> Attitudinal. Used to dissuade / warn / disadvise.
> (cf. kajde, o'i)
> .e'u nai do kargau le moklu
> You better not open your mouth.
>
> This looks very like {e'u na}, it does not
> suggest for an alternative, merely against the
> stated proposition.

I'm not very happy with this one. I suspect it should be
{e'u nai do na kargau le moklu}.

> Other possibilities are to
> use this for withdrawing a suggestion or for
> accepting one and so on.

Neither seems very attractive to me, they seem too ad hoc.

> ia (UI1)
> Attitudinal. Used to express belief / conviction
> / faith / certainty (cf. krici, birti, jinvi)
> ia lo cevni cu zasti
> Indeed God exists.
>
> ia cu'i (UI*1)
> Attitudinal. Used to express skepticism / doubt /
> agnosticism / uncertainty. (cf. senpi)
> ia cu'i lo cevni cu zasti
> Hmm ... God may or may not exist.
>
> ia nai (UI*1)
> Attitudinal. Used to express disbelief /
> incredulity / rejection (cf. tolkri)
> ia nai lo cevni cu zasti
> I don't believe God exists.
>
> As you might expect with a notion close to truth,
> the negation seems to just negate the claim. You
> can arge that not believing p is different from
> believig not-p,

Yes, that's what I would argue.

>but the alternative, of having no
> belief either way, is covered by the neutral
> form.

I think doubt is different from absence of belief. It's similar to
the aicu'i/ainai distinction, wavering vs. lack of intention.


> ie (UI1)
> Attitudinal. Used to express agreement /
> concordance / accord / concurrence. (cf. tugni)
> ie ta melbi
> Yes, that's beautiful.
>
> This is a response to suggestions rather than to
> claims, possibly also to requests and commands
> (the example seems odd, but may be in response to
> something like "Isn't it beautiful" but {ia}
> still seems to be more apt. The relation of the
> two needs some working out).

{ie} has always been used as a response to claims, as far as
I can tell, and it is one of the most frequently used UIs.

{ia} tags a belief of the speaker, {ie} tags a belief that the
speaker shares with their interlocutor.

> ie nai (UI*1)
> Attitudinal. Used to express disagreement /
> dissent / contention / difference / argument.
> (cf. toltu'i)
> ie nai go'i
> I disagree with that.
>
> Looks a lot like {ie na} but to make that needs a
> middle case for suspended judgment .

I agree it doesn't look like {ie na}. :-)

mu'o mi'e xorxes

posts: 2388

> On Tue, Sep 13, 2005 at 10:52:55PM -0300, Jorge
> Llamb?as wrote:
> > On 9/13/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > > .a'i mi ze'a ba ralte
> > > I'm trying to hold it!
> > > .a'i mi ba gasnu lo nu do cikna binxo
> > > It'll be hard for me to wake you up.
> > >
> > > These seem to be two separate notions. The
> one
> > > is for a present effort, the other for a
> future
> > > one.
> >
> > Right, that's what the tense of the bridi
> indicates. The question
> > is, are the two notions so separate that they
> can't be covered
> > by the same word, or are they related enough
> that they
> > can? My take is the latter. There is in
> principle no impediment
> > for a UI to accompany a past, present or
> future bridi. There
> > is no requirement that the bridi be marked as
> present tense.

Well, I would say that the claim about UI depends
very much on which UI is involved. But for {a'i}
it seems pretty clear to me that the same state
(perhaps in an attenuated form) may occur in
remembering or anticipating an action as does
when that action is being done. Since effort
has affects and physiological markers, this is
testable and passes. This is true for many other
UI but certainly not for all and further there
are UI which work with one combination of tenses
(tenses is a bad category here since it is
usually not the time of the event but whether it
is known to have occurred that is decisive in
many cases) but not with others. That is, every
UI (l9ke every word) has its own logic and the
doneness or not of an event is sometimes a
relevant part of that logic.

> > > I cannot now be experiencing (and so can't
> > > be expressing) the future effort.
> >
> > I can't be experiencing a future effort (can
> I experience a present
> > one, or are efforts made rather than
> experienced?)

Well, we do say "make an effort" but doing so is
experienced (and performed) in terms of stresses,
physical and psychological, many of which are
detectable even externally but certainly
internally.

But why not
> > express that I anticipate having to make one?
> Many attitudinals
> > are not for expressing what one is
> experiencing. Some are: {ui}
> > for example, I experience happiness, I
> express happiness. Others
> > aren't: {oi} is for expressing a complaint,
> but one does not experience
> > the complaint, and one can complain about
> things being experienced
> > now but also about things that were
> experienced in the past or
> > will be experienced in the future.

True enough, although I would generally take it
taht a complaint is the expression of some
underlying (perhaps liminal) feeling that is
probably detectable. But it is clear that its
object, like that of happiness, may be past,
present or future, even in the psychological
sense.

> >
> > > It may be,
> > > however, that I presently experiencing
> something
> > > like fear-that where the character of the
> > > predicted event is not that it is
> undesirable but
> > > that it is difficult, involves labor on my
> part.
> >
> > Right.
> >
> > > This is not common in English, though not
> unheard
> > > of (the comic strip version is "Groan!" ?
> e.g.,
> > > "I have to get him up tomorrow"). That, in
> turn,
> > > might be extended to the present case (just
> as
> > > fear-that can become real fear), though
> with a
> > > change (as from {a'onai} to {ii}), though
> what
> > > else might be used is not clear. From the
> > > surrounding forms, {aV}, {a'I} seems to be
> about
> > > the future case.
> >
> > {a'onai} can also apply to the past or the
> present.

And {a'o} too, in one sense. On consideration, I
take back the remark that such moves are
uncommon; they seem actually (after tinking about
it) fairly common indeed. The sense in which
this applies to {a'o} and {a'o nai} however is
not the propsoitional attitude "hope that" "fear
that" "despair that" but the more global sense of
hopefulness or despair, not tied to particular
events as objects though perhaps recognized as
causes. I don't see any problem with using the
same mark for these even thoug they are
phenomenologically and physiologically somewhat
different.


> > > .a'i cu'i (UI*1)
> > > Attitudinal. Used to express effortlessness
> /
> > > ease / facility / no special effort (cf.
> > > selfrili, fu'i)
> > > .a'i cu'i ti frili
> > > Ah, this is easy.
> > >
> > > This, however, seems to be about the
> present
> > > case, rather than "That will be a piece of
> cake,"
> > > looking ahead.
> >
> > {a'i cu'i ti ca frili} "Ah, this is easy."
> > {a'i cu'i ti ba frili} "This will be a piece
> of cake."

Yeah, if effort can be anticipated or recalled,
there doesn't seem to be any reason for leaving
the others out.

> > > .a'i nai (UI*1)
> > > Attitudinal. Used to express repose /
> inaction /
> > > inactivity / passivity / lackadaisicalness
> /
> > > indolence(cf. toltoi, cando, guksurla)
> > > .a'i nai cikre ta
> > > Nah, why bother fixing it.
> > >
> > > And this is projective, apparently.
> >
> > One could also say {a'i nai pu cikre ta}.

Yes for consistency's sake if nothing else (the
markers are a lot less clear here).

> > > .ei (UI1)
> > > Attitudinal. Used to express obligation /
> how
> > > things ought to be.
> > >
> > > This is
> > > irrealis, of course (you never are told you
> ought
> > > to do what you are already doing or have
> done)
> >
> > I think {ei} is not incompatible with an
> assertion: this
> > is how it is, and indeed how it ought to be
> as well.
> > So although often irrealis, it doesn't
> necessarily
> > impy that things are not how they ought to:
> >
> > A: oi mi ca'a klama le zarci
> > B: ei go'i
> >
> > A: Oy, I'm going to the store.
> > B: And so you should.
> >
> > > but it functions more like the directive
> cases
> > > (eV) than like those that hinge on
> desirability ,
> > > control, and likelihood: the last plays no
> role,
> > > desirability is implicit ? but not actually
> > > required, except the desirability of
> following
> > > the rules. And control is assumed.
> >
> > Not sure about whose control we are talking
> about:
> >
> > ei lo xlali na se lifri lo xamgu prenu
> > Bad things ought not to happen to good
> people.
> >
> > God's? Fate's?

Yeah, I was taking these things in order and not
thinking ahead, so I had only this for "ought."
Since it is not laying on an ob, then it is
compatible with any tense. By the way, the use
of "obligation" here is misleading, since that
word in modern English is mainly agent oriented:
even though the word outght to be a certain way
it is under no obligation (nor is it obliged) to
be that way.

> > > .e'a (UI1)
> > > Attitudinal. Used to permit / allow / grant
> > > permission / authorization / consent /
> license.
> > > (cf. curmi)
> > > .e'a do tsebi'o
> > > You may sit down.
> > >
> > > Closely related to {ei} (its dual?)
> >
> > I think {e'a} is the dual of {e'i}, both
> assume that the speaker has
> > some kind of authority over the event in
> question. ({ei} does not.)

Is there a form for noting that something is not
required (or, more importantly, not forbidden)?
{einai}? or {eicu'i}

> > > But, on the
> > > other hand, {ei} might just as well also be
> a
> > > part of an obligation-making speech act,
> laying
> > > an ob on someone, where in a formal
> ceremony or
> > > not.
> >
> > I'd say that's {e'i}.

I would too once I got to it.

> > > .e'o nai (UI*1)
> > > Attitudinal. Used to grant / cede / proffer
> /
> > > make an offer. (cf. friti)
> > > .e'o nai ko lebna lo titla
> > > Here, have some candy.
> > >
> > > This seems out of pattern. Taking it as
> norm
> > > would make {e'inai} a way to say "Yessir."
> >
> > I think all the e'V are basically {ko}
> modifiers (even though

A point of view that needs expansion — how
exactly do they modify (or supplant) {ko}? I
think that this is very close to correct however
(suggestion seems a bit too remote).



they work with third person too). "Yessir"
wouldn't fit that
> pattern. "Yessir" is {vi'o}.

This is patterning to match the {nai} form of
"request" as "grant request":: {nai} form of
command is "obey command." Since it is not that,
the request form is anomolous. I don't think the
command form should be changed to "Yessir."

> > .e'u nai (UI*1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to dissuade / warn /
disadvise.
> > (cf. kajde, o'i)
> > .e'u nai do kargau le moklu
> > You better not open your mouth.
> >
> > This looks very like {e'u na}, it does not
> > suggest for an alternative, merely against
the
> > stated proposition.
>
> I'm not very happy with this one. I suspect it
should be
> {e'u nai do na kargau le moklu}.

What then is the function of {nai}, i.e., how
does this differ from {e'u do na kargau le
moklu}?

> > Other possibilities are to
> > use this for withdrawing a suggestion or for
> > accepting one and so on.
>
> Neither seems very attractive to me, they seem
too ad hoc.

Again, they are based on ealier {nai} foirms in
this same block, which forms are pretty much a
bag of unrelated bits. Maybe that is the way it
is, but the appearance that these reading come by
some rule of interpretation rather than ad hoc
throughout needs a lot more evidence than is now
available (which is not to say that I don't think
these reading are probably the wisest choices).

> > ia (UI1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to express belief /
conviction
> > / faith / certainty (cf. krici, birti, jinvi)
> > ia lo cevni cu zasti
> > Indeed God exists.
> >
> > ia cu'i (UI*1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to express skepticism /
doubt /
> > agnosticism / uncertainty. (cf. senpi)
> > ia cu'i lo cevni cu zasti
> > Hmm ... God may or may not exist.
> >
> > ia nai (UI*1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to express disbelief /
> > incredulity / rejection (cf. tolkri)
> > ia nai lo cevni cu zasti
> > I don't believe God exists.
> >
> > As you might expect with a notion close to
truth,
> > the negation seems to just negate the claim.
You
> > can arge that not believing p is different
from
> > believing not-p,
>
> Yes, that's what I would argue.

Not believing that p covers a range of cases that
are sometimes useful to separate: beliving that
not-p, believing something more specific but
contrary to p, being torn between p and not-p (or
some specific alternative), having never
considered the p issue at all. Where do you want
the various forms available to fall? I would
suppose that, for you at least, believing that
not-p and believing something contrary to p are
just forms of believing that (i.e., take bare
{ia}).

> >but the alternative, of having no
> > belief either way, is covered by the neutral
> > form.
>
> I think doubt is different from absence of
belief. It's similar to
> the aicu'i/ainai distinction, wavering vs. lack
of intention.

So, you have the torn between p and not-p as
{cu'i} and the "never considered" case as {nai}?
But neither of these would normally be called
disbelief, which is much closer to — even if not
exactly the same as — belief that not-p. Doubt
is something else again, perhaps closer to
wavering. None of these seem to fit the example
very well.

> > ie (UI1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to express agreement /
> > concordance / accord / concurrence. (cf.
tugni)
> > ie ta melbi
> > Yes, that's beautiful.
> >
> > This is a response to suggestions rather than
to
> > claims, possibly also to requests and
commands
> > (the example seems odd, but may be in
response to
> > something like "Isn't it beautiful" but {ia}
> > still seems to be more apt. The relation of
the
> > two needs some working out).
>
> {ie} has always been used as a response to
claims, as far as
> I can tell, and it is one of the most
frequently used UIs.
>
> {ia} tags a belief of the speaker, {ie} tags a
belief that the
> speaker shares with their interlocutor.
>
> > ie nai (UI*1)
> > Attitudinal. Used to express disagreement /
> > dissent / contention / difference / argument.
> > (cf. toltu'i)
> > ie nai go'i
> > I disagree with that.
> >
> > Looks a lot like {ie na} but to make that
needs a
> > middle case for suspended judgment .
>
> I agree it doesn't look like {ie na}. :-)

Well, it does in fact look exacty like {ie na},
it just needs the middle case. Here of course we
can get a fairly complex set of negations with
first all the variations on believing and then at
least a three-way separation on agreeing. I
uniform way of handling middle cases (and
negatives, come to that) would be nice but
probably won't work out as meaningful, given the
differences in the items being dealt with.
BTW why are {ia} and {ie} irrealis?


On 9/14/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 13, 2005 at 10:52:55PM -0300, Jorge
> > Llamb?as wrote:
> > > I think all the e'V are basically {ko}
> > modifiers (even though
>
> A point of view that needs expansion — how
> exactly do they modify (or supplant) {ko}? I
> think that this is very close to correct however
> (suggestion seems a bit too remote).

e'a ko klama "Go (I give my permission)"
e'e ko klama "Go (come on, you can do it)"
e'i ko klama "Go (I command you to)"
e'o ko klama "Go (please do)"
e'u ko klama "Go (you won't regret it)"

In all cases the agent is the audience (eventually
it could be a third party, but in any case not the
speaker). The speaker's stake on the situation is
indirect.

> they work with third person too). "Yessir"
> wouldn't fit that
> > pattern. "Yessir" is {vi'o}.
>
> This is patterning to match the {nai} form of
> "request" as "grant request":: {nai} form of
> command is "obey command." Since it is not that,
> the request form is anomolous. I don't think the
> command form should be changed to "Yessir."

But {e'onai} would be for making an offer as in "help
yourself". The agent is still the audience.

> > > .e'u nai (UI*1)
> > > Attitudinal. Used to dissuade / warn /
> disadvise.
> > > (cf. kajde, o'i)
> > > .e'u nai do kargau le moklu
> > > You better not open your mouth.
> > >
> > > This looks very like {e'u na}, it does not
> > > suggest for an alternative, merely against
> the
> > > stated proposition.
> >
> > I'm not very happy with this one. I suspect it
> should be
> > {e'u nai do na kargau le moklu}.
>
> What then is the function of {nai}, i.e., how
> does this differ from {e'u do na kargau le
> moklu}?

Let's see:

e'a nai do klama - your going, I don't give my permission, in fact I forbid it.
e'e nai do klama - your going, I don't encourage it, in fact I discourage it.
e'i nai do klama - your going, I don't impose it, in fact I'm allowing
you not to go.
e'o nai do klama - your going, it is not a request, it's an invitation.
e'u nai do klama - your going, it is not a suggestion... but what the
hell is it? :-)


...
> Not believing that p covers a range of cases that
> are sometimes useful to separate: beliving that
> not-p,

It is possible for someone to believe that p and also
to believe that not-p. Illogical, maybe, but people are not
required to follow logic in their beliefs. More difficult is
to believe that p and not p, i.e. believe that the
conjunction holds (it is easier to believe that p and
believe that not p if you don't make the conection),
but still possible. It is not an analytic truth that
"believe p and q" is the same as "believe p and believe q".

> believing something more specific but
> contrary to p,

This is even easier to believe together with believing p.

>being torn between p and not-p (or
> some specific alternative), having never
> considered the p issue at all. Where do you want
> the various forms available to fall?

{ianai} indicates that something is not a belief I hold
(perhaps because I never considered the issue, but
I would have to give it at least a minimum of consideration
in order to express that). {iacu'i} indicates doubt as to
whether I hold the belief in question or not.

> I would
> suppose that, for you at least, believing that
> not-p and believing something contrary to p are
> just forms of believing that (i.e., take bare
> {ia}).

Correct.

> > >but the alternative, of having no
> > > belief either way, is covered by the neutral
> > > form.
> >
> > I think doubt is different from absence of
> belief. It's similar to
> > the aicu'i/ainai distinction, wavering vs. lack
> of intention.
>
> So, you have the torn between p and not-p as
> {cu'i} and the "never considered" case as {nai}?

I may believe neither p nor not-p, even after
careful consideration.

> But neither of these would normally be called
> disbelief, which is much closer to — even if not
> exactly the same as — belief that not-p. Doubt
> is something else again, perhaps closer to
> wavering. None of these seem to fit the example
> very well.

What would need changing?

> > > ie nai (UI*1)
> > > Attitudinal. Used to express disagreement /
> > > dissent / contention / difference / argument.
> > > (cf. toltu'i)
> > > ie nai go'i
> > > I disagree with that.
> > >
> > > Looks a lot like {ie na} but to make that
> needs a
> > > middle case for suspended judgment .
> >
> > I agree it doesn't look like {ie na}. :-)
>
> Well, it does in fact look exacty like {ie na},
> it just needs the middle case.

So are we agreeing or disagreeing?

A: lu ie nai li'u satci mintu lu ie na li'u
B1: ie na go'i
B2: ie nai go'i

A: "ie nai" is just like "ie na".
B1: I agree it is not.
B2: I disagree that it is.

