WikiDiscuss

Posted by xod on Sun 30 of May, 2004 21:05 GMT posts: 143

Not a bad proposal at all. However, usage of lo'e will break in fascinating ways. Currently people use lo'e for "the typical", and they make statements which should in fact be applicable with "ro" (if definitional) or with "su'o" (if observational). With intensionality, the sentence holds true even if the intensional items don't even exist. Most uses of lo'e don't meet that standard at all — if there are no lions, the typical one is not in Africa.

mu'o mi'e xod

Posted by xorxes on Sun 30 of May, 2004 21:14 GMT posts: 1912

"lo is defined to be the unspecified article. When used, it could
be intensional or extensional, specific or general. Its default
quantifiers are unspecified."

Is this in any way different from XS lo? If you think it is, I would like
to see a sentence that means one thing with XS-lo and a different
thing with RXS-lo.

The thing I have doubts about is "Its default quantifiers are
unspecified." Does that mean that the sentence with lo will
always have a quantifier, but you have to glork what it is?
If that's the case, then there's a difference from XS-lo, which
simply does not have a quantifier. Not having a quantifier means
for example that {lo broda na brode} is always equivalent to
{naku lo broda cu brode}: "brodas don't brode" = "it is not the
case that brodas brode", which obviously fails if lo has a hidden
quantifier that you have to glork.

mu'o mi'e xorxes

I wrote:
> Not having a quantifier means
> for example that {lo broda na brode} is always equivalent to
> {naku lo broda cu brode}: "brodas don't brode" = "it is not the
> case that brodas brode", which obviously fails if lo has a hidden
> quantifier that you have to glork.

The first should have been {lo broda naku brode}.

(I think {na} should only have scope to its right, but it is
defined as having scope over the whole bridi. In the case of
lo without quantifier that doesn't matter.)

mu'o mi'e xorxes

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On Sun, May 30, 2004 at 02:05:14PM -0700, wikidiscuss@lojban.org wrote:
> Re: RXS: Rob's version of XS
> Not a bad proposal at all. However, usage of lo'e will break in
> fascinating ways. Currently people use lo'e for "the typical", and
> they make statements which should in fact be applicable with "ro" (if
> definitional) or with "su'o" (if observational). With intensionality,
> the sentence holds true even if the intensional items don't even
> exist. Most uses of lo'e don't meet that standard at all — if there
> are no lions, the typical one is not in Africa.

As I've said to you offline, Rob, you should probably re-read the book'
definition of lo'e; it does not resemble yours at all.

-Robin

I'll get to RXS itself later; this is just cleaning up my inbox.
1. An arguable point: can't we talk about a typical unicorn even if there aren't any unicorns? Or maybe that is just stereotypical.

2. the conditions on intensional cases is the same as on extensional, it is just that the relevant world is different (no longer this one).
wikidiscuss@lojban.org wrote:
Re: RXS: Rob's version of XS
Not a bad proposal at all. However, usage of lo'e will break in fascinating ways. Currently people use lo'e for "the typical", and they make statements which should in fact be applicable with "ro" (if definitional) or with "su'o" (if observational). 2.With intensionality, the sentence holds true even if the intensional items don't even exist. 1.Most uses of lo'e don't meet that standard at all — if there are no lions, the typical one is not in Africa.

1. I still don't understand what the sense of "intensional" is in which there can be an intensional gadri: I know about intensional contexts and intesional objects and intensional definitions, but this one escapes me. Also, {lo} is by every definition I know of inspecific — do you mean particular? And I think the best thing to say about the generic {lo} — which I gather is what is being shor for here — is that quantifiers are irrelevant to it — it ranges betwen none and all but at no requir4ed place in there (and mere numbers as opposed to weights don't seettle cases anyhow).

2. This negation transparency holds in general, but is logically shakey because, while numbers do not strictly matter, they are really there behind it all. However, I would not feel at all uncomfortable (I think the odds are very low of problems) because of the vagueness of the claim from a numeric point of view.
wikidiscuss@lojban.org wrote:
Re: RXS: Rob's version of XS

1."lo is defined to be the unspecified article. When used, it could
be intensional or extensional, specific or general. Its default
quantifiers are unspecified."

Is this in any way different from XS lo? If you think it is, I would like
to see a sentence that means one thing with XS-lo and a different
thing with RXS-lo.

The thing I have doubts about is "Its default quantifiers are
unspecified." Does that mean that the sentence with lo will
always have a quantifier, but you have to glork what it is?
If that's the case, then there's a difference fom XS-lo, which
2.simply does not have a quantifier. Not having a quantifier means
for example that {lo broda na brode} is always equivalent to
{naku lo broda cu brode}: "brodas don't brode" = "it is not the
case that brodas brode", which obviously fails if lo has a hidden
quantifier that you have to glork.

mu'o mi'e xorxes

John E Clifford wrote:

>I'll get to RXS itself later; this is just cleaning up my inbox.
>1. An arguable point: can't we talk about a typical unicorn even if there aren't any unicorns? Or maybe that is just stereotypical.
>
>2. the conditions on intensional cases is the same as on extensional, it is just that the relevant world is different (no longer this one).
>
>

Consider the case of fearing something which doesn't actually exist.