Do B1 and B2 really look exactly alike?

> BTW why are {ia} and {ie} irrealis?

Because of {ia nai} and {ie nai}.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388




> On 9/14/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > > On Tue, Sep 13, 2005 at 10:52:55PM -0300,
> Jorge
> > > Llamb?as wrote:
> > > > I think all the e'V are basically {ko}
> > > modifiers (even though
> >
> > A point of view that needs expansion — how
> > exactly do they modify (or supplant) {ko}? I
> > think that this is very close to correct
> however
> > (suggestion seems a bit too remote).
>
> e'a ko klama "Go (I give my permission)"
> e'e ko klama "Go (come on, you can do it)"
> e'i ko klama "Go (I command you to)"
> e'o ko klama "Go (please do)"
> e'u ko klama "Go (you won't regret it)"
>
> In all cases the agent is the audience
> (eventually
> it could be a third party, but in any case not
> the
> speaker). The speaker's stake on the situation
> is
> indirect.

Well, there are cases where the speaker is also
the audience or even a third person in the
process, but these are clearly derivative.

> > they work with third person too). "Yessir"
> > wouldn't fit that
> > > pattern. "Yessir" is {vi'o}.
> >
> > This is patterning to match the {nai} form of
> > "request" as "grant request":: {nai} form of
> > command is "obey command." Since it is not
> that,
> > the request form is anomolous. I don't think
> the
> > command form should be changed to "Yessir."
>
> But {e'onai} would be for making an offer as in
> "help
> yourself". The agent is still the audience.

Not obviously; the request need not be "may I do
x" but equally (or more) likely "would you do x
for me" (that is, it is not always a request for
permission, it may be for commission). Then you
have in both cases the pattern x asks y of z: y
gives z to x. In any case, no pattern seems to
carry through for your various {nai} forms, they
are each either ad hoc or, at least, based on a
separate logic or practical considerations. Or
else there is some subtle pattern which needs to
be made clear — it surely is not yet.

> > > > .e'u nai (UI*1)
> > > > Attitudinal. Used to dissuade / warn /
> > disadvise.
> > > > (cf. kajde, o'i)
> > > > .e'u nai do kargau le moklu
> > > > You better not open your mouth.
> > > >
> > > > This looks very like {e'u na}, it does
> not
> > > > suggest for an alternative, merely
> against
> > the
> > > > stated proposition.
> > >
> > > I'm not very happy with this one. I suspect
> it
> > should be
> > > {e'u nai do na kargau le moklu}.
> >
> > What then is the function of {nai}, i.e., how
> > does this differ from {e'u do na kargau le
> > moklu}?
>
> Let's see:
>
> e'a nai do klama - your going, I don't give my
> permission, in fact I forbid it.
> e'e nai do klama - your going, I don't
> encourage it, in fact I discourage it.
> e'i nai do klama - your going, I don't impose
> it, in fact I'm allowing
> you not to go.
> e'o nai do klama - your going, it is not a
> request, it's an invitation.
> e'u nai do klama - your going, it is not a
> suggestion... but what the
> hell is it? :-)
>
>
> ...
> > Not believing that p covers a range of cases
> that
> > are sometimes useful to separate: beliving
> that
> > not-p,
>
> It is possible for someone to believe that p
> and also
> to believe that not-p. Illogical, maybe, but
> people are not
> required to follow logic in their beliefs. More
> difficult is
> to believe that p and not p, i.e. believe that
> the
> conjunction holds (it is easier to believe that
> p and
> believe that not p if you don't make the
> conection),
> but still possible. It is not an analytic truth
> that
> "believe p and q" is the same as "believe p and
> believe q".

Yes; and so? As noted, not believing p covers a
number of cases. The fact that he can believe p
and believe not-p doesn't mean that one way of
not believing p can't be believing not-p. This
may mean that one can both believe and not
believe p, but one can — under the ususal
condition "but not in the same respect, etc."
When the conditions are held constant, the
conflicting beliefs disappear (though finding the
right conditions when confronted with a real case
is not always an easy mtter). Another way of
putting this is that bleief sets are always
consistent but that one may hold more than one
belief set.
> > believing something more specific but
> > contrary to p,
>
> This is even easier to believe together with
> believing p.

Yes, because then it may be hard to notice the
conflict. Again, what is the point here?

> >being torn between p and not-p (or
> > some specific alternative), having never
> > considered the p issue at all. Where do you
> want
> > the various forms available to fall?
>
> {ianai} indicates that something is not a
> belief I hold
> (perhaps because I never considered the issue,
> but
> I would have to give it at least a minimum of
> consideration
> in order to express that)

Or perhaps because I consciously believe its
denial (though I may also unsciously believe it
as well).

. {iacu'i} indicates
> doubt as to
> whether I hold the belief in question or not.

That is pulled both ways or just never considered
the issue. So, how exactly is this different
from {nai}; they seem to overlap at least.


> > I would
> > suppose that, for you at least, believing
> that
> > not-p and believing something contrary to p
> are
> > just forms of believing that (i.e., take bare
> > {ia}).
>
> Correct.
>
> > > >but the alternative, of having no
> > > > belief either way, is covered by the
> neutral
> > > > form.
> > >
> > > I think doubt is different from absence of
> > belief. It's similar to
> > > the aicu'i/ainai distinction, wavering vs.
> lack
> > of intention.
> >
> > So, you have the torn between p and not-p as
> > {cu'i} and the "never considered" case as
> {nai}?
>
> I may believe neither p nor not-p, even after
> careful consideration.

And how is this different from being torn between
the two? Or at least undecided between the two.
You may be content to stop there and not feel the
urge to settle the matter, but it is still a
balancing act.

> > But neither of these would normally be called
> > disbelief, which is much closer to — even if
> not
> > exactly the same as — belief that not-p.
> Doubt
> > is something else again, perhaps closer to
> > wavering. None of these seem to fit the
> example
> > very well.
>
> What would need changing?

I suspect that, as is so often the case, what is
needed is more context; without context it is
possible to imagine all manner of scenarios in
which this line plays a role and understandfing
what is meant requires mindreading you to get the
case you are thinking of (see earlier on {e'o},
for example).

> > > > ie nai (UI*1)
> > > > Attitudinal. Used to express disagreement
> /
> > > > dissent / contention / difference /
> argument.
> > > > (cf. toltu'i)
> > > > ie nai go'i
> > > > I disagree with that.
> > > >
> > > > Looks a lot like {ie na} but to make that
> > needs a
> > > > middle case for suspended judgment .
> > >
> > > I agree it doesn't look like {ie na}. :-)
> >
> > Well, it does in fact look exacty like {ie
> na},
> > it just needs the middle case.
>
> So are we agreeing or disagreeing?
>
> A: lu ie nai li'u satci mintu lu ie na li'u
> B1: ie na go'i
> B2: ie nai go'i
>
> A: "ie nai" is just like "ie na".
> B1: I agree it is not.
> B2: I disagree that it is.
>
> Do B1 and B2 really look exactly alike?

Yeah, the example shows just how screwed up this
is. The purported agreement is in fact
disagreeing and the purported disagreement seems
actually to be agreeing. If B2 is disagreeing
with A, then he is saying that A's claim is not
the case. B1 is clearly saying that A's claim is
not the case, but in so doing he is also
diagreeing with A, so his expression of agreement
is inept. So, both are claiming that A's claim
is incorrect, which was the point I was making:
that {ienai} amounts to {ie na}. To be sure, it
is not marking an agreement, but then, they don't
agree.


>
> > BTW why are {ia} and {ie} irrealis?
> Because of {ia nai} and {ie nai}.

? Irrealis is different from false, presumably.
To say that something is not the case is as
realis as to say it is. But then, I clearly
don't understand what in the world {ianai} and
{ienai} mean (and have precious little reason to
think you do either, even though they are your
creations).

How, by the way, does {ia} differ from {pe'i} in meaning?


On 9/15/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > But {e'onai} would be for making an offer as in
> > "help
> > yourself". The agent is still the audience.
>
> Not obviously; the request need not be "may I do
> x" but equally (or more) likely "would you do x
> for me" (that is, it is not always a request for
> permission, it may be for commission).

You seem to be thinking that {e'onai} is for replying
to a request. That's not what I'm thinking.

...
> As noted, not believing p covers a
> number of cases. The fact that he can believe p
> and believe not-p doesn't mean that one way of
> not believing p can't be believing not-p.

I probably didn't understand what you meant by
"cover". In some cases {ia nai} is appropriate and
{ia na} is not, in some cases {ia na} is appropriate and
{ia nai} is not. In some cases either can be appropriate.
So there is no (full) covering of one by the other, but
yes there is a possible overlap.


> . {iacu'i} indicates
> > doubt as to
> > whether I hold the belief in question or not.
>
> That is pulled both ways or just never considered
> the issue. So, how exactly is this different
> from {nai}; they seem to overlap at least.

They might ovelap, I suppose. I can't really think
of a good example though.


> > What would need changing?
>
> I suspect that, as is so often the case, what is
> needed is more context; without context it is
> possible to imagine all manner of scenarios in
> which this line plays a role and understandfing
> what is meant requires mindreading you to get the
> case you are thinking of (see earlier on {e'o},
> for example).

If you want to suggest more clear examples, or how
to add appropriate context, please do.


> > A: lu ie nai li'u satci mintu lu ie na li'u
> > B1: ie na go'i
> > B2: ie nai go'i
> >
> > A: "ie nai" is just like "ie na".
> > B1: I agree it is not.
> > B2: I disagree that it is.
> >
> > Do B1 and B2 really look exactly alike?
>
> Yeah, the example shows just how screwed up this
> is.

I think {ie na} and {ie nai} are perfectly clear and distinct,
much more so than {ia na} and {ia nai}. I can't understand
how agreeing that not p can ever be confused with
disagreeing that p.

> The purported agreement is in fact
> disagreeing and the purported disagreement seems
> actually to be agreeing. If B2 is disagreeing
> with A, then he is saying that A's claim is not
> the case.

Of course.

> B1 is clearly saying that A's claim is
> not the case, but in so doing he is also
> diagreeing with A, so his expression of agreement
> is inept.

Of course.

> So, both are claiming that A's claim
> is incorrect, which was the point I was making:
> that {ienai} amounts to {ie na}.

Not at all. {ie nai go'i} is a perfectly correct answer,
while {ie na go'i} is a totally inept one.

> To be sure, it
> is not marking an agreement, but then, they don't
> agree.

Of course, they don't agree, that's why {ie nai} is appropriate
and {ie na} inappropriate.


> > > BTW why are {ia} and {ie} irrealis?
> > Because of {ia nai} and {ie nai}.
>
> ? Irrealis is different from false, presumably.

When I say {ie nai go'i} I am not asserting anything,
all I'm doing is showing my disagreement with my
interlocutor. The state of affairs described by {go'i}
is not claimed to hold.

> To say that something is not the case is as
> realis as to say it is. But then, I clearly
> don't understand what in the world {ianai} and
> {ienai} mean (and have precious little reason to
> think you do either, even though they are your
> creations).

Not strictly my creations in this case.

> How, by the way, does {ia} differ from {pe'i} in meaning?

I suppose in much the same way in which belief differs
from opinion in English.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On 9/15/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > But {e'onai} would be for making an offer
> as in
> > > "help
> > > yourself". The agent is still the audience.
> >
> > Not obviously; the request need not be "may I
> do
> > x" but equally (or more) likely "would you do
> x
> > for me" (that is, it is not always a request
> for
> > permission, it may be for commission).
>
> You seem to be thinking that {e'onai} is for
> replying
> to a request. That's not what I'm thinking.

Yes; that is how I read "Grant a request" Now you
seem to be saying — stressing another part of
the range you offered — that you mean simply
"offer" and this gives the pairing "X requests z
from y" and "x offers z to y." The corresponding
thing for thing for {e'i} would seem to be "x
commands y to do z" and "x volunteers to do z for
y," which doesn't seem right either — although
it is clearer somewhat than the given {e'inai}.

> ...
> > As noted, not believing p covers a
> > number of cases. The fact that he can
> believe p
> > and believe not-p doesn't mean that one way
> of
> > not believing p can't be believing not-p.
>
> I probably didn't understand what you meant by
> "cover". In some cases {ia nai} is appropriate
> and
> {ia na} is not, in some cases {ia na} is
> appropriate and
> {ia nai} is not. In some cases either can be
> appropriate.
> So there is no (full) covering of one by the
> other, but
> yes there is a possible overlap.
>
>
> > . {iacu'i} indicates
> > > doubt as to
> > > whether I hold the belief in question or
> not.
> >
> > That is pulled both ways or just never
> considered
> > the issue. So, how exactly is this different
> > from {nai}; they seem to overlap at least.
>
> They might ovelap, I suppose. I can't really
> think
> of a good example though.
>
>
> > > What would need changing?
> >
> > I suspect that, as is so often the case, what
> is
> > needed is more context; without context it is
> > possible to imagine all manner of scenarios
> in
> > which this line plays a role and
> understandfing
> > what is meant requires mindreading you to get
> the
> > case you are thinking of (see earlier on
> {e'o},
> > for example).
>
> If you want to suggest more clear examples, or
> how
> to add appropriate context, please do.

Not my job nor my forte (which is part of why it
is not my job). I do think that one sentence
examples in isolation are often misleading and at
best only of limited use, but getting longer
cases really requires some usage and most of tis
stuff hasn't hardly been used at all. Where it
has been — you say {ie} is fairly common, for
example — then real cases with significant
context should be used.

> > > A: lu ie nai li'u satci mintu lu ie na li'u
> > > B1: ie na go'i
> > > B2: ie nai go'i
> > >
> > > A: "ie nai" is just like "ie na".
> > > B1: I agree it is not.
> > > B2: I disagree that it is.
> > >
> > > Do B1 and B2 really look exactly alike?
> >
> > Yeah, the example shows just how screwed up
> this
> > is.
>
> I think {ie na} and {ie nai} are perfectly
> clear and distinct,
> much more so than {ia na} and {ia nai}. I can't
> understand
> how agreeing that not p can ever be confused
> with
> disagreeing that p.

To agree that not-p requires that the original be
not-p, to disagree that p requires that the
original be p and so is the same as asserting
not-p, with some incidental stuff about agreement
or the lack. That is why the examples are so
screwed up — and this carries over to back to
the theory. But both the misplaced agreement {ia
na go'i} and the well-placed disagreement {ianai
go'i} assert {na go'i}; only the frills are
different, one inept and the other apt.

> > The purported agreement is in fact
> > disagreeing and the purported disagreement
> seems
> > actually to be agreeing. If B2 is
> disagreeing
> > with A, then he is saying that A's claim is
> not
> > the case.
>
> Of course.
>
> > B1 is clearly saying that A's claim is
> > not the case, but in so doing he is also
> > diagreeing with A, so his expression of
> agreement
> > is inept.
>
> Of course.
>
> > So, both are claiming that A's claim
> > is incorrect, which was the point I was
> making:
> > that {ienai} amounts to {ie na}.
>
> Not at all. {ie nai go'i} is a perfectly
> correct answer,
> while {ie na go'i} is a totally inept one.

But both say that {na go'i} which is all that
really matters — the agreement bit is just a
frill (and dubiously an attitude or whatever in
any case) — these are just gussied up claims,
with not significant additional use except
rhetoric (and thus, as noted, barely
distinguishable from {ia}, which functions in the
same way).

> > To be sure, it
> > is not marking an agreement, but then, they
> don't
> > agree.
>
> Of course, they don't agree, that's why {ie
> nai} is appropriate
> and {ie na} inappropriate.
>
>
> > > > BTW why are {ia} and {ie} irrealis?
> > > Because of {ia nai} and {ie nai}.
> >
> > ? Irrealis is different from false,
> presumably.
>
> When I say {ie nai go'i} I am not asserting
> anything,
> all I'm doing is showing my disagreement with
> my
> interlocutor. The state of affairs described by
> {go'i}
> is not claimed to hold.

No, it is claimed not to hold — otherwise I
would not be disagreeing.

> > To say that something is not the case is as
> > realis as to say it is. But then, I clearly
> > don't understand what in the world {ianai}
> and
> > {ienai} mean (and have precious little reason
> to
> > think you do either, even though they are
> your
> > creations).
>
> Not strictly my creations in this case.
>
> > How, by the way, does {ia} differ from {pe'i}
> in meaning?
>
> I suppose in much the same way in which belief
> differs
> from opinion in English.

That is, the mean the same thing? The only
difference that is clear that opinions are almost
always expressed whereas a belief need not be.


On 9/15/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > You seem to be thinking that {e'onai} is for
> > replying
> > to a request. That's not what I'm thinking.
>
> Yes; that is how I read "Grant a request"

But I never wrote "Grant a request", did I? That's what
you wrote.

> Now you
> seem to be saying — stressing another part of
> the range you offered — that you mean simply
> "offer"

This is what I've been saying from the start, not just now.

>and this gives the pairing "X requests z
> from y" and "x offers z to y." The corresponding
> thing for thing for {e'i} would seem to be "x
> commands y to do z" and "x volunteers to do z for
> y," which doesn't seem right either — although
> it is clearer somewhat than the given {e'inai}.

It's not right because the "offer" I mean is a "help
yourself" kind of offer, not a "let me do it for you"
kind of offer. The distinguishing feature of the
e'V-series is that the agency is with the audience.

> To agree that not-p requires that the original be
> not-p, to disagree that p requires that the
> original be p

Indeed.

> and so is the same as asserting
> not-p,

I disagree.

> with some incidental stuff about agreement
> or the lack.

The agreement stuff is not incidental, it is the crux of {ie}.


> > > How, by the way, does {ia} differ from {pe'i}
> > in meaning?
> >
> > I suppose in much the same way in which belief
> > differs
> > from opinion in English.
>
> That is, the mean the same thing? The only
> difference that is clear that opinions are almost
> always expressed whereas a belief need not be.

I think {pe'i} is more specific in that it addresses
your sources (in contrast with za'a/ti'e/ja'o etc)
whereas {ia} does not raise the source issue.
I guess people won't use {pe'i} for religious,
faith-based beliefs, for example.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On 9/15/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > You seem to be thinking that {e'onai} is
> for
> > > replying
> > > to a request. That's not what I'm thinking.
> >
> > Yes; that is how I read "Grant a request"
>
> But I never wrote "Grant a request", did I?
> That's what
> you wrote.
>
> > Now you
> > seem to be saying — stressing another part
> of
> > the range you offered — that you mean simply
> > "offer"
>
> This is what I've been saying from the start,
> not just now.
>
> >and this gives the pairing "X requests z
> > from y" and "x offers z to y." The
> corresponding
> > thing for thing for {e'i} would seem to be
> "x
> > commands y to do z" and "x volunteers to do z
> for
> > y," which doesn't seem right either --
> although
> > it is clearer somewhat than the given
> {e'inai}.
>
> It's not right because the "offer" I mean is a
> "help
> yourself" kind of offer, not a "let me do it
> for you"
> kind of offer. The distinguishing feature of
> the
> e'V-series is that the agency is with the
> audience.

It is true that everything you have written is
open toi the interpretation you give it here, so
I concede that that is what you always meant. It
is, however, open to a variety of other
interpretations, which means that, to make the
point you want, you need to do a considerable
amount more work on the exposition here. The
sense in which {e'o nai} is negatively related to
{e'o} has also gotten further off course than
before — though, admittedly, making the general
point about {e'V} would make it somewhat more
plausible. (I think something in this area is
the right thing to have here; I just don't think
it was arrived at — or can be justified — by
appeal to general principles.)

> > To agree that not-p requires that the
> original be
> > not-p, to disagree that p requires that the
> > original be p
>
> Indeed.
>
> > and so is the same as asserting
> > not-p,
>
> I disagree.
>
> > with some incidental stuff about agreement
> > or the lack.
>
> The agreement stuff is not incidental, it is
> the crux of {ie}.
That discussion was more than a litle murky,
since we were talking at cross-purposes and
neither of us being terribly consistent. To
clarify: {ie(nai) p} either 1)asserts p and
expresses that this (dis)agrees with the hearer's
view or 2) expresses (dis)agreement on the
subject that p. I was taking the first view, on
the analogy with {ia} and the claim that {ie} was
not agreement with suggestions, you are taking
the second. But then the A B1 B2 case appears
differently from what we said. On view 1, both
B1 and B2 are inept: one says he agrees but
asserts the opposite, the other says he disagrees
but asserts the same thing, much like the
perennial difficulty in answering negartive
question apparently. On view 2, both are quite
OK, though B1, for some rhetorical purpose
perhaps, puts the subject of agreement in
negative form. Assuming that the whole does not
amount to an assertion directly, we can infer
that B1 holds go'i although he gets there through
na go'i (that is, he agrees that na go'i is
wrong, even though A never actually said anything
about na go'i). Similarly, B2 holds na go'i,
that is, disagrees with go'i (which what he
explicitly expresses). So, this convinces me
(since I don't like to think that especially B2
has it wrong) this is a coherent set of meanings
for the {ie} set ({iecu'i} for wavering or not
having considered etc. as more or less usual?)
And it seems not to be significantly different
(except in eventual clarity) from what the
original intention was.

>
>
> > > > How, by the way, does {ia} differ from
> {pe'i}
> > > in meaning?
> > >
> > > I suppose in much the same way in which
> belief
> > > differs
> > > from opinion in English.
> >
> > That is, the mean the same thing? The only
> > difference that is clear that opinions are
> almost
> > always expressed whereas a belief need not
> be.
>
> I think {pe'i} is more specific in that it
> addresses
> your sources (in contrast with za'a/ti'e/ja'o
> etc)
> whereas {ia} does not raise the source issue.
> I guess people won't use {pe'i} for religious,
> faith-based beliefs, for example.

That seems to be another aspect of the
belief-opinion divide — or several. Beliefs
tend to be more stable and opinions more
transitory (and "what I think" more passing
still). On the other hand (as far as religious
beliefs go); beliefs tend to be more factual and
opinions more evaluative (in some very broad
sense of both those words). {pe'i} — insofar as
"I think" or "I opine" is a good guide — seems
to be exactly a refusal (or an admission of
inability) to give sources or dismiss sources as
irrelevant. It is nearest thing to a neutral or
noncommittal evidential, apparently, and thus
seems to not differ practically from the bare
claim or {ia} (or {ja'a}, come to that). I
expect that some differentiations will come about
eventually — or get worked out in advance — but
I don't see any of them yet. (Is there much usage
here? I couldn't find any.)


posts: 2388



wrote:

> --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > On 9/15/05, John E Clifford
> > <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > > --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > > You seem to be thinking that {e'onai} is
> > for
> > > > replying
> > > > to a request. That's not what I'm
> thinking.
> > >
> > > Yes; that is how I read "Grant a request"
> >
> > But I never wrote "Grant a request", did I?
> > That's what
> > you wrote.
> >
> > > Now you
> > > seem to be saying — stressing another part
> > of
> > > the range you offered — that you mean
> simply
> > > "offer"
> >
> > This is what I've been saying from the start,
> > not just now.
> >
> > >and this gives the pairing "X requests z
> > > from y" and "x offers z to y." The
> > corresponding
> > > thing for thing for {e'i} would seem to be
> > "x
> > > commands y to do z" and "x volunteers to do
> z
> > for
> > > y," which doesn't seem right either --
> > although
> > > it is clearer somewhat than the given
> > {e'inai}.
> >
> > It's not right because the "offer" I mean is
> a
> > "help
> > yourself" kind of offer, not a "let me do it
> > for you"
> > kind of offer. The distinguishing feature of
> > the
> > e'V-series is that the agency is with the
> > audience.
>
> It is true that everything you have written is
> open toi the interpretation you give it here,
> so
> I concede that that is what you always meant.
> It
> is, however, open to a variety of other
> interpretations, which means that, to make the
> point you want, you need to do a considerable
> amount more work on the exposition here. The
> sense in which {e'o nai} is negatively related
> to
> {e'o} has also gotten further off course than
> before — though, admittedly, making the
> general
> point about {e'V} would make it somewhat more
> plausible. (I think something in this area is
> the right thing to have here; I just don't
> think
> it was arrived at — or can be justified — by
> appeal to general principles.)

Part of my problem is that, far from being the
opposite of a request, {e'onai}, as you present
is just (certainly in form, though maybe not in
psychology) just another request. At best, the
difference is between "x asks y to give z" and "x
asks y to take z." But the {e'o} forms are not
restricted to requests for giving and so that
difference disappears. Maybe it is between "x as
y to do what x wants" and "x asks y to do what y
wants," so that {e'onai} is always "Do what you
will," perhaps with specified parameters: {e'onai
citka} to restrict it to eating whatever you want
and so on. I keep expecting the {nai} to give
something different from a request, not merely a
change in direction or core of the request.
>
> > > To agree that not-p requires that the
> > original be
> > > not-p, to disagree that p requires that the
> > > original be p
> >
> > Indeed.
> >
> > > and so is the same as asserting
> > > not-p,
> >
> > I disagree.
> >
> > > with some incidental stuff about agreement
> > > or the lack.
> >
> > The agreement stuff is not incidental, it is
> > the crux of {ie}.
> That discussion was more than a litle murky,
> since we were talking at cross-purposes and
> neither of us being terribly consistent. To
> clarify: {ie(nai) p} either 1)asserts p and
> expresses that this (dis)agrees with the
> hearer's
> view or 2) expresses (dis)agreement on the
> subject that p. I was taking the first view,
> on
> the analogy with {ia} and the claim that {ie}
> was
> not agreement with suggestions, you are taking
> the second. But then the A B1 B2 case appears
> differently from what we said. On view 1, both
> B1 and B2 are inept: one says he agrees but
> asserts the opposite, the other says he
> disagrees
> but asserts the same thing, much like the
> perennial difficulty in answering negartive
> question apparently. On view 2, both are quite
> OK, though B1, for some rhetorical purpose
> perhaps, puts the subject of agreement in
> negative form. Assuming that the whole does
> not
> amount to an assertion directly, we can infer
> that B1 holds go'i although he gets there
> through
> na go'i (that is, he agrees that na go'i is
> wrong, even though A never actually said
> anything
> about na go'i). Similarly, B2 holds na go'i,
> that is, disagrees with go'i (which what he
> explicitly expresses). So, this convinces me
> (since I don't like to think that especially B2
> has it wrong) this is a coherent set of
> meanings
> for the {ie} set ({iecu'i} for wavering or not
> having considered etc. as more or less usual?)
> And it seems not to be significantly different
> (except in eventual clarity) from what the
> original intention was.

There is another possibility for how {ie(nai) p}
works, that might be read "I (dis)agree that p."
But this comes very close to just asserting p and
claiming agreement. In this case, B1's response
is only inept if you insist that it is A he is
agreeing with. Exchange B1 and B2 and the former
B1 now presents no problems: he agrees with the
former B2, who disagrees with A. Since the
agreement — or lack of it — is on the face,
mentioing it is just a flourish and {ienai} means
the same as {ie na}.

Back to the original a minute. In the course of
messing with {ie} I found a problem with {au}:
there seem to be three possibilities that get
intertwined. One is simply the "yummy-yuck"
range, indicating one's immediate response to
something as desirable or not (maybe "y-blah-y"
to cover the middle case). The second is the
expression of the affect of yearning, longing,
attraction and the corresponding revulsion
(etc)(and this may be two different scales in
fact). The third is as a speech act marker for
wishes and the (largely unnamed — forefending?)
opposite. These have very different logics:
anything any time can be desirable or not, but
you can only wish for what you don't have and
similarly you can be attracted to anything but
can only yearn for what you don't have. The
examples — and the various suggested words seem
to cover all these bases. Which one is intended
or is there some way to bring them all together
(or some several of them).

In a similar sort of way, the discussion of {ai}
seems to flit in and out among several meaning --
and indeed meanings derived from several
different words based on "intend" and its various
meaings. As I have noted, I tend to read
"intend" in the "commit to bring about" sense.
The nearly oldest public use of {ai} is in {ai mi
betgo} (or was it {bedgo}; I don't have Troika
handy), "I'm going to bed" which is just an
announcement of a committal, not anything to do
with planning or deliberation, just what is
involved in the old presecriptions (which I nor
hardly anyone else remembers correctly) about
"shall" and "will." From there we get to
"intentionally," which means something like "as
part of a plan" or at least "something thought
through," roughly "deliberately." Finally (well,
I sometimes think I see yet other things but this
will do for now), there is "intention," meaning
something "goal, purpose." Again, these have
different logics: the first is a speech act
marker, the other two are only doubtfully
attitudes at all. The first applies only to
not-yet-had things, the other two can apply
across the board. There are obvious connections
among these but whether they can be spelled out
in such a way as to make a coherent accoutn of
all the suggested uses of {ai} remains to be seen.


posts: 2388

.ai nai do pu se xrani
I didn't mean for you to get hurt.

Whatever else may be wrong here, the translation
is clearly not OK; it should be "I don't intend
that you were hurt." As someone noted earlier,
the tense marker comes inside the scope of the
intention marker (speech act?).


posts: 14214

On Wed, Sep 21, 2005 at 09:00:59AM -0700, John E Clifford wrote:
> .ai nai do pu se xrani
> I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
>
> Whatever else may be wrong here, the translation is clearly not
> OK; it should be "I don't intend that you were hurt." As someone
> noted earlier, the tense marker comes inside the scope of the
> intention marker (speech act?).

+1


-Robin


On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 21, 2005 at 09:00:59AM -0700, John E Clifford wrote:
> > .ai nai do pu se xrani
> > I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
> >
> > Whatever else may be wrong here, the translation is clearly not
> > OK; it should be "I don't intend that you were hurt." As someone
> > noted earlier, the tense marker comes inside the scope of the
> > intention marker (speech act?).
>
> +1
>
> -Robin

-1 :-)

Perhaps it could be written as something like:

"Attitude expressed: unintentional on my part.

Event(uality) in question: You <past> get hurt."


But that's not how one would say it in English. The English
translations are meant to be in regular English, the overall
sense is what matters, it is not a word-by-word gloss. So
the fact that in English it is the verb "intend" that carries
the tense and that in Lojban the indicator {ai} cannot carry
tense is neither here nor there.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 14214

On Wed, Sep 21, 2005 at 03:28:27PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 21, 2005 at 09:00:59AM -0700, John E Clifford wrote:
> > > .ai nai do pu se xrani
> > >
> > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
> > >
> > > Whatever else may be wrong here, the translation is clearly
> > > not OK; it should be "I don't intend that you were hurt." As
> > > someone noted earlier, the tense marker comes inside the scope
> > > of the intention marker (speech act?).
> >
> > +1
> >
> > -Robin
>
> -1 :-)

Why?

> But that's not how one would say it in English. The English
> translations are meant to be in regular English, the overall sense
> is what matters, it is not a word-by-word gloss. So the fact that
> in English it is the verb "intend" that carries the tense and that
> in Lojban the indicator {ai} cannot carry tense is neither here
> nor there.

I disagree strongly. The distinction is important, and must be
conveyed in an official example. The non-intent is present tense.
What's wrong with PC's gloss?

-Robin


On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:

> > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani
> > > >
> > > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
> > > >
> > > > it should be "I don't intend that you were hurt."
>
> What's wrong with PC's gloss?

It sounds like nonsense to me, whereas the Lojban
does not.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 14214

On Wed, Sep 21, 2005 at 03:59:02PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
>
> > > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani
> > > > >
> > > > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
> > > > >
> > > > > it should be "I don't intend that you were hurt."
> >
> > What's wrong with PC's gloss?
>
> It sounds like nonsense to me, whereas the Lojban does not.

Whereas the Lojban mostly sounds like nonsense to me. Why would one
ever express one's current intent about a past event?

-Robin


On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 21, 2005 at 03:59:02PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> > On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> >
> > > > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
> > > > > >
> Whereas the Lojban mostly sounds like nonsense to me. Why would one
> ever express one's current intent about a past event?

One wouldn't, of course. That's why "I don't intend that
you were hurt" is nonsense. But that's not what the Lojban
says (in my view). The Lojban says that the speaker admits
to being the agent/having some form of control in the event
"do pu se xrani" but denies any intentionality on their part.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388

You can't *express* an emotion, attitude, etc.
that you are not now having; you can only report
that you had it or predict having it eventually.
Attitudinals are expressions of emotions or
attitudes. Therefore, the are about current
emotions or attitudes, not past (or future) ones.
So — in so far as "I don't intend that"
expresses and attitude and {ainai} does — my
translation is perfectly correct. Now xorxes
seems to have a view of the role of (ai} (at
least {ainai}) which differs from that somehow,
but from all the discussion so far, I can't see
how it differs from the acknowledged mistake of
taking {ai mi klama} as being true or false
depending upon whether I do have such an
intention. (I think that {ai mi klama} is not
the sort of thing that can be true or false, but
that is another issue; it is clear that which it
is is not dependent on what my intentions are).



> On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell
> <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 21, 2005 at 03:59:02PM -0300,
> Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> > > On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell
> <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > > > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
> > > > > > >
> > Whereas the Lojban mostly sounds like
> nonsense to me. Why would one
> > ever express one's current intent about a
> past event?
>
> One wouldn't, of course. That's why "I don't
> intend that
> you were hurt" is nonsense. But that's not what
> the Lojban
> says (in my view). The Lojban says that the
> speaker admits
> to being the agent/having some form of control
> in the event
> "do pu se xrani" but denies any intentionality
> on their part.
>
> mu'o mi'e xorxes
>
>
>
>



On 9/21/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> You can't *express* an emotion, attitude, etc.
> that you are not now having; you can only report
> that you had it or predict having it eventually.

Right.

> Attitudinals are expressions of emotions or
> attitudes. Therefore, the are about current
> emotions or attitudes, not past (or future) ones.

Correct. But the attitudes can be about past, present,
future events, actual or not.

> So — in so far as "I don't intend that"
> expresses and attitude and {ainai} does — my
> translation is perfectly correct.

If "I don't intend that" was a perfect match for {ainai},
it would be. But "I don't intend that" can only be about
future events, eventually current ones, not about past
events. There is no such restriction, in my view, for
{ainai}.

> Now xorxes
> seems to have a view of the role of (ai} (at
> least {ainai}) which differs from that somehow,

Right. In my view, {ai} is used to express how
the speaker sees their role in the event in question.

> but from all the discussion so far, I can't see
> how it differs from the acknowledged mistake of
> taking {ai mi klama} as being true or false
> depending upon whether I do have such an
> intention. (I think that {ai mi klama} is not
> the sort of thing that can be true or false, but
> that is another issue; it is clear that which it
> is is not dependent on what my intentions are).

The most likely interpretation for {ai mi klama}
is {ai mi ba klama}, the speaker indicates
their intention of bringing about the (potential) future
event described by {mi ba klama}, i.e. they see
themselves as intentionally participating in that
event.

If, however, context suggests an {ai mi pu klama}
interpretation, then what the speaker indicates is
that they see themselves as intentionally participating
in that (potential) past event.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388

Unlike you I take both "expression" and "intend"
seriously. An expression is contemporary with
what is expressed (what presses it out of you to
go back to the root). What I intend is what I
commit to bringing about and must logically
therefore be future, since I can't bring about
what is or has been.



> On 9/21/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > You can't *express* an emotion, attitude,
> etc.
> > that you are not now having; you can only
> report
> > that you had it or predict having it
> eventually.
>
> Right.
>
> > Attitudinals are expressions of emotions or
> > attitudes. Therefore, the are about current
> > emotions or attitudes, not past (or future)
> ones.
>
> Correct. But the attitudes can be about past,
> present,
> future events, actual or not.

Not the one you are expressing. That is always
now. Events about which attitudes arise may --
depending on the attitude involved — be any
whichwhen;intention in the sense in which it can
be expressed, is limited to future (technically
"not know to have occurred or not) events.

> > So — in so far as "I don't intend that"
> > expresses and attitude and {ainai} does — my
> > translation is perfectly correct.
>
> If "I don't intend that" was a perfect match
> for {ainai},
> it would be. But "I don't intend that" can only
> be about
> future events, eventually current ones, not
> about past
> events. There is no such restriction, in my
> view, for
> {ainai}.

I tend to take "intend" as being a reasonably
accurate match for {ai}; I am less sure about
what {ainai} might be so I have used the vaguest
form. I do assume that {ainai} is of the same
logical type as {ai} itself, that I can only
{ainai} events I can {ai}. I also take the place
in which it occurs in the word lists — and the
classification as irrealis — seriously, which --
in spite of it being your classification you say
-- you apparently do not. Admittedly, there are
some cases in this list that do not fit so well,
but I see no reason to think that {ai} is one of
them (other, of course, than that solecism from
Lojban 101).