--
Motorists honked in celebration in this Ramadi as news spread of the assassination of the president of the Iraqi Governing Council Ezzidin Salim Monday. "The GC is nothing," one man shouted. "They are not the Governing Council. They are the Prostitution Council."

1. OK. What is the probolem here. There is nothing in the external world thatI fear. But surely there is something in the world of my beliefs or imagination or wherever it s that the objects of fear reside. Otherwise by what right is it that we say I fear something?
xod <xod@thestonecutters.net> wrote:John E Clifford wrote:

>I'll get to RXS itself later; this is just cleaning up my inbox.
>1. An arguable point: can't we talk about a typical unicorn even if there aren't any unicorns? Or maybe that is just stereotypical.
>
>2. the conditions on intensional cases is the same as on extensional, it is just that the relevant world is different (no longer this one).
>
>

1.Consider the case of fearing something which doesn't actually exist.

--
Motorists honked in celebration in this Ramadi as news spread of the assassination of the president of the Iraqi Governing Council Ezzidin Salim Monday. "The GC is nothing," one man shouted. "They are not the Governing Council. They are the Prostitution Council."

It's possible to fear something which no longer exists or which never
existed. The fear is real and in this world regardless of the reality of
the feared. That's about all I have to report about the fact that
existence is not a factor in intensional references, while it is for
extensions and typicals.

John E Clifford wrote:

>1. OK. What is the probolem here. There is nothing in the external world thatI fear. But surely there is something in the world of my beliefs or imagination or wherever it s that the objects of fear reside. Otherwise by what right is it that we say I fear something?
>xod <xod@thestonecutters.net> wrote:John E Clifford wrote:
>
>
>
>>I'll get to RXS itself later; this is just cleaning up my inbox.
>>1. An arguable point: can't we talk about a typical unicorn even if there aren't any unicorns? Or maybe that is just stereotypical.
>>
>>2. the conditions on intensional cases is the same as on extensional, it is just that the relevant world is different (no longer this one).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>1.Consider the case of fearing something which doesn't actually exist.
>
>
>
>
>

--
Motorists honked in celebration in this Ramadi as news spread of the assassination of the president of the Iraqi Governing Council Ezzidin Salim Monday. "The GC is nothing," one man shouted. "They are not the Governing Council. They are the Prostitution Council."

1. Right. But if I fear unicorns, the unicorns in my mental world which are the object of my fear are under the same rules — in that mental world — as the cows I kick are in this external world. Note that the fear is in this world, only its object is in the other (which is why it is useful to mark the points where we pass from one world to the next to find references).
xod <xod@thestonecutters.net> wrote:1.It's possible to fear something which no longer exists or which never
existed. The fear is real and in this world regardless of the reality of
the feared. That's about all I have to report about the fact that
existence is not a factor in intensional references, while it is for
extensions and typicals.

John E Clifford wrote:

>1. OK. What is the probolem here. There is nothing in the external world thatI fear. But surely there is something in the world of my beliefs or imagination or wherever it s that the objects of fear reside. Otherwise by what right is it that we say I fear something?
>xod wrote:John E Clifford wrote:
>
>
>
>>I'll get to RXS itself later; this is just cleaning up my inbox.
>>1. An arguable point: can't we talk about a typical unicorn even if there aren't any unicorns? Or maybe that is just stereotypical.
>>
>>2. the conditions on intensional cases is the same as on extensional, it is just that the relevant world is different (no longer this one).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>1.Consider the case of fearing something which doesn't actually exist.
>
>
>
>
>

--
Motorists honked in celebration in this Ramadi as news spread of the assassination of the president of the Iraqi Governing Council Ezzidin Salim Monday. "The GC is nothing," one man shouted. "They are not the Governing Council. They are the Prostitution Council."

la djan terpa cidapo'o i go'i lo bakni e
lo pavyseljirna e le gerku pe le dy lamji xabju
"John fears only three things: cows,
unicorns, and his neighbour's dog."

lo'i se terpa be la djan cu du lo bakni ce
lo pavyseljirna ce le gerku pe le dy lamji xabju
"The set of all things feared by John is the
three-membered-set: {cows, unicorns, his neighbour's dog}"

mu'o mi'e xorxes

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Well, in the first I remain uncertain what kind of an event a three somethings is. The second is a puzzle: I am tempted to say that it is a verbal trick, since it cannot be derived from the first (properly presented) and yet it looks so reasonable. It way be yet another argument for something other than {lo} in some places — though it is hard to see what will work. I am inclined to say the first may be true but the second is clearly false.
Jorge Llambías <jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar> wrote:
la djan terpa cidapo'o i go'i lo bakni e
lo pavyseljirna e le gerku pe le dy lamji xabju
"John fears only three things: cows,
unicorns, and his neighbour's dog."

lo'i se terpa be la djan cu du lo bakni ce
lo pavyseljirna ce le gerku pe le dy lamji xabju
"The set of all things feared by John is the
three-membered-set: {cows, unicorns, his neighbour's dog}"

mu'o mi'e xorxes

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