> > Now xorxes
> > seems to have a view of the role of (ai} (at
> > least {ainai}) which differs from that
> somehow,
>
> Right. In my view, {ai} is used to express how
> the speaker sees their role in the event in
> question.

I can think of NO reason to think this, nor of a
reason for legislating it in out of left field.
{ai} is — and always has been — to declare
intentions, sorta like promising only with only
expectations rather than duties. This is not how
the speaker sees his role but the speaker taking
on a particular role, namely that of committing
to bringing the stated event about. {ainai} is
presumably about the speaker refusing that role
in some way.

>> but from all the discussion so far, I can't
> see
> > how it differs from the acknowledged mistake
> of
> > taking {ai mi klama} as being true or false
> > depending upon whether I do have such an
> > intention. (I think that {ai mi klama} is
> not
> > the sort of thing that can be true or false,
> but
> > that is another issue; it is clear that which
> it
> > is is not dependent on what my intentions
> are).
>
> The most likely interpretation for {ai mi
> klama}
> is {ai mi ba klama}, the speaker indicates
> their intention of bringing about the
> (potential) future
> event described by {mi ba klama}, i.e. they see
> themselves as intentionally participating in
> that
> event.
>
> If, however, context suggests an {ai mi pu
> klama}
> interpretation, then what the speaker indicates
> is
> that they see themselves as intentionally
> participating
> in that (potential) past event.

Fine. But that is not intention (and, I would
say, not expressing a current attitude but
reporting on a past one). Notice that you keep
shifting around from "intend" to "intentional"
and "intentionally," even thhough these are
different notions (however related they may be).
I do things intentionally that I never intended
and so on through all the combinations: "intend"
means "commit to," "intentional" means
"deliberate, planned" and they do not have to run
together.






posts: 149

John E Clifford scripsit:

> An expression is contemporary with
> what is expressed (what presses it out of you to
> go back to the root).

I agree.

> What I intend is what I
> commit to bringing about and must logically
> therefore be future, since I can't bring about
> what is or has been.

I continue to think this is too restrictive. When Atlas
holds up the Earth, he intends to keep it aloft all the
while he is actually doing so. He could drop it either because
his grip slips or because his intention falters.

--
John Cowan cowan@ccil.org www.reutershealth.com www.ccil.org/~cowan
The known is finite, the unknown infinite; intellectually we stand
on an islet in the midst of an illimitable ocean of inexplicability.
Our business in every generation is to reclaim a little more land,
to add something to the extent and the solidity of our possessions.
--Thomas Henry Huxley


posts: 2388


> John E Clifford scripsit:
>
> > An expression is contemporary with
> > what is expressed (what presses it out of you
> to
> > go back to the root).
>
> I agree.
>
> > What I intend is what I
> > commit to bringing about and must logically
> > therefore be future, since I can't bring
> about
> > what is or has been.
>
> I continue to think this is too restrictive.
> When Atlas
> holds up the Earth, he intends to keep it aloft
> all the
> while he is actually doing so. He could drop
> it either because
> his grip slips or because his intention
> falters.

Yes he has to stick to his intention to get it
done. But that does not mean he keeps on
intending it even after he has done it-- or while
he is doing it. Notice that Atlas's intention is
still here to a future act — he is not now
intending that he now hold the globe up on that
he still do so in the next moment. I think that
there is a confusion here between having a plan
and carrying it out on the one hand and intending
on the other. They do frequently run together
but not necessarily so. I can intend something
and do it without a plan and I suppose the other
way is at least logically possible — testing a
contingency plan. say.


On 9/22/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> An expression is contemporary with
> what is expressed (what presses it out of you to
> go back to the root).

I would have said that the one doing the pressing
(out of themselves) is the expressor, not what is
expressed.

> > > Attitudinals are expressions of emotions or
> > > attitudes. Therefore, the are about current
> > > emotions or attitudes, not past (or future)
> > ones.
> >
> > Correct. But the attitudes can be about past,
> > present, future events, actual or not.
>
> Not the one you are expressing. That is always
> now. Events about which attitudes arise may --
> depending on the attitude involved — be any
> whichwhen;

Isn't that the same thing I said?


> Notice that you keep
> shifting around from "intend" to "intentional"
> and "intentionally," even thhough these are
> different notions (however related they may be).
> I do things intentionally that I never intended

For example what kind of things?

> and so on through all the combinations:

Examples?

> "intend"
> means "commit to," "intentional" means
> "deliberate, planned" and they do not have to run
> together.

The question is, are they so unrelated that they can't
be dealt with by the same word?

Definition A:
{ai broda} the speaker indicates that the event described
by broda (past, present, future, or whatever) is under the
speaker's control and constitutes a goal of the speaker's
actions.

Definition B:
{ai broda} the speaker indicates that they intend to act
so as to bring about the *future* event described by broda.

Definition A is broader than B, A covers B. I don't see any
reason to settle for the more restricted B when the cases
allowed by A and not allowed by B are useful things to
cover. What is the danger of allowing the broader A?

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On 9/22/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > An expression is contemporary with
> > what is expressed (what presses it out of you
> to
> > go back to the root).
>
> I would have said that the one doing the
> pressing
> (out of themselves) is the expressor, not what
> is
> expressed.
>
> > > > Attitudinals are expressions of emotions
> or
> > > > attitudes. Therefore, the are about
> current
> > > > emotions or attitudes, not past (or
> future)
> > > ones.
> > >
> > > Correct. But the attitudes can be about
> past,
> > > present, future events, actual or not.
> >
> > Not the one you are expressing. That is
> always
> > now. Events about which attitudes arise may
> --
> > depending on the attitude involved — be any
> > whichwhen;
>
> Isn't that the same thing I said?
>
Maybe, but I took you as talking about the
example, that is, {ai}, where the event can only
be past and the attitude only present.

> > Notice that you keep
> > shifting around from "intend" to
> "intentional"
> > and "intentionally," even thhough these are
> > different notions (however related they may
> be).
> > I do things intentionally that I never
> intended
>
> For example what kind of things?

Back to the example: I did what I did — which
constituted harming the hearer — intentionally
(deliberately, according to -plan)but did not
intend to harm the hearer. You can split hairs
about that but it doesn't change the way it
works.

> > and so on through all the combinations:
>
> Examples?

Well, I can intend (commit to bringing it about)
and then have it come about as an unforeseen
effect of something else I do.

> > "intend"
> > means "commit to," "intentional" means
> > "deliberate, planned" and they do not have to
> run
> > together.
>
> The question is, are they so unrelated that
> they can't
> be dealt with by the same word?

The basic problem is that only one of these fits
in with the sort of things that go into UI,
emotions, propositional attitudes, performative
speech acts and the like. "I plan to do it" --
and even more "I planned to do it" are purely
assertive acts reporting some mental activities
on my part. They are not expressing anything and
there relation to my committing to ssomething is
-- at best and not necessarily — to report that
it has occurred.

> Definition A:
> {ai broda} the speaker indicates that the event
> described
> by broda (past, present, future, or whatever)
> is under the
> speaker's control and constitutes a goal of the
> speaker's
> actions.

Goals are always future, but aside from that this
is not an expression of the sort of things
required. It is merely a factual matter,
generating none of the world web that intending
(in the requisite sense) does.

> Definition B:
> {ai broda} the speaker indicates that they
> intend to act
> so as to bring about the *future* event
> described by broda.

Note that — assuming you really mean your first
definition (you have a habit of presenting as
definitions things you don't really mean
apparently), then the stress on "future" is
unnecessary, since only future events are
involved in both cases. The difference is that
in one case the speaker has made a commitment, in
the other he has merely claimed that such and
such is a goal.

> Definition A is broader than B, A covers B.

Neither, since they are two different sorts of
things.
> I
> don't see any
> reason to settle for the more restricted B when
> the cases
> allowed by A and not allowed by B are useful
> things to
> cover. What is the danger of allowing the
> broader A?

We have the broader A covered just fine and
logically properly with normal bridi "I have this
under control and it is a goal of mine." That
doesn't do the work of {ai}. Your A is close to
laying down the conditions where B is
appropriate, but that doesn't mean it is — or
covers — B. By the way, your definition A does
not obviously fit your example even (of course
hurting the person is not now a purpose, you've
already done it. Unless you are secretly
planning to hurt him more).


On 9/22/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:

> > > I do things intentionally that I never
> > intended
> >
> > For example what kind of things?
>
> Back to the example: I did what I did — which
> constituted harming the hearer — intentionally
> (deliberately, according to -plan)but did not
> intend to harm the hearer.

That doesn't make sense to me. If you did it intentionally,
then you intended to do it. If you did not intend to do it
then you did it unintentionally. Or maybe I just don't
understand English, but that's how "intencionalmente"
works in Spanish.

>You can split hairs
> about that but it doesn't change the way it
> works.

You say you can do something intentionally without
intending to do it and I'm the one splitting hairs?


> > The question is, are they so unrelated that
> > they can't
> > be dealt with by the same word?
>
> The basic problem is that only one of these fits
> in with the sort of things that go into UI,
> emotions, propositional attitudes, performative
> speech acts and the like.

So you keep asserting. How do you say "oops!" in Lojban?
This is the definition of "oops" from dictionary.com:

oops
interj.
Used to express acknowledgement of a minor accident, blunder, or mistake.

Compare with:

{ainai} Attitudinal. Used to express acknowledgement of a (past) accident
or lack of intention to perform a (future) action.

> > Definition A:
> > {ai broda} the speaker indicates that the event
> > described
> > by broda (past, present, future, or whatever)
> > is under the
> > speaker's control and constitutes a goal of the
> > speaker's
> > actions.
>
> By the way, your definition A does
> not obviously fit your example even (of course
> hurting the person is not now a purpose, you've
> already done it. Unless you are secretly
> planning to hurt him more).

That's a definition for {ai}, not for {ai nai}. {ai nai} indicates
that the event is under the speaker's control, the speaker
is the agent, but the event does not constitute a goal, it's not
what the speaker wants.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On 9/22/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
>
> > > > I do things intentionally that I never
> > > intended
> > >
> > > For example what kind of things?
> >
> > Back to the example: I did what I did --
> which
> > constituted harming the hearer --
> intentionally
> > (deliberately, according to -plan)but did not
> > intend to harm the hearer.
>
> That doesn't make sense to me. If you did it
> intentionally,
> then you intended to do it. If you did not
> intend to do it
> then you did it unintentionally. Or maybe I
> just don't
> understand English, but that's how
> "intencionalmente"
> works in Spanish.

I thought your example for {ao nai} was one, but
I must have misunderstood the situation you had
in mind (though not in the example). the stock
one nowadays is collateral damage: the US bombs
Iraq intentionally, deliberately, and according
to plan but that kills innocent civilians. That
some civilians will be killed (indeed often how
many)is part of that plan. But the US did not
intend to kill those civilians (this is what
morally separates the US from terrorists, who do
intend to kill civilians).


> >You can split hairs
> > about that but it doesn't change the way it
> > works.
>
> You say you can do something intentionally
> without
> intending to do it and I'm the one splitting
> hairs?

The issue is whether If A did x intentionally and
x amounted to y, did A do y intentionally.
Philosophers run round and round on this one. I
said that A did do y intentionally although A
never intended it. I am not wedded to that, but
it is the sort of thing you were asking for.

> > > The question is, are they so unrelated that
> > > they can't
> > > be dealt with by the same word?
> >
> > The basic problem is that only one of these
> fits
> > in with the sort of things that go into UI,
> > emotions, propositional attitudes,
> performative
> > speech acts and the like.
>
> So you keep asserting. How do you say "oops!"
> in Lojban?
> This is the definition of "oops" from
> dictionary.com:
> oops
> interj.
> Used to express acknowledgement of a minor
> accident, blunder, or mistake.
>
> Compare with:
>
> {ainai} Attitudinal. Used to express
> acknowledgement of a (past) accident
> or lack of intention to perform a (future)
> action.

How you say that "oops" in Lojban is an
interesting question, but I don't see any thing
about it here. We are not in any case
acknowledging a blunder, mistake or accident but
rather that something happend that was
objectionable and we are denying that it was part
of our plan. I just don't see this as in any way
on a linguistic par with {ai}; what is being
expressed here? Put another way, I do not agree
that acknowledging has the same logic as
committing nor do I see an accident or a mistake
as the same sort of thing as a bringing about or
refusing to do so.

> > > Definition A:
> > > {ai broda} the speaker indicates that the
> event
> > > described
> > > by broda (past, present, future, or
> whatever)
> > > is under the
> > > speaker's control and constitutes a goal of
> the
> > > speaker's
> > > actions.
> >
> > By the way, your definition A does
> > not obviously fit your example even (of
> course
> > hurting the person is not now a purpose,
> you've
> > already done it. Unless you are secretly
> > planning to hurt him more).
>
> That's a definition for {ai}, not for {ai nai}.

Sorry; I thought that {ainai} was somehow (not
sure exactly how, but it doesn't matter here) the
negation of {ai}, so expressing non-commitment
(or commitment to not bringing about or
commitment to bringing about not and probably
some other variations). In at least some of
these senses, the fact that you cannot now bring
something about is adequate grounds for denying
that you are committing to do so.
> {ai nai} indicates
> that the event is under the speaker's control,
> the speaker
> is the agent, but the event does not constitute
> a goal, it's not
> what the speaker wants.

Again, since the event has occurred, it can't be
a purpose the speaker has now — nor for that
matter is it under his control, being over and
done with. and, as usual, what attitude (etc.) is
being ecxpressed here?


On 9/22/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> the US bombs
> Iraq intentionally, deliberately, and according
> to plan but that kills innocent civilians. That
> some civilians will be killed (indeed often how
> many)is part of that plan. But the US did not
> intend to kill those civilians

So, would you say that the US kills innocent civilians
intentionally, but does not intend to kill them? I don't
think you would.

> The issue is whether If A did x intentionally and
> x amounted to y, did A do y intentionally.

I don't think that's the issue, because in considering
{ai broda} or {ai nai broda} there is only x, no y.

> Philosophers run round and round on this one. I
> said that A did do y intentionally although A
> never intended it. I am not wedded to that, but
> it is the sort of thing you were asking for.

I would prefer an example you really were
wedded to. You said you sometimes do things
intentionally that you never intended to do. To me
that sounds very odd. I can believe philosophers
do say that sort of thing, but it doesn't sound at
all like ordinary language.

> How you say that "oops" in Lojban is an
> interesting question, but I don't see any thing
> about it here.

I say {ai nai}.

> We are not in any case
> acknowledging a blunder, mistake or accident but
> rather that something happend that was
> objectionable and we are denying that it was part
> of our plan.

Isn't that the same as an accident?

> I just don't see this as in any way
> on a linguistic par with {ai}; what is being
> expressed here?

That I acknowledge my control of or responsability for
the event in question but deny that it was done on purpose,
i.e. I indicate lack of intent on my part.

> Put another way, I do not agree
> that acknowledging has the same logic as
> committing nor do I see an accident or a mistake
> as the same sort of thing as a bringing about or
> refusing to do so.

Perhaps "assume responsibility for" can cover both
acknowledgement for being the agent in a past event,
and commitment to being the agent in a future one?

> > {ai nai} indicates
> > that the event is under the speaker's control,
> > the speaker
> > is the agent, but the event does not constitute
> > a goal, it's not
> > what the speaker wants.
>
> Again, since the event has occurred, it can't be
> a purpose the speaker has now — nor for that
> matter is it under his control, being over and
> done with. and, as usual, what attitude (etc.) is
> being ecxpressed here?

Just lack of intent, as in "oops".

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On 9/22/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > the US bombs
> > Iraq intentionally, deliberately, and
> according
> > to plan but that kills innocent civilians.
> That
> > some civilians will be killed (indeed often
> how
> > many)is part of that plan. But the US did
> not
> > intend to kill those civilians
>
> So, would you say that the US kills innocent
> civilians
> intentionally, but does not intend to kill
> them? I don't
> think you would.

What I would say is beside the point here: the US
does indeed say something very like this --
admitting responsibility for the deaths, for
example (though not that it is blameworthy, which
is an even trickier move to make).

> > The issue is whether If A did x intentionally
> and
> > x amounted to y, did A do y intentionally.
>
> I don't think that's the issue, because in
> considering
> {ai broda} or {ai nai broda} there is only x,
> no y.

I would have said there is only y; we don't know
what the person did that resulted in the hearer
being hurt (the problem of insufficeint context
again), but I would assume it was something the
speaker did deliberately for present purposes.

> > Philosophers run round and round on this one.
> I
> > said that A did do y intentionally although A
> > never intended it. I am not wedded to that,
> but
> > it is the sort of thing you were asking for.
>
> I would prefer an example you really were
> wedded to. You said you sometimes do things
> intentionally that you never intended to do. To
> me
> that sounds very odd. I can believe
> philosophers
> do say that sort of thing, but it doesn't sound
> at
> all like ordinary language.

Well, ordinary language is a good guideline for
conceptual questions only when used with great
care and precision. In this case, I don't think
it helps a lot, since, as noted, there are cases
where people really do — in very official ways
-- say these apparently extraordinary things. It
is a datum to be dealt with and suggests that
exclusionary definitions are at least not
certain, even if eventually defensible. It is
certainly the norm that, if you do what you
intend to, you do it intentionally (though there
are exceptions as noted) and if you do something
intentionally, you intended to do it (again with
at least prima facie exceptions, as above). The
parenthetical exceptions show that this normal
cooccurrence is not semantically necessitated nor
even czusally reliable. But even if there were a
reliable connection, this would not help your
case (inso far as I can make sense of it) since
doing something intentionally is not doing it
with a certain attitude or feeling or whatever
that can be expressed in the relevant way; it is
doing it according plan, carefully an
consciously, deliberately, in short. That is
acting intentionally is a way of acting not a
feeling about about acting. Intending is a
feeling (in some sense, of course-- there is no
good general word for the range of possibilities)
about the action — even before it is undertaken
(you can only do an action intentionally when you
are doing it — or maybe have done it).


> > How you say that "oops" in Lojban is an
> > interesting question, but I don't see any
> thing
> > about it here.
>
> I say {ai nai}.


I know you would but you have not given any
evidence that this is correct, even by the
definitions you have given — quoted for "oops",
invented (but you have not really given one yet)
for {ainai}.

> > We are not in any case
> > acknowledging a blunder, mistake or accident
> but
> > rather that something happend that was
> > objectionable and we are denying that it was
> part
> > of our plan.
>
> Isn't that the same as an accident?

Not obviously. To be sure, accidents are not
parts of plans but not everything that happens
outside some plan is an accident. For that
matter, outside of Islam and like-minded theists,
everything is outside some plan, but is not
therefore an accident (well, there are those who
would go so far as to say they are, but that is
also an extreme position, not quite normal).
> > I just don't see this as in any way
> > on a linguistic par with {ai}; what is being
> > expressed here?
>
> That I acknowledge my control of or
> responsability for
> the event in question but deny that it was done
> on purpose,
> i.e. I indicate lack of intent on my part.
>
> > Put another way, I do not agree
> > that acknowledging has the same logic as
> > committing nor do I see an accident or a
> mistake
> > as the same sort of thing as a bringing about
> or
> > refusing to do so.
>
> Perhaps "assume responsibility for" can cover
> both
> acknowledgement for being the agent in a past
> event,
> and commitment to being the agent in a future
> one?

Now, that is about as close to a reasonable
suggestion as I have seen so far. To be sure,
responsibility goes with intentional action, not
with intended action (see the Iraqi case again),
but it does do one thing you want, namely get
something that applies as well after an action as
before it. And it gets very close to an attitude
(etc.): we have a sense of responsibility and
feel responsible for something — and, more to
the point, take responsibility for something. It
does not seem to work for {ai} (nor, so I would
hope, for {ainai}) in the simplest cases, the old
{ai mi betgo} from Troika, for example. There is
no sense of responsibility here at all; talking
about responsibility would be taken as simple
nonsense in the context (girl announces this to
two others who are clearly going to go on talking
for a while). It is simply a stated intention,
perhaps an act of committal.

> > > {ai nai} indicates
> > > that the event is under the speaker's
> control,
> > > the speaker
> > > is the agent, but the event does not
> constitute
> > > a goal, it's not
> > > what the speaker wants.
> >
> > Again, since the event has occurred, it can't
> be
> > a purpose the speaker has now — nor for that
> > matter is it under his control, being over
> and
> > done with. and, as usual, what attitude
> (etc.) is
> > being ecxpressed here?
>
> Just lack of intent, as in "oops".

But lack of intent (i.e., not doing something
intentionally) is not an attitude or whatever, it
is just a fact about the way you did something,
making {ainai} malglico again.


posts: 14214


Just FYI, I'm stepping out of this discussion now, for the most
part. I simply don't have the energy.

I'll try to make time to review the sections. I expect I'll vote no
on the .ai one; I'll defer to jcowan and Broca to let me know when I
should consider changing that vote, since I'm not really going to be
paying attention.

-Robin


On 9/23/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
>
> Just FYI, I'm stepping out of this discussion now, for the most
> part. I simply don't have the energy.
>
> I'll try to make time to review the sections. I expect I'll vote no
> on the .ai one; I'll defer to jcowan and Broca to let me know when I
> should consider changing that vote, since I'm not really going to be
> paying attention.

Perhaps you should set a deadline for votes, since we've
been mostly going in circles in the discussion for a while
now, and it seems unlikely that anyone will be changing
their mind on this issue. Once the votes are cast, and
since it looks like the irrealis section at least won't be
approved, I will be happy to step down as shepherd and
let someone else do whatever adjustments they feel
are necessary.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 14214

On Fri, Sep 23, 2005 at 03:30:56PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> On 9/23/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> >
> > Just FYI, I'm stepping out of this discussion now, for the most
> > part. I simply don't have the energy.
> >
> > I'll try to make time to review the sections. I expect I'll
> > vote no on the .ai one; I'll defer to jcowan and Broca to let me
> > know when I should consider changing that vote, since I'm not
> > really going to be paying attention.
>
> Perhaps you should set a deadline for votes,

Probably. I'd like to see the last section get finished, of course.

> since we've been mostly going in circles in the discussion for a
> while now, and it seems unlikely that anyone will be changing
> their mind on this issue. Once the votes are cast, and since it
> looks like the irrealis section at least won't be approved, I will
> be happy to step down as shepherd and let someone else do whatever
> adjustments they feel are necessary.

I don't see that you stepping down is necessary or even desirable.
It sets a precedent I don't like; that people get punished in some
sense for having a point of view. Is there a problem with you
making the changes yourself? It's not like you don't know what
people want.

-Robin


On 9/23/05, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> I don't see that you stepping down is necessary or even desirable.
> It sets a precedent I don't like; that people get punished in some
> sense for having a point of view.

I assure you I won't feel it as punishment! It seems like
the right procedure.

> Is there a problem with you
> making the changes yourself? It's not like you don't know what
> people want.

I don't know that there is agreement on what others want.

Also, there should be a way to cancel one's yes vote
without having to vote no (or vice versa), a way to
explicitly abstain, because we are making changes to
the pages after votes have been cast. I won't be voting in
favour of ainai = rejection/refusal, but I won't be vetoing
either if that's what most people want as the official
definition.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388



wrote:

> --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > On 9/22/05, John E Clifford
> > <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > > the US bombs
> > > Iraq intentionally, deliberately, and
> > according
> > > to plan but that kills innocent civilians.
> > That
> > > some civilians will be killed (indeed often
> > how
> > > many)is part of that plan. But the US did
> > not
> > > intend to kill those civilians
> >
> > So, would you say that the US kills innocent
> > civilians
> > intentionally, but does not intend to kill
> > them? I don't
> > think you would.
>
> What I would say is beside the point here: the
> US
> does indeed say something very like this --
> admitting responsibility for the deaths, for
> example (though not that it is blameworthy,
> which
> is an even trickier move to make).
>
> > > The issue is whether If A did x
> intentionally
> > and
> > > x amounted to y, did A do y intentionally.
> >
> > I don't think that's the issue, because in
> > considering
> > {ai broda} or {ai nai broda} there is only x,
> > no y.
>
> I would have said there is only y; we don't
> know
> what the person did that resulted in the hearer
> being hurt (the problem of insufficeint context
> again), but I would assume it was something the
> speaker did deliberately for present purposes.
>
> > > Philosophers run round and round on this
> one.
> > I
> > > said that A did do y intentionally although
> A
> > > never intended it. I am not wedded to that,
> > but
> > > it is the sort of thing you were asking
> for.
> >
> > I would prefer an example you really were
> > wedded to. You said you sometimes do things
> > intentionally that you never intended to do.
> To
> > me
> > that sounds very odd. I can believe
> > philosophers
> > do say that sort of thing, but it doesn't
> sound
> > at
> > all like ordinary language.
>
> Well, ordinary language is a good guideline for
> conceptual questions only when used with great
> care and precision. In this case, I don't
> think
> it helps a lot, since, as noted, there are
> cases
> where people really do — in very official ways
> — say these apparently extraordinary things.
> It
> is a datum to be dealt with and suggests that
> exclusionary definitions are at least not
> certain, even if eventually defensible. It is
> certainly the norm that, if you do what you
> intend to, you do it intentionally (though
> there
> are exceptions as noted) and if you do
> something
> intentionally, you intended to do it (again
> with
> at least prima facie exceptions, as above).
> The
> parenthetical exceptions show that this normal
> cooccurrence is not semantically necessitated
> nor
> even czusally reliable. But even if there were
> a
> reliable connection, this would not help your
> case (inso far as I can make sense of it) since
> doing something intentionally is not doing it
> with a certain attitude or feeling or whatever
> that can be expressed in the relevant way; it
> is
> doing it according plan, carefully an
> consciously, deliberately, in short. That is
> acting intentionally is a way of acting not a
> feeling about about acting. Intending is a
> feeling (in some sense, of course-- there is no
> good general word for the range of
> possibilities)
> about the action — even before it is
> undertaken
> (you can only do an action intentionally when
> you
> are doing it — or maybe have done it).
>
>
> > > How you say that "oops" in Lojban is an
> > > interesting question, but I don't see any
> > thing
> > > about it here.
> >
> > I say {ai nai}.
>
>
> I know you would but you have not given any
> evidence that this is correct, even by the
> definitions you have given — quoted for
> "oops",
> invented (but you have not really given one
> yet)
> for {ainai}.
>
> > > We are not in any case
> > > acknowledging a blunder, mistake or
> accident
> > but
> > > rather that something happend that was
> > > objectionable and we are denying that it
> was
> > part
> > > of our plan.
> >
> > Isn't that the same as an accident?
>
> Not obviously. To be sure, accidents are not
> parts of plans but not everything that happens
> outside some plan is an accident. For that
> matter, outside of Islam and like-minded
> theists,
> everything is outside some plan, but is not
> therefore an accident (well, there are those
> who
> would go so far as to say they are, but that is
> also an extreme position, not quite normal).
> > > I just don't see this as in any way
> > > on a linguistic par with {ai}; what is
> being
> > > expressed here?
> >
> > That I acknowledge my control of or
> > responsability for
> > the event in question but deny that it was
> done
> > on purpose,
> > i.e. I indicate lack of intent on my part.
> >
> > > Put another way, I do not agree
> > > that acknowledging has the same logic as
> > > committing nor do I see an accident or a
> > mistake
> > > as the same sort of thing as a bringing
> about
> > or
> > > refusing to do so.
> >
> > Perhaps "assume responsibility for" can cover
> > both
> > acknowledgement for being the agent in a past
> > event,
> > and commitment to being the agent in a future
> > one?
>
> Now, that is about as close to a reasonable
> suggestion as I have seen so far. To be sure,
> responsibility goes with intentional action,
> not
> with intended action (see the Iraqi case
> again),
> but it does do one thing you want, namely get
> something that applies as well after an action
> as
> before it. And it gets very close to an
> attitude
> (etc.): we have a sense of responsibility and
> feel responsible for something — and, more to
> the point, take responsibility for something.
> It
> does not seem to work for {ai} (nor, so I would
> hope, for {ainai}) in the simplest cases, the
> old
> {ai mi betgo} from Troika, for example. There
> is no sense of responsibility here at all;
<<talking
about responsibility would be taken as simple
nonsense in the context (girl announces this to
two others who are clearly going to go on talking
for a while). It is simply a stated intention,
perhaps an act of committal. >>

Botice also that, given this, {ainai} even more
does not acknowledge and accident or whatever,
but go directly to "it's not my fault," moving
into the blame game directly — where intentions
do not go.

<<> > > {ai nai} indicates
> > > that the event is under the speaker's
> control,
> > > the speaker
> > > is the agent, but the event does not
> constitute
> > > a goal, it's not
> > > what the speaker wants.
> >
> > Again, since the event has occurred, it can't
> be
> > a purpose the speaker has now — nor for that
> > matter is it under his control, being over
> and
> > done with. and, as usual, what attitude
> (etc.) is
> > being ecxpressed here?
>
> Just lack of intent, as in "oops".

But lack of intent (i.e., not doing something
intentionally) is not an attitude or whatever, it
is just a fact about the way you did something,
making {ainai} malglico again.>>







John E Clifford scripsit:

> I thought your example for {ao nai} was one, but I must have
> misunderstood the situation you had in mind (though not in the
> example). the stock one nowadays is collateral damage: the US bombs
> Iraq intentionally, deliberately, and according to plan but that
> kills innocent civilians. That some civilians will be killed (indeed
> often how many)is part of that plan. But the US did not intend to kill
> those civilians (this is what morally separates the US from terrorists,
> who do intend to kill civilians).

The criminal law, at least, will not allow A to claim that he aimed at
B but hit C, and therefore his killing of C was unintentional. It is
(the other requirements being met) murder. This is an example of how
the law treats intention as an objective fact, not a state of mind.

(FWIW, I don't think there's any moral distinction either. To intentionally
undertake an action in full knowledge that it will kill people, whether
specific people or nonspecific ones, is intentional killing. It can be
justified, if at all, only by the (IMHO specious) argument of *raison d'etat*.)

--
They tried to pierce your heart John Cowan
with a Morgul-knife that remains in the http://www.ccil.org/~cowan
wound. If they had succeeded, you would http://www.reutershealth.com
become a wraith under the domination of the Dark Lord. --Gandalf


posts: 2388

wrote:

> John E Clifford scripsit:
>
> > I thought your example for {ao nai} was one,
> but I must have
> > misunderstood the situation you had in mind
> (though not in the
> > example). the stock one nowadays is
> collateral damage: the US bombs
> > Iraq intentionally, deliberately, and
> according to plan but that
> > kills innocent civilians. That some
> civilians will be killed (indeed
> > often how many)is part of that plan. But the
> US did not intend to kill
> > those civilians (this is what morally
> separates the US from terrorists,
> > who do intend to kill civilians).
>
> The criminal law, at least, will not allow A to
> claim that he aimed at
> B but hit C, and therefore his killing of C was
> unintentional. It is
> (the other requirements being met) murder.
> This is an example of how
> the law treats intention as an objective fact,
> not a state of mind.

The other requirements play a significant role
here. For example, a policeman shooting at B in
the line of duty but hitting C typically is not
charged with murder, even when it is clear that
he was aware of the possibility of hitting C. He
is liable to internal sanctions, of course, and
may get some criminal action (negligent homicide
or the like) if there was some obvious
alternative action to shooting at B to achieve
appropriate goals. And, in general, if the
shooting of B was a lawful act, then the charge
will almost certainly be less than Murder One and
may end up only as a civil wrongful death suit
(an extreme but not all that uncommon event). To
be sure, if the shooting of B would already be
unlawful, then that intention is no out. This is
all, of course, about acting intentionally or not
and says nothing about intending in the relevant
sense. Intentionally committing a crime but
failing at it and in the process unintentionally
committing a different crime does not excuse one
from the other crime (though it might work if you
were failing at a lawful activity). If this can
be made to stick in general, it undercuts the US
position (but the cop cases suggest it does not
work for governments and, of course, a government
can always argue that their original intentional
acts were not criminal or immoral or whatvver is
at issue).

> (FWIW, I don't think there's any moral
> distinction either. To intentionally
> undertake an action in full knowledge that it
> will kill people, whether
> specific people or nonspecific ones, is
> intentional killing. It can be
> justified, if at all, only by the (IMHO
> specious) argument of *raison d'etat*.)

The moral case is even murkier, since it tends
(as in the legal case) to depend upon what the
justification is for the original intentional act
and, with governemnts, that is almost never clear
(except, as you note, policy). The
Schrecklichkeit of the Hiroshima (and, even more,
Nagasaki) bombing are about as close to a clear
case as you can get (US did intend to kill
civilians and the more the better — as a matter
of policy) but there is no consensus about even
that after 50 years.


Here's my attempt at a summary of {ai}. Let's consider first these
four examples:

(1) ai mi ba catra le do patfu
''Aye, I will kill your father!" (at least that's the idea)

(2) ai nai mi ba catra le do patfu
"It's not part of my plans to kill your father" (if I do happen to kill
him it won't be because I set out to do it)

(3) ai mi pu catra le do patfu
''The idea was indeed to kill your father" (no assertion is made here
one way or another as to whether or not the father was actually killed)

(4) ai nai mi pu catra le do patfu
"Oops, I didn't mean to kill your father" (maybe I killed him, maybe
I nearly killed him, but in any case it wasn't on purpose)

(Disclaimer: The English sentences are not meant as literal transcriptions
of the Lojban, obviously. They are only meant to get at their sense.)

Now, I think there is no major disagreement about (1).

There is some disagreement about (2): some people want {ai nai} to
indicate more than just an absence of intent. Based on the "rejection/
refusal" keywords they want {ai nai} to indicate intent to avoid, similar
or the same as {ai mi na ba catra le do patfu}. I think this doesn't
fit with the way {nai} works in general. In many cases the distinction is
minor, in other cases it may be significant.

There is more disagreement about (3) and (4). It is argued that there is
an insurmountable logical barrier between (1)/(2) and (3)/(4), that {ai} can
only work in conjunction with a future event and that the Lojban in (3) and
(4) is therefore meaningless and the English does not correspond to it.

Let me do a bit of imagery: the speaker is an archer holding a bow in their
hands. An arrow represents the speaker's actions. In all four examples,
the bridi {mi catra le do patfu} is a description of a target. In (1) and (2),
the arrow is still in the bow, in (3) an (4) the arrow has been shot. We don't
really know from the info given whether or not the arrow hits the target.

In the most restrictive interpretation {ai} is used to express that the speaker
is holding the arrow in their hands, bow stretched and aiming at the target.
{ainai} the same but *aiming to miss* the target.

In my interpretation {nai} does not indicate an aim to miss, but rather that
the target is ignored. The aim is somewhere else, but if the target is in the
way it may get hit after all. Also, in my interpretation {ai} is only used
to indicate the target, it does not indicate that the arrow hasn't been shot
yet, that's left to the tense.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388

Good summary of your side of things, not so good
on the other side(s).



> Here's my attempt at a summary of {ai}. Let's
> consider first these
> four examples:
>
> (1) ai mi ba catra le do patfu
> ''Aye, I will kill your father!" (at least
> that's the idea)
>
> (2) ai nai mi ba catra le do patfu
> "It's not part of my plans to kill your
> father" (if I do happen to kill
> him it won't be because I set out to do
> it)

This is a problem still, since the negative pzrt
is still vague. The parentheses suggests that I
am not committed to preventing his killing
either, so this looks like the decision to have
nothing to do with the killing either way:
recusal. It is still a commitment but one to not
take sides on the issue.

> (3) ai mi pu catra le do patfu
> ''The idea was indeed to kill your father"
> (no assertion is made here
> one way or another as to whether or not
> the father was actually killed)

The note makes it worse, since it now becomes (I
haven't seen any reason to think not) an
assertion about what my intentions were, not an
expression of anything: the very malglico we have
been warned against so often over the last 50
years. The point of the disclaimer below seems
to be that we should not take this as asserting
anything when it does not assert somehting about
killing Dad. The assumption is then that it
expresses some attitude (etc.), but no such
attitude has been offered and none is an obvious
candidate. It is not, of course, intention,
since that requires that the event intended not
yet (be known to) have occurred and this is
explicitly about an event in the past. Now,
there is some wiggle room here: an event may be
past but not yet known, so we can imagine
(putting this into the context description — if
it is what is meant — would help) the speaker
has set a pretty fool-proof trap for Dad which
was to have been sprung five minutes ago, but he
has not yet heard whether it worked as planned.
So, his intention can still be in force and even
have a past object. But that is a very odd case
and needs (as noted) quite a bit of context. The
translation is terrible, since it suggests that
the intention was in the past but not now "I
intend that he was killed" reads oddly but is
more accurate.

> (4) ai nai mi pu catra le do patfu
> "Oops, I didn't mean to kill your father"
> (maybe I killed him, maybe
> I nearly killed him, but in any case it
> wasn't on purpose)

Assuming that {ainai} is a recusal expression
(whether that makes sense or not is another
issue), that I have nothing to do one way or the
other with intentionally killing Dad, tis again
makes sense in the case that the news has not
come through yet. It has nothing to do, note,
with accidentally (almost) killing him; indeed,
it doesn't really suggest that he has been in any
danger (though disclaiming involvement usually
means you think there was something to be
involved in). Again some context is needed to
make this plausible . And I don't really think
that this is what xorxes has in mind.

> (Disclaimer: The English sentences are not
> meant as literal transcriptions
> of the Lojban, obviously. They are only meant
> to get at their sense.)
>
> Now, I think there is no major disagreement
> about (1).
>
> There is some disagreement about (2): some
> people want {ai nai} to
> indicate more than just an absence of intent.
> Based on the "rejection/
> refusal" keywords they want {ai nai} to
> indicate intent to avoid, similar
> or the same as {ai mi na ba catra le do patfu}.
> I think this doesn't
> fit with the way {nai} works in general. In
> many cases the distinction is
> minor, in other cases it may be significant.

These hinted at rules are certainly not obvious.
The old list seems in fact to assume something
like the here derogated approach in many cases
and the supposed other readings are often
apparently ad hoc and create problems with the
scalar notions (if the negation is whatever it
happens to be in a given case, what is the
neutral mid-point, which typically must be some
sort of negation as well. Sorting out negation
is hard enough, expressing them unambiguously is
worse, and formulating a rule that identifies the
various types of negations to be represented
across the board for UI — or even "irrealis"
cases — seems outside our range altogether.
that said, it does seem that {ainai} might
usefully be something other than {ai na} (or, at
least, that some of the UI might be usefully
treated in this way and so we might try it for
{ainai}). The problem here has been to find
something of the appropriate sort — like
"intend" — to be expressed by the form. So far
xorxes has not come up with a good case of
something that can be expressed even, let alone
fitting the pattern. There does not, in fact,
seem to be a good English word here (maybe
"recuse" but that is mainly technical for what to
be a normal event). This does not mean that we
can't have a Lojban word for it (indeed, that
might be a demonstrable advantage of Lojban), but
we need to describe it very carefully before we
can be said to have solved this problem. I think
that what comes closest to xorxes various stories
about this attitude is the following: {ai}
affirms (makes or announces or renews) a
commitment to bringing about the connected event,
which may be positive or negative (that is {ai p}
and {ai na p} are on the same end of the
spectrum, committing to taking an active role in
determining the reality pole of p). {ainai} then
affirms a commitment to not take a role in
determining p's pole. The mid ground is not
committing to any position here --- because one
cannot make up one's mind to go pro, con, or out
of it or because one has not even considered the
amtter. This does fit xorxes' emerging pattern
fairly well, I think and gives a nice attitude
(in this case a performative speech act) to be
expressed.

> There is more disagreement about (3) and (4).
> It is argued that there is
> an insurmountable logical barrier between
> (1)/(2) and (3)/(4), that {ai} can
> only work in conjunction with a future event
> and that the Lojban in (3) and
> (4) is therefore meaningless and the English
> does not correspond to it.

Technically, not a future event but ones whose
reality pole is not known to the speaker. So one
where the determination is known (actually,
believed is enough) to have taken place but whose
determination is not known, can be intended in a
past tense sentence — as in the discussion
above.

> Let me do a bit of imagery: the speaker is an
> archer holding a bow in their
> hands. An arrow represents the speaker's
> actions. In all four examples,
> the bridi {mi catra le do patfu} is a
> description of a target. In (1) and (2),
> the arrow is still in the bow, in (3) and (4)
> the arrow has been shot. We don't
> really know from the info given whether or not
> the arrow hits the target.

This allegory does not shed as much light as one
might hope. The target is the (un)intended
event, as laid out in the connected sentence. It
is not clear what the arrow in the speaker's bow
is doing: it is said to be the speaker's action,
but nothing sbout {ai} — and certainly nothing
about {ainai} — requires any action at all (I
suppose if you did nothing toward p long enough,
someone might question your intending it, but
they could not prove their point conclusively).
Indeed, what the bow is is hard to make out. But
I suppose that intending to do something is like
aiming an arrow at a target somehow. So {ai} is
like aiming at the target, the old version (as
far as anyone can tell) is like aiming away from
the target (it would be useful generally to have
an alternate target to aim at, although the
"anything but that" approach is also to be dealt
with somewhere, I suppose). So the arrow once
released is the course of events that follows,
which either comes to hitting the target or not,
regardless of which way one was aiming. But
certainly, once the target is hit or missed (and
indeed long before that, even for archers who use
body English) the aiming has ceased, that is,
intending certainly ends when the event is
determined (the fact aiming ends sooner is just a
minor flaw in the allegory setup). So, the
separation between 1&2 and 3&4 remains.

> In the most restrictive interpretation {ai} is
> used to express that the speaker
> is holding the arrow in their hands, bow
> stretched and aiming at the target.
> {ainai} the same but *aiming to miss* the
> target.
>
> In my interpretation {nai} does not indicate an
> aim to miss, but rather that
> the target is ignored.

I am inclined to take this as recusal, refusal to
aim at the target or away from it but just
f9iring off arrows at random. Or, better,
refusing to take up the bow at all. but the
allegory continues in a different way.

>The aim is somewhere
> else, but if the target is in the
> way it may get hit after all.

How is this different from aiming to miss the
target, with the possibility that you might hit
it anyhow, i.e., how is this different from old
{ainai}?

>Also, in my
> interpretation {ai} is only used
> to indicate the target, it does not indicate
> that the arrow hasn't been shot
> yet, that's left to the tense.

Surely {ai} at least indicates that the target is
being aimed at or not, not just that it is the
target. But, it ceases to be the target *for
this round* as soon as it is hit or missed. We
may reuse it, but that is a different intention,
that is we have to aim anew, even if the target
is the same physical object. Pushing the allegory
too hard gets to some problems, since I can
intend p even after not-p comes about and I can
maintain that it is the same intention as before,
merely renewed in the face of failure. Whether
that position can be sustained in the end needs
to be worked out — and the target story does not
help much, since aiming is so different from
intending.
I must admit that the allegory and its key do not
make clear that aiming is to represent intending,
but I don't see anything else that will serve.
Maybe firing the arrow (but he says {ai} does not
say whether the arrow is fired and it certainly
say the intention occurs)? Barring some other
association, it seems to me that this allegory
makes the case against 3&4 fairly clearly and
does nothing to resolve the issue of what {ainai}
should mean.




On Saturday 24 September 2005 12:56, Jorge Llambías wrote:
> In my interpretation {nai} does not indicate an aim to miss, but rather
> that the target is ignored. The aim is somewhere else, but if the target is
> in the way it may get hit after all. Also, in my interpretation {ai} is
> only used to indicate the target, it does not indicate that the arrow
> hasn't been shot yet, that's left to the tense.

I think that ignoring the target should be {aicu'i} and aiming to miss should
be {ainai}.

phma


On 9/25/05, Pierre Abbat <phma@phma.hn.org> wrote:

>
> I think that ignoring the target should be {aicu'i} and aiming to miss should
> be {ainai}.

For some reason that seems like a popular choice: {ai nai broda} = {ai
na broda},
and it is also the one suggested by the "rejection/refusal" keywords.
(If you use
{ai cu'i} for ignoring the target you don't have anything for
indecision/wavering
though.)

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On Saturday 24 September 2005 12:56, Jorge
> Llambías wrote:
> > In my interpretation {nai} does not indicate
> an aim to miss, but rather
> > that the target is ignored. The aim is
> somewhere else, but if the target is
> > in the way it may get hit after all. Also, in
> my interpretation {ai} is
> > only used to indicate the target, it does not
> indicate that the arrow
> > hasn't been shot yet, that's left to the
> tense.
>
> I think that ignoring the target should be
> {aicu'i} and aiming to miss should
> be {ainai}.

This is, of course, the old meaning (as far as we
can figure), but xorxes has been working on a
different pattern for the other words in this
set, one where the negation of {nai} attaches not
to the propositional part but to some aspect of
the definition of the attitude (e.g., negating
"hope" negates the desirability of the event but
leaves other factors — likelihood, control --
untouched). The neutral place then usually comes
to be either indecision or indifference or
noninvolvement. In this latter sense, {aicu'i}
might work but that would leave {ainai} being {ai
na} and xorxes is pretty well committed to not
allowing that (and with good reasons in at lest
some cases).

The allegory gets less useful the more you think
about it. My attempts to make sense of it were
not very successful and led me to say some dumb
things: mainly that I cease to have something as
intended once I fail to get it (stop aiming once
I have missed), which is nonsense. So, I am
trying a new story:
A kid is out in the woods with his bow and arrow
and he see something that would make a target --
better, a couple of things close together. He
has a range of responses: he may pick one as a
target to shoot at, or the other, or (being
realistic) pick to miss one or the other, or just
not be able to decide which to pick even after
deciding to shoot at something, or ignore both of
them and go on his way without shooting, or
decide to shoot without a target. These
correspond in an obvious way to intending p,
intending q (incompatible with p), intending
not-p, being unable to decide between p and q
(not-p) but feeling the need to do something in
the area, not realizing there is an opportunity
to do something, and realizing the opportunity
but decidsing not to do anything about it. How
to line these up on the scale is up for grabs. I
think that the not realizing there is an
opportunity is not there at all, since, if you
don't see the opportunity, you can't do anything
about committing to exploit it. But whether the
others belong in or not and where to put them are
almost open questions. Issues like whether we
would ever use some of them (but that doesn't
seem to be much of an issue) and whether they can
properly be called attitudes to be expressed alos
play a role.


posts: 2388

> On 9/25/05, Pierre Abbat <phma@phma.hn.org>

> wrote:
> >
> > I think that ignoring the target should be
> {aicu'i} and aiming to miss should
> > be {ainai}.
>
> For some reason that seems like a popular
> choice: {ai nai broda} = {ai
> na broda},
> and it is also the one suggested by the
> "rejection/refusal" keywords.
> (If you use
> {ai cu'i} for ignoring the target you don't
> have anything for
> indecision/wavering
> though.)

Yup, assuming "ignoring" means "recognizing it as
a potential target but refusing to shoot at it"
or some such thing, not "not recognizing it as a
target."

Now, about the tense issue ...



On 9/24/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> Technically, not a future event but ones whose
> reality pole is not known to the speaker. So one
> where the determination is known (actually,
> believed is enough) to have taken place but whose
> determination is not known, can be intended in a
> past tense sentence — as in the discussion
> above.

I'm not convinced that that is a correct analysis of
"I intend that". I think what you intend not only has to
be in the future, but in the linguistic equivalent of the
relativistic absolute future cone of causality, i.e. you
have to be able (or rather believe that you are able) to
affect it through your actions. If you intend that X, you
can always stop intending X simply by changing your
mind and your plans. If I have set a trap intending for
someone to fall into, I can the next day hope that they
fell into the trap or change my mind and hope that they
didn't fall, but I cannot the next day be intending that
they already fell into the trap (and much less intend that
they didn't fall), even if I don't know whether they did or
not, because there is nothing I can do about it. "Hope"
works with what I know or don't know, but "intend" works
with what I believe I can affect or not. I can't intend
something, even in the future, that I don't believe that
I have a chance of affecting.

Having said that, I'm not proposing that {ai} is an exact
match for "I intend that". {ai} can also be used to indicate
past intent (or its absence, as in "oops"). What {ai} does
is indicate that my actions are, will be, or have been oriented
towards a specified situation, and {ai nai} that they are not,
will not or have not be so oriented. If the target situation in
question is in the past, then obviously I can only be
acknowledging past actions (as in "oops"), if the target is
in the future, then my current and future actions are relevant.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On 9/24/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > Technically, not a future event but ones
> whose
> > reality pole is not known to the speaker. So
> one
> > where the determination is known (actually,
> > believed is enough) to have taken place but
> whose
> > determination is not known, can be intended
> in a
> > past tense sentence — as in the discussion
> > above.
>
> I'm not convinced that that is a correct
> analysis of
> "I intend that". I think what you intend not
> only has to
> be in the future, but in the linguistic
> equivalent of the
> relativistic absolute future cone of causality,
> i.e. you
> have to be able (or rather believe that you are
> able) to
> affect it through your actions. If you intend
> that X, you
> can always stop intending X simply by changing
> your
> mind and your plans. If I have set a trap
> intending for
> someone to fall into, I can the next day hope
> that they
> fell into the trap or change my mind and hope
> that they
> didn't fall, but I cannot the next day be
> intending that
> they already fell into the trap (and much less
> intend that
> they didn't fall), even if I don't know whether
> they did or
> not, because there is nothing I can do about
> it. "Hope"
> works with what I know or don't know, but
> "intend" works
> with what I believe I can affect or not. I
> can't intend
> something, even in the future, that I don't
> believe that
> I have a chance of affecting.

I agree. I tried to find a way to make at least
some sense of your position and this seemed the
best of a thing lot. Since it doesn't work, I am
surprised by the following.


> Having said that, I'm not proposing that {ai}
> is an exact
> match for "I intend that".

Pity! It has served that purpose for 50 years
and I have yet to see a reason to replace it --
nor what attitude it is to be replaced with. If
we do replace it, then we needs must find a new
word for "I intend that," since this is clearly
something that language needs. I doubt that
thais will be true of whatever is proposed to
replace it as meaning for {ai}.



> {ai} can also be
> used to indicate
> past intent (or its absence, as in "oops").

That is, something in this area but an attitude
is being proposed to replace "intend" as the
meaning for {ai} ({ai} as it stands cannot be
used in this way, so the sentence is misleading).
The nearest thing so far suggested this
replacement is "take responsibility for," but
that does not cover the old {ai} (I can intend
things that I will not take responsibility for
and, alas, conversely). Notice that "opops" is
not about responsibility — nor about intentions
either, though most things that call for an
"oops" are unintended. So, {ainai} is not a good
candidate for "oops," whatever it ends up
meaning.

> What {ai} does
> is indicate that my actions are, will be, or
> have been oriented
> towards a specified situation, and {ai nai}
> that they are not,
> will not or have not be so oriented.

But how is this an attitude — or any other
expressive rather than informative act? What is
expressed is present tense by definition and this
seems to be about intentions at some other time,
not about my current attitude. Or, at least, I
have seen no reason to think it is and can't
think of any myself.


> If the
> target situation in
> question is in the past, then obviously I can
> only be
> acknowledging past actions (as in "oops"), if
> the target is
> in the future, then my current and future
> actions are relevant.

Now, acknowledging might be a kind of attitude,
but I do not see that in this case it is
significantly different from taking
responsibility. The primary use of {ai} is to
make a commitment and then to acknowledge that it
has been made (and so renew it). But the
commitment ends with the occurrence of the target
event. What then is the force of acknowledging
that I once had that commitment — it cannot
renew it after the fact and that even attenuated
committing is what allows (ai) outside its
original performative function. I wait for a
serious proposal along these lines before I go on
-- but I don't see much likelihood of one coming
along.

Now, as to "oops" and {ainai}. No, the latter
will not do for the former. "Oops" acknowledges
a boo-boo has occurred, but says nothing about
responsibility — certainly neither takes it on
nor denies it (I can oops in third person and
second as well as first, and in the first I still
have to say "sorry."). {ainai} on the other hand
does not claim that the event occurred (irrealis,
remember) but denies responsibility for it if it
did occur — in the xorxes version, that is. And
extreme non-responsibility; I can't even claim
that I was intending that the event not happen
(incidentally, the event involved does not have
to be undesirable, as it is for "oops"), rather
my position is "Not my pidgin." The Lojban for
"oops," like that for "tsk tsk" remains to be
identified (or created).



On 9/26/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Having said that, I'm not proposing that {ai}
> > is an exact
> > match for "I intend that".
>
> Pity! It has served that purpose for 50 years
> and I have yet to see a reason to replace it --
> nor what attitude it is to be replaced with.

It is not being replaced, just expanded.

> The nearest thing so far suggested this
> replacement is "take responsibility for," but
> that does not cover the old {ai} (I can intend
> things that I will not take responsibility for
> and, alas, conversely).

You can intend things that you will not take responsibility
for, yes, as long as you keep the intent to yourself, but
by expressing it to others, i.e. by using {ai}, you can't help
but assume responsibility.

> What then is the force of acknowledging
> that I once had that commitment — it cannot
> renew it after the fact and that even attenuated
> committing is what allows (ai) outside its
> original performative function.

The force of acknowledging past intent is the
assumption of resposibility.

> I wait for a
> serious proposal along these lines before I go on
> — but I don't see much likelihood of one coming
> along.

I wait for a serious rebuttal — but I don't see
much likelihood of one coming along.

> (I can oops in third person and
> second as well as first,

Yes, I can, empathetically. That would be made explicit
in Lojban with {a'i nai dai}.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


On 9/26/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> The Lojban for
> "oops," like that for "tsk tsk" remains to be
> identified (or created).

Isn't "tsk tsk" something like {.i'e nai}?

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On 9/26/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > Having said that, I'm not proposing that
> {ai}
> > > is an exact
> > > match for "I intend that".
> >
> > Pity! It has served that purpose for 50
> years
> > and I have yet to see a reason to replace it
> --
> > nor what attitude it is to be replaced with.
>
> It is not being replaced, just expanded.

But from what I can make of the expansion being
hinted at, the expansion destroys it for the
usual purposes. If I am merely claiming to have
an intention rather than committing to it or
renewing it, then I need some way of doing these
original things and there is not yet, I think, a
converter (and, of course, claiming is just what
this bit of UI is not supposed to do).

> > The nearest thing so far suggested this
> > replacement is "take responsibility for," but
> > that does not cover the old {ai} (I can
> intend
> > things that I will not take responsibility
> for
> > and, alas, conversely).
>
> You can intend things that you will not take
> responsibility
> for, yes, as long as you keep the intent to
> yourself, but
> by expressing it to others, i.e. by using {ai},
> you can't help
> but assume responsibility.

Of course I can. I intend that George Bush die
in office, say, but, if he does, it is unlikely
that I will — or justifiably could — take
responsibility for it. I would have to do
something at least along useful lines before I
could take responsibility (with any plausibility
-- (I suppose I could claim responsibility for
all sorts of things, thus making a case for my
paranaoia). And, of course, I can, with good
reason take responsibility for thing I did not
intend — and did not even do (my daughter's
court record, for example).

> > What then is the force of acknowledging
> > that I once had that commitment — it cannot
> > renew it after the fact and that even
> attenuated
> > committing is what allows (ai) outside its
> > original performative function.
>
> The force of acknowledging past intent is the
> assumption of resposibility.

As noted, they seem to be, if not totally
different, different enough to make using the
same word for both ill-advised. Acknowledging a
past intention is merely admitting to having had
it, that is it is making a claim and has no other
performative status. Assuming responsibility is
another act in the general area of promising: it
makes one liable to an array of rights and
duties, which would not be one's own unless that
responsibility were either assumed or assigned.
Intending (committing or renewing) only opens one
up to expectations, not rights and duties, and,
as noted elsewhere, these expectations are pretty
weak (I can intend and never fulfill any of
them). And, of course, even those expectations
die with the occurrence of the event: I may keep
on doing the same things but they can no longer
be with the ntention of bringing about what in
fact now is.

> > serious proposal along these lines before I
> go on
> > — but I don't see much likelihood of one
> coming
> > along.

>From this I gather that you think you have made a
proposal. Would you please spell it out. What
attitude does {ai} express which attitude is
present even with repsect to events in the past?
How is the normal current usage of {ai}
accomodated within this attitude?

> I wait for a serious rebuttal — but I don't
> see
> much likelihood of one coming along.

I have pointed out in some detail why none of
your suggestions so far work. Give me something
solid and stable and I will try to do better
(though I suspect I will just be repeating
myself, there not having been much room for
improvement in what I have seen so far).

> > (I can oops in third person and
> > second as well as first,
>
> Yes, I can, empathetically. That would be made
> explicit
> in Lojban with {a'i nai dai}.

? What the Hell is {dai} doing here? Since
"oops" doesn't say anything about anyone's
feelings, there would be no need to bring in
empathy in dealing with another person's boo-boo.
Of course, since {ainai} has nothing to do with
"oops" (they are positive and negative to one
another in most repsects), the question is
probably misplaced. I suppose it would be more
to the point to ask What does {ainaidai} mean? I
empathize with so-and-so's recusal in this
matter? I have my doubts about that being an
attitude, though I suppose any empathizing would
be to some extent. In that case though the mode
of empathy would be the whole description of the
other's state, not some complex attitude of mine.





posts: 2388

Close enough for government work. So "oops"
alone remains — though I think a little thought
would come up with other unsettled cases. Still
things are moving along toward full
expressibility (for English speakers anyhow).



> On 9/26/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > The Lojban for
> > "oops," like that for "tsk tsk" remains to be
> > identified (or created).
>
> Isn't "tsk tsk" something like {.i'e nai}?
>
> mu'o mi'e xorxes
>
>
>
>



On 9/26/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> If I am merely claiming to have
> an intention rather than committing to it

But that's a strawman. With {ai ba broda} you are
commiting to bringing about broda, in all the
interpretations of {ai} under discussion.

> I intend that George Bush die
> in office, say,

How can you possibly intend that? Wish, hope or
expect I can understand, but intend? How could you
possibly commit to bring that about?

> but, if he does, it is unlikely
> that I will — or justifiably could — take
> responsibility for it.

Then I don't see how you could commit to bring it
about.

> And, of course, I can, with good
> reason take responsibility for thing I did not
> intend — and did not even do (my daughter's
> court record, for example).

Yes. {ai} can only serve to take responsibility for
one's own actions, not for anyone else's.

> Assuming responsibility is
> another act in the general area of promising: it
> makes one liable to an array of rights and
> duties, which would not be one's own unless that
> responsibility were either assumed or assigned.
> Intending (committing or renewing) only opens one
> up to expectations, not rights and duties,

{ai} is not about rights and duties either, it is much more
informal. It is certainly not for formal admission of
responsibility. It is just owning up to the actions that lead
to the target event in question. Commiting to performing
them or admitting to having performed them.

> and,
> as noted elsewhere, these expectations are pretty
> weak (I can intend and never fulfill any of
> them).

Of course. If you have a better watered down expression
for informal assumption of responsibility please suggest it.
Even "commit" is much too strong for {ai}. I don't suppose
the person saying {ai mi ckakla} would say anything like
"I hereby commit to going to bed" in English. The next
second they can change their mind and nobody would
probably reproach them.

> And, of course, even those expectations
> die with the occurrence of the event: I may keep
> on doing the same things but they can no longer
> be with the ntention of bringing about what in
> fact now is.

Sorry, I don't follow that sentence.


> > > (I can oops in third person and
> > > second as well as first,
> >
> > Yes, I can, empathetically. That would be made
> > explicit
> > in Lojban with {a'i nai dai}.
>
> ? What the Hell is {dai} doing here? Since
> "oops" doesn't say anything about anyone's
> feelings, there would be no need to bring in
> empathy in dealing with another person's boo-boo.

Perhaps I misunderstood your second and third person
"oops". How does it work if not by your putting yourself
in the place of the other person? {dai} says something like:
"this is what I would say if I were in your place now".

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388




> On 9/26/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > If I am merely claiming to have
> > an intention rather than committing to it
>
> But that's a strawman. With {ai ba broda} you
> are
> commiting to bringing about broda, in all the
> interpretations of {ai} under discussion.

Sorry, I took it that you explanation of {ai}
applied in the same way to past, present, and
future. If it does not, why use the same term?

> > I intend that George Bush die
> > in office, say,
>
> How can you possibly intend that? Wish, hope or
> expect I can understand, but intend? How could
> you
> possibly commit to bring that about?

Well, why not? People do thing like this all the
time — as witness the number of presidents and
the like that do die in office at someone's
hands.
And for every success there are probably several
failed or uncompleted plots, including some at
very early stages of development, perhaps no more
than taking the vow that the President shall not
live out his term.

> > but, if he does, it is unlikely
> > that I will — or justifiably could — take
> > responsibility for it.
>
> Then I don't see how you could commit to bring
> it about.

You are building something in here that I don't
quite understand. I commit to it and it happens
but it happens through someone else's agency.
Where is my responsibility? And in what way was
my commitment bogus?

> > And, of course, I can, with good
> > reason take responsibility for thing I did
> not
> > intend — and did not even do (my daughter's
> > court record, for example).
>
> Yes. {ai} can only serve to take responsibility
> for
> one's own actions, not for anyone else's.

Not true historically (aside from its not being
about responsibility). I can commit to someone
else doing something. To be sure, there is
implicit in this a commitment to some action on
my part (though not to any particular ones). But
overtly the commitment is someone else's action
and it is that action occurring that releases me
from my commitment.

> > Assuming responsibility is
> > another act in the general area of promising:
> it
> > makes one liable to an array of rights and
> > duties, which would not be one's own unless
> that
> > responsibility were either assumed or
> assigned.
> > Intending (committing or renewing) only opens
> one
> > up to expectations, not rights and duties,
>
> {ai} is not about rights and duties either, it
> is much more
> informal. It is certainly not for formal
> admission of
> responsibility. It is just owning up to the
> actions that lead
> to the target event in question. Commiting to
> performing
> them or admitting to having performed them.

Then it is not about responsibility, since that
is a value notion, precisely a matter of duties
and the like. I agree that {ai} doesn't do this,
which is why I keep objecting to your saying {ia}
is about responsibility. Note that "owning up"
is already value-laden and so inappropriate here
"Admitting" has similar problems. But even did it
not, there seems to be no reason to think that
there is anything similar about admitting and
committing: one is a report, the other is an act
of will, for starters. So how come they to be
covered by the same term?

> > and,
> > as noted elsewhere, these expectations are
> pretty
> > weak (I can intend and never fulfill any of
> > them).
>
> Of course. If you have a better watered down
> expression
> for informal assumption of responsibility
> please suggest it.

Well, since I am not dealing with responsibility,
I won't waste time on that issue. I admit that
"commit" sounds awfully powerful for what goes on
{ai mi betgo} or "I'm going to bed" but then, in
Lojban these things come in degrees and so we can
have very weak sense of commitment and very
strong ones. What I am looking for is something
that is plausibly an attitude that fits in here
and "commit" is the enarest I have found ("plan"
does not have performative force, I think).

> Even "commit" is much too strong for {ai}. I
> don't suppose
> the person saying {ai mi ckakla} would say
> anything like
> "I hereby commit to going to bed" in English.
> The next
> second they can change their mind and nobody
> would
> probably reproach them.

That is one of the points about intentions; they
may be very unstable. That is one of the things
that gives rise to the possibility of repeating a
commitment ceremony (to get fancy about it) over
and over, even if it really is just an
announcement.

> > And, of course, even those expectations
> > die with the occurrence of the event: I may
> keep
> > on doing the same things but they can no
> longer
> > be with the intention of bringing about what
> in
> > fact now is.
>
> Sorry, I don't follow that sentence.

So I intend to kill the President and (as
expected) gather a cache of guns. Then the
President dies somehow. I may keep on gathering
guns, but it is no longer to be explained as part
of a commitment to bring down that President.

>
> > > > (I can oops in third person and
> > > > second as well as first,
> > >
> > > Yes, I can, empathetically. That would be
> made
> > > explicit
> > > in Lojban with {a'i nai dai}.
> >
> > ? What the Hell is {dai} doing here? Since
> > "oops" doesn't say anything about anyone's
> > feelings, there would be no need to bring in
> > empathy in dealing with another person's
> boo-boo.
>
> Perhaps I misunderstood your second and third
> person
> "oops". How does it work if not by your putting
> yourself
> in the place of the other person? {dai} says
> something like:
> "this is what I would say if I were in your
> place now".

But none of that is operative in "oops" — which
is neither a taking of responsibility nor an
apology. It just calls attention to the boo-boo.
And I can obviously call attention to another
person's boo-boo as well as to my own.


On 9/26/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> Sorry, I took it that you explanation of {ai}
> applied in the same way to past, present, and
> future. If it does not, why use the same term?

The reason to use the same term is that the expressions
involved are useful and close enough that they don't warrant
different terms, not to mention that nothing better is at hand.

How about this:

{ai broda}: The speaker acknowledges the situation described
by broda as a possible consequence and also as the orientation
of their actions.

{ai nai broda}: The speaker acknowledges the situation described
by broda as a possible consequence but not as the orientation of
their actions.

That would apply to past, present and future targets.


> It just calls attention to the boo-boo.
> And I can obviously call attention to another
> person's boo-boo as well as to my own.

We may have different understandings of "oops".
For me it is essentially first person and only second or
third person when the speaker puts themself in the
place of the other. In my view an apathetic speaker would
not oops to call attention to someone else's boo-boo.
But in any case that's an English expression, not a
Lojban one, so its idiosincracies need not concern
the meaning of the Lojban words.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On 9/26/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > Sorry, I took it that you explanation of {ai}
> > applied in the same way to past, present, and
> > future. If it does not, why use the same
> term?
>
> The reason to use the same term is that the
> expressions
> involved are useful and close enough that they
> don't warrant
> different terms, not to mention that nothing
> better is at hand.

Well, I don't see the similarity nor the need for
a UI for the proposed meanings (which are still
very doubtfully attitudes at all).

> How about this:
>
> {ai broda}: The speaker acknowledges the
> situation described
> by broda as a possible consequence and also as
> the orientation
> of their actions.

Consequence of what?

> {ai nai broda}: The speaker acknowledges the
> situation described
> by broda as a possible consequence but not as
> the orientation of
> their actions.
>
> That would apply to past, present and future
> targets.
"Target" is presumably a match for "orientation
of action," but where does "consequence" come in?
As I have said, "acknowledgement" at least looks
like it might be a performative speech act, but
hardly seems of enough use to deserve somehting
short from the available space. Perhaps
something put together from all those
constructive devices later in the chapter would
do. In the meantime, we still need something for
intentions — which are not acknowledgements even
if those are speech acts.

>
> > It just calls attention to the boo-boo.
> > And I can obviously call attention to
> another
> > person's boo-boo as well as to my own.
>
> We may have different understandings of "oops".
> For me it is essentially first person and only
> second or
> third person when the speaker puts themself in
> the
> place of the other. In my view an apathetic
> speaker would
> not oops to call attention to someone else's
> boo-boo.
> But in any case that's an English expression,
> not a
> Lojban one, so its idiosincracies need not
> concern
> the meaning of the Lojban words.

Quite true about the meaning of Lojban words
(although, of course, we were looking for how to
say "oops" in Lojban). Notice, though, that
{ainai}, even as you propose it, does not do the
job, since it is about orientation or lack of it,
not about calling attention to an event (the
definition I was using for "oops" was the one you
provided, by the way).


On 9/27/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > {ai broda}: The speaker acknowledges the
> > situation described
> > by broda as a possible consequence and also as
> > the orientation
> > of their actions.
>
> Consequence of what?

Of the speaker's actions.

> > {ai nai broda}: The speaker acknowledges the
> > situation described
> > by broda as a possible consequence but not as
> > the orientation of
> > their actions.
> >
> > That would apply to past, present and future
> > targets.
> "Target" is presumably a match for "orientation
> of action," but where does "consequence" come in?

"consequence of their actions". Should I have used
a couple of commas there?

The speaker acknowledges the situation described
by broda as a possible consequence, but not as
the orientation, of their actions.


> In the meantime, we still need something for
> intentions — which are not acknowledgements even
> if those are speech acts.

I intend X = I acknowledge X as a possible outcome
of my actions, and I acknowledge orienting my actions
towards X.

Where does that fail?


> Notice, though, that
> {ainai}, even as you propose it, does not do the
> job, since it is about orientation or lack of it,
> not about calling attention to an event (the
> definition I was using for "oops" was the one you
> provided, by the way).

The definition I provided was:

oops
interj.
Used to express acknowledgement of a minor accident,
blunder, or mistake.

I took it for granted that it was an accident on the
speaker's part. In other words "used to express
acknowledgment of an unintentional act on the
speaker's part". Whether or not that applies to English
"oops" always, in most cases, or sometimes, that's
what I'm proposing for {.ai nai}. I'm not saying {.ai nai}
is identical to "oops", just that they have considerable
overlap.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 2388


> On 9/27/05, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > {ai broda}: The speaker acknowledges the
> > > situation described
> > > by broda as a possible consequence and also
> as
> > > the orientation
> > > of their actions.
> >
> > Consequence of what?
>
> Of the speaker's actions.
>
> > > {ai nai broda}: The speaker acknowledges
> the
> > > situation described
> > > by broda as a possible consequence but not
> as
> > > the orientation of
> > > their actions.
> > >
> > > That would apply to past, present and
> future
> > > targets.
> > "Target" is presumably a match for
> "orientation
> > of action," but where does "consequence" come
> in?
>
> "consequence of their actions". Should I have
> used
> a couple of commas there?
>
> The speaker acknowledges the situation
> described
> by broda as a possible consequence, but not as
> the orientation, of their actions.

If I say I intend something, it is not just a
possible consequence of my action, nor am I
acknowledging anything. I am committing, which
is a performative speech act, that is the saying
of it alone creates a new world and creating that
world is its purpose (or one of them).
Acknowledging is not a performative
>
> > In the meantime, we still need something for
> > intentions — which are not acknowledgements
> even
> > if those are speech acts.
>
> I intend X = I acknowledge X as a possible
> outcome
> of my actions, and I acknowledge orienting my
> actions
> towards X.
>
> Where does that fail?

Lack of commitment to start with plus misplaed
emphasis (maybe just reversing the claues would
help with this aspect).
>
> > Notice, though, that
> > {ainai}, even as you propose it, does not do
> the
> > job, since it is about orientation or lack of
> it,
> > not about calling attention to an event (the
> > definition I was using for "oops" was the one
> you
> > provided, by the way).
>
> The definition I provided was:
>
> oops
> interj.
> Used to express acknowledgement of a minor
> accident,
> blunder, or mistake.

ac·knowl·edge
tr.v. ac·knowl·edged, ac·knowl·edg·ing,
ac·knowl·edg·es

1.
1. To admit the existence, reality, or
truth of.
2. To recognize as being valid or having
force or power.
2.
1. To express recognition of:
acknowledge a friend's smile.
2. To express thanks or gratitude for.
3. To report the receipt of: acknowledge a
letter.
4. Law. To accept or certify as legally
binding: acknowledge a deed.

Nothing here about commitment or something
similar.

> I took it for granted that it was an accident
> on the
> speaker's part. In other words "used to express
> acknowledgment of an unintentional act on the
> speaker's part".

Nothing in the definition of about
"unintentional" nor about the speaker.

> Whether or not that applies to
> English
> "oops" always, in most cases, or sometimes,
> that's
> what I'm proposing for {.ai nai}. I'm not
> saying {.ai nai}
> is identical to "oops", just that they have
> considerable
> overlap.

At most, {ainai} says of the indicated event that
it is none of my business, I had no part in it
either way. This does not seem to fit your
intended reading very well, since that says (as
{ainai} does not) that the event occurred, that
it was unintentional (a much weaker attitude, or
whatever, than recusal — it allows that I tried
to prevent it, for example), that it is
undesirable (or at least that seems to be part of
what you mean) and, of course, the restriction in
this case to the speaker's actions goes against
the original {ai}.

The best thing so far for "oops" seems to be the
observative {se srera}, which does lack the snap
of the English.



On 9/27/05, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> If I say I intend something, it is not just a
> possible consequence of my action, nor am I
> acknowledging anything. I am committing, which
> is a performative speech act, that is the saying
> of it alone creates a new world and creating that
> world is its purpose (or one of them).

I thought we agreed that commitment was too strong
for {ai}. If you commit to something, others have a right
to expect it of you. If you only express intent, you are
free to change your mind without breaking your word.
{ai} is simply for indicating to others what was or will be
the orientation of your actions.

> Acknowledging is not a performative

Iffy, but that's just a classification anyway. If you admit
the existence or reality of something you have changed
the world.


> At most, {ainai} says of the indicated event that
> it is none of my business, I had no part in it
> either way.

With my proposal, it doesn't. It rejects that the
actions were or will be oriented towards the indicated
event, but at the same time it acknowledges that the
indicated event was or might be a direct consequence
of my actions.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 14214

So it turns out that .ai / .ai nai mean something rather different than we all though.

According to Bob and Nora, the word comes from the expression "Aye-Aye(, Cap'n)", and is about the intent to be involved in bringing something about, that is, the intent to help directly in something occuring. "Yeah, I'll do it."

We've been talking as though it was about committing, in the abstract, to something occuring, but it's not, it's about committing to engaging in a task. Therefore, ".ai nai" as "accidental" makes no sense. ".ai nai" is "I refuse to get involved".

ma klama le zarci do'e lo sovda
.ai nai

Who's going to the store to get eggs?
Not me.

-Robin

> According to Bob and Nora, the word comes from the expression
> "Aye-Aye(, Cap'n)", and is about the intent to be involved in bringing
> something about, that is, the intent to help directly in something
> occuring. "Yeah, I'll do it."

That's {vi'o}. Even if the original intent was for it to mean something
like {vi'o}, that's not what CLL says. The CLL example is:

.ai mi benji do le ckana
intent I transfer you to-the bed.
I'm putting you to bed.

So that's intent, not compliance.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 953

I was thinking that now might be a good time to get this section rolling again.

To summarize the main positions, and their proponents:

1. The negations of the attitudinals are part of a system, from which
the current definition of {ai nai}, {e'o nai} and {e'o cu'i} deviates.
- Jorge

2. The connection between {ai nai} and the keyword "refusal" is too entrenched
in usage to depart from.
- Arnt Richard

3. If an attitudinal means one thing (e.g. {i'a nai} = refusal), it is an error
for another attitudinal to mean approximately or exactly the same
(e.g. {ai nai})
- Jorge

4. {ai nai} cannot impart the same meaning on a sentence as that of {ai}
on the negation of that sentence, ie. {ai nai broda} != {ai na broda}
- Jorge
- Robin

5. It is an error that there is no attitudinal for "accidental".
- Jorge

Have I missed some important issues? Misrepresented who supports them?

There are a number of ways out of this impasse that I can see.

  • Think long and hard and try to come up with a consistent system for attitudinal negation that applies to all of the attitudinals in such a way that the current keywords are adequate.

  • Split up {ai} into two cmavo. Keep the current form for the intent/refusal scale, and make an experimental cmavo for the delibareteness/accidentalness scale.

  • Vote on the section straight away. Ignore single vetos.


Feel free to suggest others.

--
Arnt Richard Johansen

posts: 52

On 4/10/07, arj <wikidiscuss@lojban.org> wrote:
> Re: BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
> I was thinking that now might be a good time to get this section rolling again.
>
> To summarize the main positions, and their proponents:
>
> 1. The negations of the attitudinals are part of a system, from which
> the current definition of {ai nai}, {e'o nai} and {e'o cu'i} deviates.
> - Jorge
>
> 2. The connection between {ai nai} and the keyword "refusal" is too entrenched
> in usage to depart from.
> - Arnt Richard
>
> 3. If an attitudinal means one thing (e.g. {i'a nai} = refusal), it is an error
> for another attitudinal to mean approximately or exactly the same
> (e.g. {ai nai})
> - Jorge
>
> 4. {ai nai} cannot impart the same meaning on a sentence as that of {ai}
> on the negation of that sentence, ie. {ai nai broda} != {ai na broda}
> - Jorge
> - Robin

+ bancus


> 5. It is an error that there is no attitudinal for "accidental".
> - Jorge
>
> Have I missed some important issues? Misrepresented who supports them?

Then there's my stance against propositional attitudinals. but I think
I'm alone in that. There's also my stance that we shouldn't be able to
express something with attitudinals that we can't express any other
way, which is vaguely related.

> There are a number of ways out of this impasse that I can see.
>
> * Think long and hard and try to come up with a consistent system for attitudinal negation that applies to all of the attitudinals in such a way that the current keywords are adequate.
>
> * Split up {ai} into two cmavo. Keep the current form for the intent/refusal scale, and make an experimental cmavo for the delibareteness/accidentalness scale.
>
> * Vote on the section straight away. Ignore single vetos.
>

--
Theodore Reed (treed/bancus)
www.surreality.us


On 4/10/07, arj <wikidiscuss@lojban.org> wrote:
>
> 1. The negations of the attitudinals are part of a system, from which
> the current definition of {ai nai}, {e'o nai} and {e'o cu'i} deviates.
> - Jorge

s/negations/opposites

Opposite is not the same as negation. {nai} indicates opposite, not
negation.

> 3. If an attitudinal means one thing (e.g. {i'a nai} = refusal), it is an error
> for another attitudinal to mean approximately or exactly the same
> (e.g. {ai nai})
> - Jorge

I do not subscribe to this. I merely point out that the keyword "refusal"
is more appropriate for the opposite of "acceptance", or for the opposite
of "compliance", than for the opposite of "intention". I don't have a problem
with synonymous or nearly synonymous expressions in general, they are
certainly not errors.

> 5. It is an error that there is no attitudinal for "accidental".
> - Jorge

I would call it inconvenient rather than an error.

> There are a number of ways out of this impasse that I can see.
>
> * Think long and hard and try to come up with a consistent system
> for attitudinal negation that applies to all of the attitudinals in such
> a way that the current keywords are adequate.
>
> * Split up {ai} into two cmavo. Keep the current form for the
> intent/refusal scale, and make an experimental cmavo for the
> delibareteness/accidentalness scale.

Do you mean change the meaning of {ai} to "intention to comply",
as in "Aye-aye, sir"? Or what do you mean by "the intent/refusal
scale"?

> * Vote on the section straight away. Ignore single vetos.
>
> Feel free to suggest others.

  • Move on to other sections, and come back to this when we've

gained some momentum.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


On 4/10/07, Theodore Reed <ted.reed@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Then there's my stance against propositional attitudinals. but I think
> I'm alone in that. There's also my stance that we shouldn't be able to
> express something with attitudinals that we can't express any other
> way, which is vaguely related.

Don't you rather mean that we should be able to express everything that
we can express with attitudinals in some other way as well? The way you
put it makes it sound as if you thought there were things that shouldn't
be expressible at all.

I suppose every UI can be expressed as {sei broda} for some appropriate
broda, but perhaps that still counts as an "attitudinal".

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 52

On 4/10/07, Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 4/10/07, Theodore Reed <ted.reed@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Then there's my stance against propositional attitudinals. but I think
> > I'm alone in that. There's also my stance that we shouldn't be able to
> > express something with attitudinals that we can't express any other
> > way, which is vaguely related.
>
> Don't you rather mean that we should be able to express everything that
> we can express with attitudinals in some other way as well? The way you
> put it makes it sound as if you thought there were things that shouldn't
> be expressible at all.

Yeah, you're right. Your wording is better. One of the problems that
Robin presented with doing away with irrealis is that there are
irrealis for which there is no brivla.

> I suppose every UI can be expressed as {sei broda} for some appropriate
> broda, but perhaps that still counts as an "attitudinal".
>
> mu'o mi'e xorxes
>
>
>
>


--
Theodore Reed (treed/bancus)
www.surreality.us

posts: 953

On Tue, Apr 10, 2007 at 05:36:12PM -0300, Jorge Llambías wrote:
> On 4/10/07, arj <wikidiscuss@lojban.org> wrote:
> >
> >1. The negations of the attitudinals are part of a system, from which
> > the current definition of {ai nai}, {e'o nai} and {e'o cu'i} deviates.
> > - Jorge
>
> s/negations/opposites
>
> Opposite is not the same as negation. {nai} indicates opposite, not
> negation.

Yes, of course.

> >3. If an attitudinal means one thing (e.g. {i'a nai} = refusal), it is an
> >error
> > for another attitudinal to mean approximately or exactly the same
> > (e.g. {ai nai})
> > - Jorge
>
> I do not subscribe to this. I merely point out that the keyword "refusal"
> is more appropriate for the opposite of "acceptance", or for the opposite
> of "compliance", than for the opposite of "intention". I don't have a
> problem
> with synonymous or nearly synonymous expressions in general, they are
> certainly not errors.

Is your primary problem with "ai nai" as "refusal" that it does not seem to be the opposite of "intention" in an obvious way?

> >5. It is an error that there is no attitudinal for "accidental".
> > - Jorge
>
> I would call it inconvenient rather than an error.

Does this mean that you would be content with an attitudinal system that lacked the "accidental" UI, as long as it was otherwise okay?

> >* Split up {ai} into two cmavo. Keep the current form for the
> >intent/refusal scale, and make an experimental cmavo for the
> >delibareteness/accidentalness scale.
>
> Do you mean change the meaning of {ai} to "intention to comply",
> as in "Aye-aye, sir"? Or what do you mean by "the intent/refusal
> scale"?

I mean to keep the meanings of "ai" and "ai nai" more or less the same, and perhaps replacing the keyword "refusal" with another that is kinda sorta the same, but seems like an opposite of "intent".

> * Move on to other sections, and come back to this when we've
> gained some momentum.

I fully support this. I've recently started working again on my own unfinished sections, and I encourage everyone to do the same.

Still, eventually we have to come back here and find a way to come to an agreement. It doesn't hurt to have that in the back of our heads in the mean time.

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
Your speaker should ... not be suffering for a cold, or cough, or a
hangover. If something goes wrong ... it is important that the speaker has
as similar a voice as with the original recording, waiting for another cold
to come along is not reasonable, (though some may argue that the same
hangover can easily be induced).
--Building Synthetic Voices, by Alan W. Black and Kevin A. Lenzo


posts: 14214

On Tue, Apr 10, 2007 at 02:05:40PM -0700, Theodore Reed wrote:
> On 4/10/07, Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
> >On 4/10/07, Theodore Reed <ted.reed@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> Then there's my stance against propositional attitudinals. but
> >> I think I'm alone in that. There's also my stance that we
> >> shouldn't be able to express something with attitudinals that
> >> we can't express any other way, which is vaguely related.
> >
> >Don't you rather mean that we should be able to express
> >everything that we can express with attitudinals in some other
> >way as well? The way you put it makes it sound as if you thought
> >there were things that shouldn't be expressible at all.
>
> Yeah, you're right. Your wording is better. One of the problems
> that Robin presented with doing away with irrealis is that there
> are irrealis for which there is no brivla.

There are *lots* of things for which there is no brivla; I'm not
sure how that is relevant.

-Robin


posts: 52

On 4/10/07, Robin Lee Powell <rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 10, 2007 at 02:05:40PM -0700, Theodore Reed wrote:
> > On 4/10/07, Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >On 4/10/07, Theodore Reed <ted.reed@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> Then there's my stance against propositional attitudinals. but
> > >> I think I'm alone in that. There's also my stance that we
> > >> shouldn't be able to express something with attitudinals that
> > >> we can't express any other way, which is vaguely related.
> > >
> > >Don't you rather mean that we should be able to express
> > >everything that we can express with attitudinals in some other
> > >way as well? The way you put it makes it sound as if you thought
> > >there were things that shouldn't be expressible at all.
> >
> > Yeah, you're right. Your wording is better. One of the problems
> > that Robin presented with doing away with irrealis is that there
> > are irrealis for which there is no brivla.
>
> There are *lots* of things for which there is no brivla; I'm not
> sure how that is relevant.

Because we're talking about my dislike of irrealis.

--
Theodore Reed (treed/bancus)
www.surreality.us

On 4/10/07, Theodore Reed <ted.reed@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> One of the problems that
> Robin presented with doing away with irrealis is that there are
> irrealis for which there is no brivla.

I guess he meant no gismu. Brivla is an open class, so any missing
brivla can always be included as a lujvo or eventually as a fu'ivla.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 52

On 4/10/07, Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 4/10/07, Theodore Reed <ted.reed@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > One of the problems that
> > Robin presented with doing away with irrealis is that there are
> > irrealis for which there is no brivla.
>
> I guess he meant no gismu. Brivla is an open class, so any missing
> brivla can always be included as a lujvo or eventually as a fu'ivla.

I think his point was that he doesn't want to take away the ability to
say something that is currently expressible.

--
Theodore Reed (treed/bancus)
www.surreality.us

On 4/10/07, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
>
> Is your primary problem with "ai nai" as "refusal" that it does not
> seem to be the opposite of "intention" in an obvious way?

Yes.

One can express refusal to do something by expressing that one
intends not to do it, but that does not make refusal the opposite
of intention.

Similarly one can express hatred by insulting someone, but that
does not make insult the opposite of love.


> > >5. It is an error that there is no attitudinal for "accidental".
> > > - Jorge
> >
> > I would call it inconvenient rather than an error.
>
> Does this mean that you would be content with an attitudinal system
> that lacked the "accidental" UI, as long as it was otherwise okay?

There are other useful attitudes missing, so that would be just one more.

> > >* Split up {ai} into two cmavo. Keep the current form for the
> > >intent/refusal scale, and make an experimental cmavo for the
> > >delibareteness/accidentalness scale.
> >
> > Do you mean change the meaning of {ai} to "intention to comply",
> > as in "Aye-aye, sir"? Or what do you mean by "the intent/refusal
> > scale"?
>
> I mean to keep the meanings of "ai" and "ai nai" more or less the
> same, and perhaps replacing the keyword "refusal" with another
> that is kinda sorta the same, but seems like an opposite of "intent".

"Lack of intent" or such would be fine for me.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 52

On 4/10/07, Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 4/10/07, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
> >
> > Is your primary problem with "ai nai" as "refusal" that it does not
> > seem to be the opposite of "intention" in an obvious way?
>
> Yes.
>
> One can express refusal to do something by expressing that one
> intends not to do it, but that does not make refusal the opposite
> of intention.
>
> Similarly one can express hatred by insulting someone, but that
> does not make insult the opposite of love.

ITYM:

One can express refusal to do something by expressing that one intends
not to do it, but that does not make the expression of refusal the
opposite of intention.

I don't see how this is relevant.

>
> "Lack of intent" or such would be fine for me.
>

Then what is .aicu'i?

--
Theodore Reed (treed/bancus)
www.surreality.us

On 4/10/07, Theodore Reed <ted.reed@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 4/10/07, Jorge Llambas <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On 4/10/07, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > Is your primary problem with "ai nai" as "refusal" that it does not
> > > seem to be the opposite of "intention" in an obvious way?
> >
> > Yes.
> >
> > One can express refusal to do something by expressing that one
> > intends not to do it, but that does not make refusal the opposite
> > of intention.
> >
> > Similarly one can express hatred by insulting someone, but that
> > does not make insult the opposite of love.
>
> ITYM:
>
> One can express refusal to do something by expressing that one intends
> not to do it, but that does not make the expression of refusal the
> opposite of intention.
>
> I don't see how this is relevant.
>

You mean you don't see the analogy? I wouldn't use "insult" as the
keyword for {iu nai} just as I wouldn't use "refusal" as the keyword for
{ai nai}, even if in some specific context one could use {ai nai} to
express refusal to do something, and one could use {iu nai} to insult
someone. If you ask me to do something, and I express a lack of
intention to do it, you can take that as a refusal, even though I haven't
expressed it as such. If I express hatred for you, you may feel insulted,
even if I haven't directly expressed it as an insult. In other words,
expressing a lack of intention might be one way of expressing refusal,
but that's just a secondary effect of it and only in some limited contexts.


> > "Lack of intent" or such would be fine for me.
> >
> Then what is .aicu'i?

The proposal is:

.ai cu'i (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to express indecision / hesitation / vacillation / wavering.

.ai cu'i mi ti ba te vecnu
I don't know whether I'll purchase these or not.


mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 953

On Tue, Apr 10, 2007 at 05:36:12PM -0300, Jorge Llambías wrote:
> On 4/10/07, arj <wikidiscuss@lojban.org> wrote:
> >
> >1. The negations of the attitudinals are part of a system, from which
> > the current definition of {ai nai}, {e'o nai} and {e'o cu'i} deviates.
> > - Jorge
>
> s/negations/opposites
>
> Opposite is not the same as negation. {nai} indicates opposite, not
> negation.

I've incorporated this, and other comments in the thread, into:
http://www.lojban.org/tiki/tiki-index.php?page=BPFK+working+page%3A+Opinions+regarding+attitudinals

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
Den tredje dagen* tar jeg en dusj. ... Jeg har ikke savnet � vaske
meg engang. --Erling Kagge: Alene til Sydpolen
(*dvs. den tredje dagen p� sydpolen, 53 dager etter avreise fra Patriot
Hills.)


posts: 953

On Tue, Apr 10, 2007 at 07:25:59PM -0300, Jorge Llambías wrote:
> On 4/10/07, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
> >> >* Split up {ai} into two cmavo. Keep the current form for the
> >> >intent/refusal scale, and make an experimental cmavo for the
> >> >delibareteness/accidentalness scale.
> >>
> >> Do you mean change the meaning of {ai} to "intention to comply",
> >> as in "Aye-aye, sir"? Or what do you mean by "the intent/refusal
> >> scale"?
> >
> >I mean to keep the meanings of "ai" and "ai nai" more or less the
> >same, and perhaps replacing the keyword "refusal" with another
> >that is kinda sorta the same, but seems like an opposite of "intent".
>
> "Lack of intent" or such would be fine for me.

Should I write up a counter-proposal for this section before August 13?

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
Please Note: Some Quantum Physics Theories Suggest That When the
Consumer Is Not Directly Observing This Product, It May Cease to Exist
or Will Exist Only in a Vague and Undetermined State.
--Susan Hewitt and Edward Subitzky


On 6/9/07, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
>
> Should I write up a counter-proposal for this section before August 13?

I think what we can do is wait for the deadline, then if as expected
the proposal doesn't pass you take over the section and we move the
deadline for one week later. But let's get all the other sections out of
the way first so as not to get bogged down again, yes?

mu'o mi'e xorxes


posts: 953

On Sat, Jun 09, 2007 at 10:56:12PM -0300, Jorge Llambías wrote:
> On 6/9/07, Arnt Richard Johansen <arj@nvg.org> wrote:
> >
> >Should I write up a counter-proposal for this section before August 13?
>
> I think what we can do is wait for the deadline, then if as expected
> the proposal doesn't pass you take over the section and we move the
> deadline for one week later. But let's get all the other sections out of
> the way first so as not to get bogged down again, yes?

Okay.

--
Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/
Assumption is the mother of all screw-ups. (Wethern's Law)